Africa
Sahel – conflicts, coups and migration bombs (I)
by Teodor Dechev
The beginning of the new cycle of violence in the Sahel countries can be tentatively linked to the Arab Spring. The link isn’t really symbolic and it’s not related to someone’s “inspirational example”. The direct link is related to the participation of the Tuareg armed militias, which for decades have been fighting for the creation of an independent state – mostly in the northern part of Mali. [1]
During the civil war in Libya, during the lifetime of Muammar Gaddafi, the Tuareg militias sided with him, but after his death, they returned to Mali with all their heavy and light weapons. The sudden appearance of much stronger than before Tuareg paramilitaries, who are literally armed to the teeth, is bad news for the authorities in Mali, but also for other countries in the region. The reason is that a transformation has taken place among the Tuareg and some of their armed factions have “rebranded” themselves from fighters for national independence into Uzhkim Islamist militant formations. [2]
This phenomenon, in which ethnocentric formations with a long history, suddenly embrace “jihadi” slogans and practices, the author of these lines calls “double bottom organizations”. Such phenomena are not a specialty of West Africa alone, such is the “God’s Resistance Army” in Uganda, as well as various Islamist armed formations in the southernmost islands of the Philippine archipelago. [2], [3]
Things in West Africa came together in such a way that after 2012-2013, the region became a battleground where “franchises” of global terrorist networks, which to a greater or lesser extent can be called “terrorist” disorganizations”, due to their particular structure, rules and leadership, which are the negation of classical organizations. [1], [2]
In Mali, the Tuareg, newly minted Islamists, in confrontation with al-Qaeda but in alliance with Salafist formations that did not belong to either the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, attempted to create an independent state in northern Mali. [2] In response, the Malian authorities launched a military operation against the Tuareg and jihadists, which was supported by France with a mandate from the UN Security Council – under the so-called UN Stabilization Mission in Mali – Minusma.
Operations Serval and Barhan begin one after the other, Operation Serval is a French military operation in Mali conducted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. The resolution was voted on at the request of the Malian authorities, with no one, including Russia, objecting, let alone a Security Council veto. The goal of the operation with the mandate of the UN is to defeat the forces of the jihadists and the Tuareg “organizations with a double bottom” in the northern part of Mali, which are beginning to make their way to the central part of the country.
In the course of the operation, three of the five leaders of the Islamists were killed – Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, Abdel Krim and Omar Ould Hamaha. Mokhtar Belmokhtar fled to Libya and Iyad ag Ghali escaped to Algeria. Operation Serval (named after the famously lovable African wild cat) ended on 15 July 2014 to be succeeded by Operation Barhan, which began on 1 August 2014.
Operation Barhan is taking place on the territory of five Sahel countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. 4,500 French soldiers are participating, and the five countries of the Sahel (G5 – Sahel) are training about 5,000 soldiers to join the anti-terrorist operations.
The attempt to secede the northern part of Mali into some kind of Tuareg-Islamist state failed. Operations “Serval” and “Barkhan” are achieving their immediate objectives. The ambitions of Islamists and “double bottom organizations” are over. The bad thing is that this does not put an end to the violence and, accordingly, to the hostilities in the Sahel. Although defeated and forced to think first and foremost about how to hide from the forces of France and the G5-Sahel countries, the Islamic radicals are turning to guerrilla warfare, turning at times into simple banditry.
Although after the Serwal and Barkhan operations, the Islamic radicals are no longer able to achieve any strategic successes, at least at first sight, the number of attacks against civilians is not decreasing, but in certain places is increasing. This creates an extremely nervous and unhealthy environment, which is taken advantage of by ambitious military men who do not share the view that the army belongs in the barracks.
On the one hand, the African army is a social elevator. It enables a person to rise to some kind of meritocratic principle. On the other hand, the practice of military coups in Africa is so widespread that aspiring army commanders do not seem to consider it a crime at all.
As STATISTA data shows, between January 1950 and July 2023 there were about 220 successful and failed coup attempts in Africa, accounting for almost half (44 percent of all coup attempts in the world. Including failed attempts, Sudan tops the list of African countries with the most coups since 1950 with a total of 17. After Sudan, Burundi (11), Ghana and Sierra Leone (10) are the countries with the most coup attempts since the mid-20th century.
In today’s situation in the Sahel, following the initial advance of radical Islamists and “double bottom organizations” in northern Mali and the corresponding counterattack by the armed forces of the G5 Sahel countries and France, the main concern is personal security of people. Some citizens of different countries in the region share similar feelings, which can be summed up in the aphorism of a citizen of Burkina Faso: “During the day we tremble lest the military from the regular army come, and at night we tremble lest the Islamists come.”
It is precisely this situation that gives courage to certain circles among the military to reach for power. This is basically justified by the thesis that the current government does not cope with the terror imposed by Islamic radicals. It should be noted that the moment was chosen quite precisely – on the one hand, the jihadists are defeated and their ability to permanently seize territories is not so great. At the same time, attacks by Islamic radicals remain very dangerous and deadly for many civilians. Thus, the military in some countries take advantage of the work done by the UN and G5 Sahel forces against troublemakers and at the same time (quite hypocritically) raise the issue that their territories are not pacified and their “competence” is needed intervention.
One might argue that at one point Burkina Faso, where the authorities are believed to have secure control of just 60 percent of the country’s territory as of early 2022, has proved to be an exception. [40] This is true, but only in parts. It should be clear that Islamic radicals do not exercise control over the remaining 40 percent of the territory in the sense that the word “control” could be used under the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq or the attempt to secede the northern Tuareg-populated part slow down. There is no local administration here that has been installed by the Islamists, and no de facto control at least over basic communications. It’s just that the rebels can commit crimes with relative impunity, and that’s why critics of the government at the time (and probably the current one as well) believe that this part of the country’s territory is not under the control of the authorities. [9], [17], [40]
In any case, the undeniably extremely painful issue of constant attacks by Islamic radicals has given moral justification (at least in their own eyes) for the military in some Sahel countries to take power by force, justifying their actions with concern for the security of the people. The last such coup to hit the region was the coup d’état in Niger, where General Abdurahman Tiani seized power on 26 July 2023. [22]
It is important to say here that the coup in Gabon, which is arguably the most recent possible coup in West Africa, cannot be seen in the same context as that created by the processes taking place in the Sahel countries. [10], [14] Unlike Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, there is no hostilities between government forces and Islamic radicals in Gabon, and the coup is aimed, at least for now, against the presidential family, the Bongo family, who already rule Gabon 56 years.
Anyway, it should be emphasized that after the period of relative calm between 2013 and 2020, there were 13 coup attempts in Africa, including in Sudan, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali. [4], [32]
Here we have to point out as somewhat related to the current new maelstrom of political instability in West Africa, particularly in the Sahel, the ongoing violence in the Central African Republic (CAR), where two civil wars have been fought back-to-back. The first, known as the Central African Republic Bush War, began in 2004 and ended formally with a de jure peace agreement in 2007, and de facto in March 2013. The second, known as the “civil war in the Central African Republic” (Central African Republic Civil War), began in April 2013 and has not ended to this day, although government troops have now laid hands on the largest part of the territory of the country they once controlled.
Needless to say, a country that is extremely poor, its human development index is at the lowest possible levels of the ranking (the last place, at least until 2021 was reserved for Niger) and the risk of undertaking any economic activity is extremely high, is practically a “failed state” and sooner or later becomes prey to various political and military vultures. To this category we can in good conscience refer Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan from the group of countries considered in this analysis.
At the same time, the list of countries in Africa where the Russian private military company Wagner has been confirmed to have a noticeable and government-agreed presence includes Mali, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Madagascar. [4], [39]
A comparison between the list of “failed states” ravaged by civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, military coups and other such misfortunes and the list of countries where PMC Wagner mercenaries “work” ostensibly in favor of legitimate governments shows a remarkable coincidence.
Mali, the Central African Republic and South Sudan feature prominently on both lists. There is still no confirmed data on the official presence of PMC “Wagner” in Burkina Faso, but there are enough indications of Russian intervention and support in favor of the latest coup plotters in the country, not to mention the rampant pro-Russian sentiments, already to the fact that the mercenaries of the late Prigozhin had already managed to “distinguish themselves” in the neighboring country of Mali. [9], [17]
In fact, PMC Wagner’s “appearances” in the Central African Republic and in Mali should rather cause horror among Africans. Russian mercenaries’ penchant for mass slaughter and brutality have been public since the Syrian period in their appearances, but their exploits in Africa, especially in the aforementioned CAR and Mali, are also well documented. [34] At the end of July 2022, the commander of French forces in the UN-flagged Operation Barhan, General Laurent Michon, directly accused PMC Wagner of “looting Mali”. [24]
In fact, as already mentioned above, the events in Mali and Burkina Faso are connected and follow the same pattern. The “contagion” of radical Islamist violence started in Mali. It went through a Tuareg-Islamist insurgency in the north of the country and, after the defeat of the rebels by the UN forces and the G5 – Sahel, then took the form of guerrilla warfare, violence against the civilian population and outright banditry in the middle part of Mali, where he sought the support of the Fulani or Fulbe people (a very important issue that will be analyzed in detail later) and moved to Burkina Faso. Analysts even talked about Burkina Faso becoming the “new epicenter of violence”. [17]
However, an important detail is that in August 2020, a military coup overthrew the elected president of Mali – Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. This had a bad effect on the fight against the jihadists, because the military that came to power looked with distrust on the UN force, which consisted mainly of French soldiers. They rightly suspected that the French did not approve of the military coup. That is why the new, self-appointed authorities in Mali hastened to demand the termination of UN operations (especially the French) in Mali. At that very moment, the country’s military rulers were more afraid of the UN-mandated French forces on their territory than of Islamic radicals.
The UN Security Council ended the peacekeeping operation in Mali very quickly and the French began to withdraw, apparently without much regret. Then the military junta in Bamako remembered that the guerilla war of the Islamic radicals had not ended at all and sought other external help, which appeared in the form of PMC “Wagner” and the Russian Federation, which is always ready to serve like-minded statesmen. Events developed very quickly and PMC “Wagner” left deep footprints of its shoes in the sands of Mali. [34], [39]
The coup in Mali triggered the “domino effect” – two coups followed in one year in Burkina Faso (!), and then in Niger and Gabon. The pattern and motivations (or rather justifications) for carrying out the coups in Burkina Faso were identical to those in Mali. After 2015, violence, sabotage and armed attacks by Islamic radicals increased sharply. The various “franchises” of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (the Islamic State of West Africa, the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, etc.) and independent Salafist formations have killed thousands of civilians, and the number of “internally displaced”, you understand – refugees has exceeded two million people. Thus, Burkina Faso acquired the dubious reputation of being “the new epicenter of the Sahel conflict.” [9]
On January 24, 2022, the military in Burkina Faso, led by Paul-Henri Damiba, overthrew President Roch Kabore, who had ruled the country for six years, after several days of rioting in the capital, Ouagadougou. [9], [17], [32] But on September 30, 2022, for the second time in the same year, another coup was carried out. The self-appointed president Paul-Henri Damiba was overthrown by the equally ambitious captain Ibrahim Traore. After ousting the current president, Traore also dissolved the transitional government created by Damiba and suspended (finally) the constitution. In no uncertain terms, the army spokesman said that a group of officers had decided to remove Damiba because of his inability to deal with the armed insurgency of Islamic radicals. That he belongs to the same institution that has failed to deal with jihadists under two successive presidents for about seven years does not faze him at all. Moreover, he openly states that “in the last nine months” (that is, right after the military coup in January 2022 with his participation), “the situation has worsened”. [9]
In general, a model of violent seizure of power is being created in countries where there is an intensification of the subversive work of Islamic radicals. Once the UN forces (understand the “bad” French and the G5 – Sahel troops) break the offensive drive of the jihadists and the fighting remains in the sphere of guerilla warfare, sabotage and attacks on the civilian population, the local military in a given country considers that its hour has struck; it is said that the fight against radical Islamists is not successful and … takes power.
Undoubtedly, a comfortable situation – the Islamic radicals no longer have the strength to enter your capital and establish some form of “Islamic State” for you, and at the same time, the fighting is far from over and there is something to scare the population. A separate issue is that a large part of the population is afraid of their “native” army for a number of reasons. They range from the irresponsibility of army commanders to disparities in the tribal affiliation of the same generals.
To all this, the frank horror of the methods of “Wagner”, who are supporters of “radical actions” and “industrial logging”, has already been added. [39]
It is here that we must leave for a moment the long flight over the history of the Islamic penetration into West Africa and pay attention to a coincidence that is most likely not accidental. In search of human resources for their cause, especially after being largely abandoned by the Tuareg militias following the failure of the insurgency in northern Mali, Islamic radicals are turning to the Fulani, a semi-nomadic people of hereditary herders who engage in migratory pastoralism in a belt from the Gulf of Guinea to the Red Sea, south of the Sahara desert.
The Fulani (also known as Fula, Fulbe, Hilani, Philata, Fulau, and even Pyol, depending on which of the many languages spoken in the region) are one of the first African peoples to convert to Islam and by virtue of their lifestyle and livelihood are to a certain extent marginalized and discriminated against. In fact, the geographical distribution of the Fulani looks like this:
The Fulani number approximately 16,800,000 in Nigeria out of a total population of 190 million; 4,900,000 in Guinea (with capital Conakry) out of 13 million inhabitants); 3,500,000 in Senegal out of a country of 16 million; 3,000,000 in Mali out of 18.5 million inhabitants; 2,900,000 in Cameroon out of 24 million inhabitants; 1,600,000 in Niger out of 21 million inhabitants; 1,260,000 in Mauritania out of 4.2 million inhabitants; 1,200,000 in Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) out of a population of 19 million; 580,000 in Chad out of a population of 15 million; 320,000 in The Gambia out of a population of 2 million; 320,000 in Guinea-Bissau out of a population of 1.9 million; 310,000 in Sierra Leone out of a population of 6.2 million; 250,000 in the Central African Republic of 5.4 million inhabitants (with researchers stressing that this is half of the country’s Muslim population, which in turn is about 10% of the population); 4,600 in Ghana out of a population of 28 million; and 1,800 in Côte d’Ivoire out of a population of 23.5 million. [38] A Fulani community has also been established in Sudan along the pilgrimage route to Mecca. Unfortunately, the Sudanese Fulani are the least studied community and their numbers was not assessed during official censuses.[38]
As a percentage of the population, the Fulani make up 38% of the population in Guinea (with capital Conakry), 30% in Mauritania, 22% in Senegal, just under 17% in Guinea-Bissau, 16% in Mali and Gambia, 12% in Cameroon, almost 9% in Nigeria, 7.6% in Niger, 6.3% in Burkina Faso, 5% in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, just under 4% of the population in Chad and very small shares in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire Ivory. [38]
Several times in history, the Fulani have created empires. Three examples can be cited:
• In the 18th century, they established the theocratic state of Futa-Jalon in Central Guinea;
• In the 19th century, the Massina Empire in Mali (1818 – 1862), established by Sekou Amadou Barii, then Amadou Sekou Amadou, who succeeded in conquering the great city of Timbuktu.
• Also in the 19th century, the Sokoto Empire was established in Nigeria.
These empires proved to be unstable state entities, however, and today, there is no state that is controlled by the Fulani. [38]
As already noted, traditionally the Fulani are migratory, semi-nomadic pastoralists. They have remained so for the most part, even if it is considered that a number of them have gradually become settled, both because of the limitations imposed on them by the continuous expansion of the desert in certain regions, and because of their dispersion, and because some governments have created programs aimed at guiding the nomadic population to a sedentary lifestyle. [7], [8], [11], [19], [21], [23], [25], [42]
The vast majority of them are Muslims, almost all of them in a number of countries. Historically, they played an important role in the penetration of Islam into West Africa.
The Malian writer and thinker Amadou Hampate Bâ (1900-1991), who himself belongs to the Fulani people, recalling the way in which they are perceived by other communities, makes a comparison with the Jews, as much as the Jews before the creation of Israel , they have been dispersed in many countries, where they generate repeated insults from other communities, which do not vary much from country to country: the Fulani are often perceived by others as prone to communitarianism, nepotism and treachery. [38]
The traditional conflicts in the migration areas of the Fulani, between them, on the one hand, as semi-nomadic herders and settled farmers of different ethnic groups, on the other, and the fact that they are more present than other ethnic groups in a large number of countries (and therefore in contact with different groups of the population), doubtless contribute to the explanation of this reputation, too often maintained by the population with which they entered into opposition and dispute. [8], [19], [23], [25], [38]
The idea that they are pre-emptively developing vectors of jihadism is much more recent and can be explained by the role of the Fulani in the noted not so long ago rise of terrorism in the central part of Mali – in the Masina region and in the bend of the Niger River . [26], [28], [36], [41]
When talking about the emerging points of contact between the Fulani and the “Jihadists”, it must always be borne in mind that historically throughout Africa, conflicts have arisen and continue to exist between settled farmers and pastoralists, who are usually nomadic or semi-nomadic and have the practice of migrating and moving with their herds. Farmers accuse cattle herders of ravaging their crops with their herds, and herders complain of livestock theft, difficult access to water bodies and hindrances to their movement. [38]
But since 2010, the increasingly numerous and deadly conflicts have taken on a completely different dimension, especially in the Sahel region. Hand-to-hand combat and club fights have been replaced by shooting with Kalashnikov assault rifles. [5], [7], [8], [41]
The continuous expansion of agricultural land, imposed by very rapid population growth, gradually limits the areas for grazing and animal husbandry. Meanwhile, severe droughts in the 1970s and 1980s prompted herders to migrate south to areas where settled people were unaccustomed to competing with nomads. In addition, the priority given to policies for the development of intensive animal husbandry tend to marginalize nomads. [12], [38]
Left out of development policies, migrant pastoralists often feel discriminated against by the authorities, feel that they live in a hostile environment and mobilize to protect their interests. In addition, terrorist groups and militias fighting in West and Central Africa are trying to use their frustration to win them over. [7], [10], [12], [14], [25], [26]
At the same time, the majority of pastoral nomads in the region are Fulani, who are also the only nomads to be found in all countries of the region.
The nature of some of the Fulani empires mentioned above, as well as the distinct warlike tradition of the Fulani, has led many observers to believe that Fulani involvement in the emergence of terrorist jihadism in central Mali since 2015 is in some sense a combined product of the historical heritage and identity of the Fulani people, who are presented as the bête noire (“black beast”). The participation of the Fulani in the growth of this terrorist threat in Burkina Faso or even in Niger seems to confirm this view. [30], [38]
When talking about the historical legacy, it should be noted that the Fulani played an important role in the resistance against French colonialism, especially in Futa-Jalon and the surrounding regions – the territories that would become the French colonies of Guinea, Senegal and French Sudan.
Furthermore, the important distinction must be made that while the Fulani played an important role in the creation of a new terrorist center in Burkina Faso, the situation in Niger is different: it is true that there are periodic attacks by groups composed of Fulani, but these are external attackers. coming from Mali. [30], [38]
In practice, however, the situation of the Fulani varies greatly from country to country, whether it is their way of life (degree of settlement, level of education, etc.), the way they perceive themselves, or even the way , according to which they are perceived by others.
Before proceeding with a more in-depth analysis of the various modes of interaction between the Fulani and the jihadists, a significant coincidence should be noted, to which we will return towards the end of this analysis. It was stated that the Fulani live scattered in Africa – from the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean in the west, to the shores of the Red Sea in the east. They live practically along one of the most ancient trade routes in Africa – the route running immediately along the southern edge of the Sahara desert, which to this day is also one of the most important routes along which migratory agriculture takes place in the Sahel .
If, on the other hand, we look at the map of the countries where PMC “Wagner” carries out official activities, in aid of the relevant government forces (regardless of whether the government is at all legal or came to power as a result of a recent coup – see especially Mali and Burkina Faso ), we will see that there is a serious overlap between the countries where the Fulani reside and where the “Wagnerovites” operate.
On the one hand, this can be attributed to coincidence. PMC “Wagner” relatively successfully parasitises countries where there are severe internal conflicts, and if they are civil wars – even better. With Prigozhin or without Prigozhin (some people still consider him alive), PMC “Wagner” will not budge from its positions. Firstly, because it has to fulfill contracts for which money has been taken, and secondly, because such is the geopolitical mandate of the central government in the Russian Federation.
There is no greater falsification than the declaration of “Wagner” as a “private military company” – PMC. One would rightly ask what is “private” about a company that was created at the behest of the central government, armed by it, assigned tasks of prime importance (first in Syria, then elsewhere), provides it is “personal staff”, through the parole of prisoners with heavy sentences. With such “service” by the state, it is more than misleading, it is downright perverse, to call “Wagner” a “private company”.
PMC “Wagner” is an instrument of the realization of Putin’s geopolitical ambitions and is responsible for the penetration of “Russky Mir” in places where it is not “hygienic” for the regular Russian army to appear in all its parade official form. The company usually appears where there is great political instability to offer its services like a modern-day Mephistopheles. The Fulani have the misfortune of living in places where political instability is very high, so at first glance their clash with PMC Wagner should not come as a surprise.
On the other hand, however, the opposite is also true. “Wagner” PMCs extremely methodically “moved” along the route of the already mentioned ancient trade route – today’s key migratory cattle-breeding route, part of which even coincides with the route of many African nations for the Hajj in Mecca. The Fulani are about thirty million people and if they are radicalized, they could cause a conflict that would have the character of at least an all-African war.
Up to this point in our time, countless regional wars have been fought in Africa with huge casualties and incalculable damage and destruction. But there are at least two wars that claim the albeit unofficial labels of “African world wars”, in other words – wars that involved a large number of countries on the continent and beyond. These are the two wars in the Congo (today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo). The first lasted from October 24, 1996 to May 16, 1997 (more than six months) and led to the replacement of the dictator of the then country of Zaire – Mobuto Sese Seko with Laurent-Désiré Kabila. 18 countries and paramilitary organizations are directly involved in the hostilities, supported by 3 + 6 countries, some of which are not completely open. The war was also to some extent triggered by the genocide in neighboring Rwanda, which led to a wave of refugees in the DR Congo (then Zaire).
As soon as the First Congo War ended, the victorious Allies came into conflict with each other and it quickly turned into the Second Congo War, also known as the “Great African War”, which lasted almost five years, from August 2, 1998 to July 18, 2003. The number of paramilitary organizations involved in this war is almost impossible to ascertain, but suffice it to say that on the side of Laurent-Désiré Kabila are fighting contingents from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Sudan, while against the regime in Kinshasa are Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. As researchers always emphasize, some of the “helpers” intervene completely uninvited.
In the course of the war, the president of the DR Congo, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, died and was replaced by Joseph Kabila. Besides all the possible cruelty and destruction, the war is also remembered for the total extermination of 60,000 pygmy civilians (!), as well as about 10,000 pygmy warriors. The war ended with an agreement that saw the formal withdrawal of all foreign forces from DR Congo, the appointment of Joseph Kabila as interim president, and the swearing in of four pre-agreed vice presidents, depending on the interests of all warring parties. In 2006, general elections were held, as they might be held in a Central African country that has experienced two consecutive intercontinental wars within more than six years.
The example of the two wars in the Congo can give us some rough idea of what could happen if a war was ignited in the Sahel involving the 30 million Fulani people. We cannot doubt that a similar scenario has long been considered in the countries of the region, and especially in Moscow, where they probably think that with the engagements of PMC “Wagner” in Mali, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR and Cameroon ( as well as in the DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Madagascar), they “keep their hand on the counter” of a large-scale conflict that could be provoked out of necessity.
Moscow’s ambitions to be a factor in Africa are not from yesterday at all. In the USSR, there was an exceptionally prepared school of intelligence officers, diplomats and, above all, military specialists who were ready to intervene in one or another region of the continent if necessary. A large part of the countries in Africa were mapped by the Soviet General Administration of Geodesy and Cartography (back in 1879 – 1928) and the “Wagners” can count on very good information support.
There are strong indications of strong Russian influence in carrying out the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso. At this stage, there are no allegations of Russian involvement in the Niger coup, with US Secretary of State Blinken personally dismissing such a possibility. The latter, of course, does not mean at all that during his lifetime Prigozhin did not welcome the coup plotters and did not offer the services of his “private” military company.
In the spirit of the former Marxist traditions, here too Russia operates with a minimum program and a maximum program. The minimum is to “set foot” in more countries, seize “outposts”, create influence among local elites, especially among the military, and exploit as many valuable local minerals as possible. PMC “Wagner” has already achieved results in this regard.
The maximum program is to gain control over the entire Sahel region and let Moscow decide what will happen there – peace or war. Someone would reasonably say: “yes, of course – it makes sense to collect the money of the coup governments and dig up as much valuable mineral resources as possible. But what the hell do the Russians need to control the existence of the Sahel countries?”.
The answer to this reasonable question lies in the fact that in the event of a military conflict in the Sahel, flows of refugees will rush to Europe. These will be masses of people that cannot be contained by police forces alone. We will witness scenes and ugly sights with a huge propaganda charge. Most likely, European countries will try to accept part of the refugees, at the expense of detaining others in Africa, who will have to be supported by the EU due to their complete defenselessness.
For Moscow, all this would be a paradisiacal scenario that Moscow would not hesitate to set in motion at a given moment, if given the opportunity. It is clear that the capacity of France to play the role of a major peacekeeping force is in question, and also in question is the desire of France to continue to perform such functions, especially after the case in Mali and the termination of the UN mission there. In Moscow, they are not worried about carrying out nuclear blackmail, but what is left for detonating a “migration bomb”, in which there is no radioactive radiation, but the effect can still be devastating.
Precisely for these reasons, the processes in the Sahel countries should be followed and studied in depth, including by Bulgarian scientists and specialists. Bulgaria is at the forefront of the migration crisis and the authorities in our country are obliged to exert the necessary influence on the policy of EU in order to be prepared for such “contingencies”.
Part two follows
Sources used:
[1] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, The Rise of Global Terrorist Disorganizations. Terrorist franchising and rebranding of terrorist groups, Jubilee collection in honor of the 90th anniversary of Prof. D.I.N. Toncho Trandafilov, VUSI Publishing House, pp. 192 – 201 (in Bulgarian).
[2] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, “Double bottom” or “schizophrenic bifurcation”? The interaction between ethno-nationalist and religious-extremist motives in the activities of some terrorist groups, Sp. Politics and Security; Year I; no. 2; 2017; pp. 34 – 51, ISSN 2535-0358 (in Bulgarian).
[3] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, Terrorist “franchises” of the Islamic State seize bridgeheads in the Philippines. The environment of the Mindanao island group offers excellent conditions for the strengthening and growth of terrorist groups with a “double bottom”, Research Papers of the Graduate School of Security and Economics; Volume III; 2017; pp. 7 – 31, ISSN 2367-8526 (in Bulgarian).
[4] Fleck, Anna, A renewed wave of coups in Africa?, 03/08/2023, blacksea-caspia (in Bulgarian).
[5] Ajala, Olayinka, New drivers of conflict in Nigeria: an analysis of the clashes between farmers and pastoralists, Third World Quarterly, Volume 41, 2020, Issue 12, (published online 09 September 2020), pp. 2048-2066
[6] Benjaminsen, Tor A. and Boubacar Ba, Fulani-Dogon killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, African Security, Vol. 14, 2021, Issue 1, (Published online: 13 May 2021)
[7] Boukhars, Anouar and Carl Pilgrim, In Disorder, they Thrive: How Rural Distress Fuels Militancy and Banditry in the Central Sahel, March 20, 2023, Middle East Institute
[8] Brottem, Leif and Andrew McDonnell, Pastoralism and Conflict in the Sudano-Sahel: A Review of the Literature, 2020, Search for Common Ground
[9] Burkina Faso”s coup and political situation: All you need to know, October 5, 2022, Al Jazeera
[10] Cherbib, Hamza, Jihadism in the Sahel: Exploiting Local Disorders, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2018, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed)
[11] Cissé, Modibo Ghaly, Understanding Fulani Perspectives on the Sahel Crisis, April 22, 2020, Africa Center for Strategic Studies
[12] Clarkson, Alexander, Scapegoating the Fulani is Fueling the Sahel”s Cycle of Violance, July 19, 2023, World Political Review (WPR)
[13] Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Sahel, April 1, 2021, JSTOR, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
[14] Cline, Lawrence E., Jihadist Movements in the Sahel: Rise of the Fulani?, March 2021, Terrorism and Political Violence, 35 (1), pp. 1-17
[15] Cold-Raynkilde, Signe Marie and Boubacar Ba, Unpacking “new climate wars”: Actors and drivers of conflict in the Sahel, DIIS – Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS REPORT 2022: 04
[16] Courtright, James, Ethnic Killings by West African Armies are Undermining Regional Security. By joining hands with militias that target Fulani civilians, state forces risk sparking a wider conflict, March 7, 2023, Foreign Policy
[17] Durmaz, Mucahid, How Burkina Faso became the epicentre of conflict in the Sahel. Casualities in the West Africa state are eclipsing those in its neighbour mali, the birthplace of the conflict, 11 March 2022, Al Jazeera
[18] Equizi, Massimo, The true role of ethnicity in Sahelian herder-farmer conflicts, January 20, 2023, PASRES – Pastoralism, Uncertinity, Resilience
[19] Ezenwa, Olumba E. and Thomas Stubbs, Herder-farmer conflict in the Sahel needs a new description: why “eco-violance” fits, July 12, 2022, The Conversation
[20] Ezenwa, Olumba, What”s in a Name? Making the Case for the Sahel Conflict as “Eco-violance, July 15, 2022
[21] Ezenwa, Olumba E., Nigeria”s deadly conflicts over water and grazing pasture are escalating – here”s why, Smart Water Magazine, November 4, 2022
[22] Fact Sheet: Military Coup in Niger, 3 August 2023, ACLED
[23] Farmer-Herder Conflict between Fulani and Zarma in Niger, Climate Diplomacy. 2014
[24] French Commander Accuses Wagner of “Preying” on Mali, Author – Staff writer with the AFP, The Defense Post, July 22, 2022
[25] Gaye, Sergine-Bamba, Conflicts between farmers and herders against a backdrop of asymmetric threats in Mali and Burkina Faso, 2018, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Saharan Africa, ISBN: 978-2-490093-07-6
[26] Higazy, Adam and Shidiki Abubakar Ali, Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel. Towards Peaceful coexistence, August 2018, UNOWAS Study
[27] Hunter, Ben and Eric Humphery-Smith, Sahel”s downward spiral fuelled by weak governance, climate change, 3 November 2022, Verisk Maplecroft
[28] Jones, Melinda, The Sahel Faces 3 Issues: Climate, Conflict and Overpopulation, 2021, Vision of Humanity, IEP
[29] Kindzeka, Moki Edwin, Cameroon Hosted Sahel Cross-Boundary Pastoralists Forum Proposes Peacekeeping, July 12, 2023, VOA – Africa
[30] McGregor, Andrew, The Fulani Crisis: Communal Violance and Radicalization in the Sahel, CTC Sentinel, February 2017, Vol. 10, Issue 2, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[31] Mediation of local conflicts in the Sahel. Butkina Faso, Mali and Niger, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), 2022
[32] Moderan, Ornella and Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, Who caused the coup in Burkina Faso, February 03, 2022, Institute for Security Studies
[33] Moritz, Mark and Mamediarra Mbake, The danger of a single story about Fulani pastoralists, Pastoralism, Vol. 12, Article number: 14, 2022 (Published: 23 March 2022)
[34] Moving Out of the Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations Around the World, 2 August 2023, ACLED
[35] Olumba, Ezenwa, We need a new way of understanding violence in the Sahel, February 28th, 2023, London School of Economics Blogs
[36] Populations at Risk: Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), 31 May 2023, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
[37] Sahel 2021: Communal Wars, Broken Ceasefires and Shifting Frontiers, 17 June 2021, ACLED
[38] Sangare, Boukary, Fulani people and Jihadism in Sahel and West African countries, February 8, 2019, Observatoire of Arab-Muslim World and Sahel, The Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)
[39] The Soufan Center Special Report, Wagner Group: The Evolution of a Private Army, Jason Blazakis, Colin P. Clarke, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sean Steinberg, The Soufan Center, June 2023
[40] Understanding Burkina Faso”s Latest Coup, By the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, October 28, 2022
[41] Violent Extremism in the Sahel, August 10, 2023, by the Center for Preventive Action, Global Conflict Tracker
[42] Waicanjo, Charles, Transnational Herder-Farmer Conflicts and Social Instability in the Sahel, May 21, 2020, African Liberty
[43] Wilkins, Henry, By Lake Chad, Fulani Women Make Maps That Reduce Farmer – Herder Conflicts; July 07, 2023, VOA – Africa
About the author:
Teodor Dechev has been a full-time associate professor at the Higher School of Security and Economics (VUSI) – Plovdiv (Bulgaria) since 2016.
He taught at New Bulgarian University – Sofia and at VTU “St. St. Cyril and Methodius”. He currently teaches at VUSI, as well as at UNSS. His main teaching courses are: Industrial relations and security, European industrial relations, Economic sociology (in English and Bulgarian), Ethnosociology, Ethno-political and national conflicts, Terrorism and political assassinations – political and sociological problems, Effective development of organizations.
He is the author of more than 35 scientific works on fire resistance of building structures and resistance of cylindrical steel shells. He is the author of over 40 works on sociology, political science and industrial relations, including the monographs: Industrial relations and security – part 1. Social concessions in collective bargaining (2015); Institutional Interaction and Industrial Relations (2012); Social Dialogue in the Private Security Sector (2006); “Flexible Forms of Work” and (Post) Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (2006).
He co-authored the books: Innovations in collective bargaining. European and Bulgarian aspects; Bulgarian employers and women at work; Social Dialogue and Employment of Women in the Field of Biomass Utilization in Bulgaria. More recently he has been working on issues of the relationship between industrial relations and security; the development of global terrorist disorganizations; ethnosociological problems, ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts.
Member of the International Labor and Employment Relations Association (ILERA), the American Sociological Association (ASA) and the Bulgarian Association for Political Science (BAPN).
Social democrat by political convictions. In the period 1998 – 2001, he was Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Policy. Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” from 1993 to 1997. Director of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” in 2012 – 2013. Deputy Chairman and Chairman of SSI in the period 2003 – 2011. Director of “Industrial Policies” at AIKB since 2014 .to this day. Member of NSTS from 2003 to 2012.
Author
In a deeply concerning development in Mozambique’s political landscape, the European Union (EU) has condemned the recent killings of two prominent figures: Elvino Dias, a legal advisor to Presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, and opposition politician Paulo Guambe. The EU stated that these politically motivated murders have no place in a democracy and expressed its heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the deceased.
The EU’s strong condemnation comes in the wake of alarming reports regarding the violent dispersal of political supporters following last week’s elections in Mozambique. The Union has called for an immediate, thorough, and transparent investigation into the killings, demanding justice for those responsible and clarity on the circumstances surrounding these outrageous crimes. The EU reiterated its hope for a timely response from the Mozambican Government, emphasizing that a quick and effective inquiry is essential to restore public confidence.
In addition to seeking accountability for the murders, the EU has urged all parties to exercise restraint during this turbulent post-electoral period. The organization underlined the importance of respecting fundamental freedoms and political rights, asserting that strong protective measures for all candidates are crucial to ensuring their safety and fostering a more stable political environment.
Meanwhile, the European Union Election Observation Mission remains actively engaged in Mozambique, closely assessing the ongoing electoral process. The EU expects the country’s Election Management Bodies to uphold integrity in their operations, ensuring that the electoral process is conducted with due diligence and transparency—reflecting the will of the Mozambican people.
As the nation grapples with the implications of these political killings, the international community watches closely, hoping for accountability, peace, and the preservation of democratic values in Mozambique.
Author
The European Union and the Agreements with Morocco: An In-Depth Analysis of Recent Developments
The European Union (EU) has recently taken crucial decisions regarding its fisheries and agriculture agreements with Morocco, a matter that raises complex economic, political and legal issues. These agreements, which allow European vessels access to Moroccan waters and facilitate the import of Moroccan agricultural products into the European market, are essential for both parties. However, they are also marked by tensions linked to the Western Sahara issue.
Legal background to the agreements
The fisheries and agriculture agreements between the EU and Morocco have been renewed several times since they were first signed. However, their legitimacy has been called into question, notably following rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In 2016, the CJEU annulled a fisheries agreement, arguing that it failed to comply with international law, particularly with regard to the rights of the Saharan people. The Court stressed that the resources of Western Sahara cannot be exploited without the consent of its people, leading to a re-evaluation of existing agreements.
Morocco’s position and international support
Morocco has championed an autonomy initiative for Western Sahara, proposing a solution that would allow the territory to enjoy a degree of autonomy while remaining under Moroccan sovereignty. This initiative has received the support of over 100 nations, including major geopolitical players such as the United States, France, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Germany and Spain. This international support is crucial for Morocco, as it strengthens its position on the international stage and enables it to legitimize its actions regarding the Western Sahara.
Morocco maintains that the proposed autonomy is the best solution for ensuring stability and development in the region. The Moroccan authorities maintain that this initiative could encourage dialogue and cooperation between the various stakeholders, while guaranteeing respect for the rights of local populations.
Reactions from the Polisario Front
In contrast, the Polisario Front, which claims independence for Western Sahara and is supported by Algeria, advocates a referendum on self-determination for the Saharan people. This position has historically enjoyed some international support, but is currently less popular in the current geopolitical context.
The difficulties of implementing a referendum are manifold. Analysts point out that issues such as voter registration, factional tensions and security concerns make it a complex option. Moreover, international support for the Polisario Front has waned in recent years, further complicating its position.
Economic consequences of the agreements
The fisheries and agriculture agreements are of vital importance to the Moroccan economy. The fishing industry, in particular, is an essential source of income and employment, especially in coastal regions. Access to the European market enables Moroccan fishermen to sell their products at a competitive price, while meeting the growing demand for seafood products in Europe.
At the same time, the agricultural agreement also opens up opportunities for Morocco to export agricultural products, promoting the development of Moroccan agriculture. For the EU, these agreements guarantee a stable supply of food products while supporting sustainable fishing, which is crucial in the context of growing concerns about food security in Europe.
Future challenges
The challenges facing the EU and Morocco are many. The need to reconcile economic interests with the requirements of international law and humanitarian concerns is paramount. The situation in Western Sahara continues to be a sticking point influencing EU negotiations and decisions.
The EU seeks to maintain advantageous trade relations with Morocco while respecting the principles of international law. The complexity of this situation calls for continuous and constructive dialogue between the various parties, in order to find lasting solutions that are acceptable to all.
Future prospects
In the future, the EU may consider modifications to its agreements to ensure their compliance with international legal standards while safeguarding its economic interests. Enhanced dialogue between the EU and Morocco will be essential to navigate these complexities. Morocco’s international support could also play a key role in future discussions, influencing EU decisions.
In summary, the EU’s decision on fisheries and agriculture agreements with Morocco represents a delicate balance between economic interests, legal considerations and humanitarian issues. Future discussions will need to take these various aspects into account to achieve sustainable solutions, while recognizing the international context that shapes this dynamic. The future of EU-Morocco relations will depend on the ability of both parties to overcome current challenges and cooperate constructively for the development of the region.
Author
By Emmanuel Ande Ivorgba, PhD. Executive Director, Centre for Faith and Community Development (CFCD)
INTRODUCTION
The traditional concept of leadership is based on the notion that leaders are selected to command control and make final decisions for the collective group. However, through this viewpoint, leadership is viewed not only as an exercise of authority but also on the legal grounds. As societies become more complex, technical demands of the state grow, and decision authority becomes specialized. We are more naturally concerned with what leaders do with the job, and what they are and their behavior. In a country of high-rank public-private sector bureaucracy, leaders at different management hierarchical levels play a major role in shaping the direction of political life. They contribute to our understanding about the role of political leadership in policy formulation.
Nigeria, with its vast amount of natural resources, is currently undergoing rapid economic decline. There is a high incidence of poverty, escalating inflation, balance of payment problems, as well as heavy debt-servicing problems. The root cause of this economic problem stems from the pursuit of an inappropriate economic policy. The dominance of poor leadership in policy formulation in Nigeria can clearly be identified as the main source of the problems. Political leadership is pivotal and significant in shaping the economic landscape of any nation (Klarin, 2020). The quality of any nation’s political leadership can significantly determine or influence such nation’s overall economic development trajectory. Nigeria is blessed with a vibrant human population, abundance of natural resources. These resources, coupled with the great entrepreneurial spirit and resilience of the citizens, have positioned Nigeria as a potential continental economic powerhouse. Unfortunately, and disappointedly so, weak institutional frameworks, coupled with corruption, policy inconsistencies and other numerous governance challenges, have constituted stumbling blocks to the country’s inability to effectively and efficiently harness its economic potential (Ogunleye & Adeleye, 2018).
Economic development is a measure of the increase of per capita income, which is itself, a function of the growth rate of national income (Mankiw & Taylor, 2014). National income growth depends largely on, political leadership stability as well as the appropriate economic policies implemented by the political leadership. Also, insights into the influence of political leadership on the socio-economic development enable one to understand the roots of the poverty trap in which many developing nations are stuck. Understanding why countries have the type of leaders they do have and what determines a politician to govern well or govern poorly help us appreciate the positions of governance. This paper seeks to explore the intricate and dynamic relationship between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria. The paper will briefly examine the historical context, challenges and opportunities in Nigeria’s economic landscape, key policy decisions, and governance structures to unravel the impact of political leadership on key economic indicators such as job creation, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, GDP growth, and foreign direct investment. The paper will provide insights into how effective leadership can catalyze positive economic transformation and propel inclusive growth and development in Nigeria. BACKGROUND With a human population of over 230 million, and rich in natural resources, Nigeria, popularly referred to as the “Giant of Africa” (UK Essays, 2018), and continental powerhouse (Akindele, et al. 2012), holds vast potential for economic growth and development. Despite this abundance of human and natural resources, the country has faced numerous complex challenges and struggles on its path to economic prosperity. Nigeria has experienced significant political, social, and economic changes since its independence from British colonial rule in 1960. Political leadership continues to play a central role in Nigeria’s fate. In general, the effects of political stability on economic development underscore the fact that political opportunities drive the economic policies in countries, especially those that are external as opposed to internal factors. The effectiveness of political leadership in providing the best opportunities for economic policies is also important because the nature of the stability is driven by how the political market works in various countries. Overall, many different types of political markets lead to different types of policy commitments. The impact of political leadership attributes is manifested through varying degrees of political stability, democratization, income inequality, and governance quality. The historical context of Nigeria’s economic development efforts has been shaped by a complex interplay of factors. These include the legacies of the colonial era, post-independence governance structures, the discovery of oil and Nigeria’s dependence on oil, political instability and social inequalities, among others. The country has experienced long periods of military rule, and military coups, disrupting democratic processes, with profound repercussions on economic management and policy consistency. While the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the 1950s provided a unique opportunity for the transformation of Nigeria’s economy and acceleration of the development process, the country’s over-reliance and dependence on oil revenues, and neglect of particularly, manufacturing and agriculture, exposed the country’s economy to external shocks and volatility. This has been further compounded by the mismanagement of oil revenues and the absence of, or lack of diversification. Different administrations and political leaders in Nigeria, have implemented several economic policies that have generated both positive and negative impacts on the nation’s economy. Additionally, the socio-political dynamics coupled with regional disparities, ethno-religious tensions, poverty, youth unemployment, among others, underscore the multidimensional complexities that Nigeria’s political leaders must address in order to foster inclusive and sustainable national economic growth. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA From the beginning, the political leadership has been infused with a degree of military dominance and military interests. Their unwillingness to relinquish control of governance and the economy exposed Nigeria’s leadership to ineffective policies that advocate autocracy, preserve tradition, uphold the old methods instead of developing creative and entrepreneurial elements to thrive when addressing economic development and socio[1]economic change. Political leadership in Nigeria is primarily dedicated to self-interests and strategies. This inadequacy largely refuses them from seeing the need for Nigeria to devise and implement the strategic economic development policies rather than the traditional growth-based doctrines provided and promoted by international economic analysts and international economic ideologues. The autocratic policy models are directed at reinforcing figureheads and also provide ‘cocktail’ solutions primarily to maintain political rivalry. As a result, policy leadership evolves less in the way of the country’s economic and social development. An important characteristic of Nigeria’s political leadership is the role of ethnic and religious affiliations in shaping political alliances and power structures. Ethno-religious dynamics and blocs have played a significant role in determining political outcomes and leadership appointments (Akande, 2016). This has often resulted in a fragmented political landscape, with leaders often prioritizing the interests of their own ethnic or religious groups over those of the nation as a whole. Also, the legacy of military rule has had a lasting impact on Nigeria’s political leadership. Many former military leaders have transitioned into civilian politics, bringing with them a hierarchical and authoritarian style of leadership that has at times undermined democratic principles (Ojo, 2017). This has contributed to a culture of strongman politics, where leaders often centralize power and suppress dissent to maintain control. There have been efforts, in recent years, to reform the country’s political leadership and improve governance standards, through initiatives such as anti-corruption campaigns and electoral reforms, to address some of the challenges facing the country’s leadership (Adesina, 2020). However, progress in this direction has been very slow, and entrenched power structures continue to pose obstacles to meaningful change. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW In analyzing how political leaders influence economic performance in Nigeria, one should be cognizant of the fact that it is the interaction of the political elite with the economic cycle that provides insight into how political institutions mediate the influence of the political elite on the economy. Nigerian society has experienced considerable political upheaval. Income inequality has increased since the 1960s, and democratic political structures have not been effectively adapted to reflect the changes in social structures influenced by modernization. The erratic progress of democracy in Nigeria and its inability to cope with the pressures of rapid modernization have led to an erosion of belief in the efficacy of the social system. Decades of authoritarian or military rule in Nigeria have had a negative impact on the quality of governance and the standard of living of most Nigerians. Nigeria’s economic development has been greatly influenced by a variety of historical, social, and political factors, including pre-colonial trade, colonial exploitation, post-independence policies, and the oil boom. In the pre-colonial period, several thriving economies with very extensive trade networks existed. For example, the Yoruba city- states existed in the southwest, the Benin Kingdom in the southeast and the Hausa kingdoms in the north, engaged in agriculture and craft production, and traded, not only among themselves, but with coastal and trans-Saharan traders (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Then came the Colonial Era, which lasted from 1861-1960, and significantly altered Nigeria’s economic landscape. During this period, the British concentrated on extraction and exportation of raw materials to feed the European Industrial Revolution. The economy was designed to produce cash crops like groundnuts, palm oil, cocoa and others to serve British interests (Ake, 1981). The Post-Independence Industrialization period, from 1960-1970 sought to transform the colonial economic structure and accelerate Nigeria’s industrial development (Ekundare, 1973). Economic development plans were then designed by the government to promote and support the diversification of the country’s economy from agriculture towards industrialization and infrastructural development. This was followed, in the 1970s, by the period of Nigeria’s Oil Boom, where the problem of the country was not money but how to spend it. Oil contributed about 90% of foreign exchange earnings and over 80% of government revenues. The result was increased urbanization and investments in the development of infrastructure, but agriculture and other sectors were practically neglected (Osoba, 1996). With support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Nigeria adopted the Structural Adjustment Program in 1986. This was in response to the challenges of rising debt and falling oil prices. An important goal of the SAP was to liberalize Nigeria’s economy, support private enterprise and minimize state involvement. However, the immediate social impact of the SAP was increased poverty and inequality (Iyoha & Oriakhi, 2002). In 2004, the Nigeria launched the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), focusing on poverty reduction, economic diversification and infrastructure development. The NEEDS focused on the promotion of good governance practices, private sector participation, and social development programs (Soludo, 2017). the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) was launched in 2007 by the government to support and boost agriculture, manufacturing and services (Kalejaiye & Aliyu, 2013). Another policy, the Vision 2020 Agendafollowed in 2009. The goal of the Vision 2020 was to position Nigeria as one of the top 20 economies in the world by 2020. It focused on key sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services, and called for investment in human capital development and infrastructure (Ibrahim, 2020). Since 1990 to date, the country has witnessed a mixture of economic growth and setbacks. While there has been some form of stability in terms of democratic governance and political stability, corruption-induced challenges, the lack of economic diversification away from oil and lack of basic infrastructure still remain.
The influence of political leadership on the economy has been evident in various policies, decisions, and actions taken by those in power. One key example of this can be seen in their management of the country’s vast natural resources, particularly oil. Nigeria is a major oil producer, and the country’s political leaders have often used revenue from the oil sector to fund government programs and projects. Unfortunately, mismanagement, corruption, and lack of diversification have led to a situation where the economy remains heavily reliant on oil, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices (Oyekola, 2015). In order to attract investments and spur economic development, sound economic policies, infrastructural development and regulatory frameworks are very essential. However, political instability, policy inconsistency, and corruption have often deterred investors, leading to suboptimal economic performance (Onyishi, 2018). Also, decisions in respect to government spending, currency stability, taxations and interest rates, are important factors that influence economic performance. Purposeful and effective political leadership in these areas can lead to sustainable economic growth, while poor decisions, as Nigeria’s experience has shown, exacerbate economic challenges(Akinbobola, 2019).
Nigeria has just as much potential as almost any other developed country and can show the same improvement if their government becomes truly transparent and accountable, focusing on creating a conducive enabling environment for organizing Nigerian civil society to generate growth. The importance of political instability and poor governance to the decline of Nigeria’s business climate is not limited to discouraging large foreign investors, but it also affects small and medium-sized businesses. Banks are also affected in several ways by the political instability and poor governance of the country. Political instability contributes to a high-risk credit market and reduced access to credit for the private sector. The financial sector is one area in which scientific and internal market work can be done to establish how poor governance affects Nigeria’s economy.
POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORIES
The literature on political economy (Mills, 2005) as well as political business cycle theory (Nordhaus & William, D, 1975) is rich with reasons why politicians in particular would want to shape economies. They have incentives to gain from various forms of rent seeking. Classical and neoliberal economists have come up with mechanisms through which leaders can manipulate areas of the economy to stay in power. Politicians also agree to a social contract with citizens to provide public goods in return for a mandate to govern. There are incentives for politicians to supply public goods to maintain power. Politicians may choose to use economic policy to expand a country’s productive capacity or improve national welfare as part of their stewardship. This may involve providing an enabling environment where the private sector flourishes and produces many desirable goods and services. Politicians can also manipulate the economy by trading off some economic policy in exchange for political survival. Political leaders remain the most important economic agents whose intentions to grow the economy can impact on aggregate productivity and improve economic outcomes.
Political economy theories offer insights into the complex interplay of institutions, interests and power, as well as different perspectives on the relationship between economics and politics. Some key political economy theories include:
a. The Classical Political Economy Theory, which began around the 18th and 19th centuries, was very prominent and promoted by great thinkers and renowned economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, among others. The classical political economy theory emphasizes minimal government intervention, free markets and self-interests in driving economic outcomes. Proponents of the classical political economy theory believe that overall economic prosperity through the invisible hand mechanism (Smith, 1776), would result from self-interest.
b. The Marxist Political Economy Theory: Developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the Marxist political economy theory deals with the relationship between social classes, labour and capital. The foundation of this theory is that capitalism is inherently exploitative, hence proponents of Marxist political economy theory advocate for the overthrow of the capitalist system (Marx, 1867), and the establishment of a classless society rooted in the common ownership of th means of production.
c. The Institutional Political Economy Theory: The Institutional Political Economy Theory is described as a fusion of economic analysis with political science and sociological insights, in order to properly examine how economic behaviour and outcomes are shaped by institutions. The theory highlights the significance and influence of formal and informal rules and norms, including power structures in economic decision-making (North, 1990). Institutions have the capacity to either promote or hinder economic development and social welfare.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA
Economic growth is a significant contributor and necessary component of economic development. Economic development is the creation of enabling conditions that promote and stimulate rapid and substantial increase in the basic material well-being of the majority. This is achievable by the implementation of political leadership policies to promote economic growth through land reforms, capital intensive industrialization, educational stimulus and effective public health system. Economic development must be measured through such areas as the reduction in the opportunities for malnutrition, the considerable reduction in high infant mortality rates, the availability of potable water, the availability of access to quality educational material, the growth of public health, greater opportunities for employment, the gradual socio-economic level generated by the majority of the people whereby an average level of society is established, the reduction in the level of high inflation and unemployment, indices of per-capita income, and through the efficient allocation of resources in regulating the type of social relationships. The term “economic development” can be viewed from the perspective of a false dichotomy in the development process. The dichotomy resulted due to the identifying of economic development with the advancement of the “center” (the more developed and industrialized countries, usually capitalist, on the one hand) and the possibilities of the “periphery” (viz the less developed, under-developed, undeveloped or developing countries, often countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the other. What the political economist referred to frequently as “economic growth” – a sustained increase in the output of goods and services of a country, usually measured at one sector of the economy most times through the increase of the Gross National product (as one of the forms of indicators of economic development) is often confused with economic development itself. Historically, Nigeria’s economic development has evolved significantly, shaped by its rich endowment of natural resources, governmental policies, and its interactions within the global economy. Nigeria’s oil and gas sector accounts for about 90% of export earnings and more than 50% of government revenue (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2022). This over-dependence on oil and gas has made the country’s economy highly susceptible to global oil price fluctuations. Efforts have been intensified in recent times, to diversify the economy through the development of the agricultural sector, which accounts for about 70% of the labour force and about 24% of the country’s GDP (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022). The Manufacturing sector, though still nascent, holds great promise, in terms of its contributions to the nation’s GDP. This is the clear focus of the Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP), designed to support the manufacturing sector to become globally competitive by increasing the sector’s manufacturing base (Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, 2022). The services sector has recorded the fastest growth in Nigeria, with telecommunications driving the expansion of mobile telephony and internet penetration. The financial services industry has been revolutionized, enhancing financial inclusion (PwC, 2023). Despite such progress, especially in the services sector, Nigeria’s economic development is still hampered by challenges of corruption, insecurity, political instability, and unacceptable unemployment rate, especially among the country’s youth population. Poverty is also widespread, as a significant portion of the country’s human population continues to live below the poverty line. Nigeria’s political leaders are today, also strained by contemporary socio-economic and geopolitical problems.
INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The interplay between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria is profound and deeply influential, presenting a mix of opportunities and challenges over the years. Depending on the nature of leadership, sometimes military and sometimes civilian, centralized versus decentralized, this interplay between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria has been marked by significant shifts. Persistent issues such as corruption and political instability remain significant barriers. The path to sustainable economic development in Nigeria depends largely on the emergence of transparent, accountable, and effective political leadership. Economic policies and outcomes are directly impacted by political leadership. For example, Nigeria witnessed significant regional disparities due to political and ethnic tensions, during Nigeria First Republic (1960-1966), which greatly influenced developmental policies and economic development decisions (Falola & Heaton, 2008). From the late 1960s to late 1990s, the Nigeria witnessed long periods of military regimes, with centralized control over decision-making and economic resources. Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999, signaling a significant turning point for the nation’s political and economic landscape. The Federal Government then, led by President Olusegun Obasanjo, from 1999- 2007, initiated significant economic policies, including banking sector reforms, privatization and the war against corruption to promote Nigeria’s growth and economic stability (Utomi, 2013). Despite these encouraging efforts, corruption, insurgency, political instability, and inadequate infrastructure have continued to impede substantial economic progress. Resources that could be applied for economic development have been drained by political corruption, due to large-scale mismanagement and embezzlement of funds by political leaders (Ekanade, 2014), significantly hampering Nigeria’s economic development. The establishment of institutions such as the ICPC and the EFCC demonstrates leadership commitment to combating corruption. However, the effectiveness of these institutions has depended largely, on the leadership’s commitment and political climate (Agbiboa, 2012). Political leadership seeks to recast the economy, the rules of the institution of property and production, and the distributional benefits from economic growth and stability; it seeks to redistribute property and production, enunciates and enforces written and principled rules of commercial behavior so that technology, skills, knowledge, and other means of production are deployed efficiently at the levels of the corporate sector, while acceptable distributional privileges are punctuated; and it seeks to protect and defend property rights, and to regulate the conduct and behavior of economic agents within the terms of written and enforced rules. The governance structure can either facilitate or obstruct the realization of the aim and objectives of political leadership.
CONCLUSION
Political leadership is fundamental in the process of governance, towards the achievement of desirable objectives, including economic development, social integration, public well-being, and such other related goals. However, political leaders could impact the economy in diverse ways, such as their political orientation and ideology. Furthermore, political leadership is expected to engineer the economy towards greater performance through various operative mechanisms like policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and the evaluation of policies. It is these functions that allow political leaders to use public resources to create value for the improvement of the living standards of a country, while at the same time working to broaden social welfare, for instance, by increasing employment. Although political leadership’s corresponding influence on economic development can have significant consequences, either through its impact on policy change driven by its transfer of power from one set of political actors to another, or by altering expectations and beliefs, political regimes can shape patterns of economic development and distributions. Such leaders can act as a model, man of action, great communicator, or transformational leader, while others have been seen as people of vision pursuit focusing on creativity and risk persuasiveness inspiring trust to make things happen, society builder, nation-builder(s), nation transformer, and many more. Good political leadership creates an environment that promotes economic development. Intriguingly, corruption at all levels of governance, poor accountability and transparency have been identified as the bane of the underdevelopment of many African nations including Nigeria. To find solutions to these problems, this work has investigated the influence of political leadership on economic development in Nigeria. The paper is anchored on the legitimacy theory which emphasizes the importance of public confidence and trust in government-to-government effectiveness. The study adopted the quasi-experimental research design with the secondary source of data as the only source of data collection. Data analyzed were obtained from secondary sources using content analysis. The research found out that political leadership influences economic development in Nigeria ranging from ineffective utilization of resources, embezzlement of public funds, bad governance, poor service, and inadequate level of socialization, and encouragement of corrupt practices among public officials. This paper suggests that more attention should be paid to the challenges at the institutional structure and the political system in Nigeria. These challenges call for significant measures aimed at promoting good political leadership in Nigeria. For Nigeria to attain her worthy goals as a competitive and prospering nation, Nigerians must commit to re-establishing value for the common good, a good society, community, dialogue, tolerance, fraternity, and self-identity, fostering a mutual sense of belonging in full participation and well-being. Furthermore, initiating agile services reflecting due transparency and encouraging responsibility among all its leaders at all levels, in good faith and uprightness, and manifesting self-pride. To this end, the paper advocates for the urgent need for enhancing moral leadership and promoting genuine politics in terms of the inviolability of life, perennial morals, and the preservation of the human environment, and democracy for social and civil rights.
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When political leaders are unjust, oppressive and manipulative, it becomes difficult to share the goals of the elite, and consequently stifle efforts toward growth and development. However, and usefully, vision, political will, attributes of democratic inclusiveness and transformational qualities make great leaders capable of leading development and country mobilization into prosperity, democracy and development. A sense of national interest as the cardinal point of leadership informs the communal spirit of visionary political leadership in building and remolding the structure of a nation state. In conclusion, all historical trajectories to high growth in emerging economies were marked by focused attention to structural change by political leadership. In this sense, an inclusive approach and response from the political leadership in Nigeria places some optimism in the quest for long-term growth and economic progress. Leadership at the level of nation-states had a greater impact on growth and development than at any higher level. A developing country’s own leadership had the major responsibility to initiate, guide and pace its growth process. History and successful models of change provide a message of hope, that with the right policies, attributes and dispositions of its leaders, good countries can become better. However, at other times political leaders thwart the development of their nations through corrupt practices and greed that undermines development objectives.
REFERENCES
1. Akande, J. (2016). Ethnicity, Religion and Corruption in Nigeria. African Journal of Politics & Society, 3(2), 87-101.
2. Ake, C. (1981). _A Political Economy of Africa_. Longman.
3. Akinbobola, M. (2019). Fiscal Policy and Economic Performance in Nigeria: An Empirical Analysis, Nigerian Journal of Economics, 22(3), 56-71.
4. Akindele, R.A., & Ate, B.E. (2012). Nigeria and the ECOWAS since 1985: Towards an Explanation of a Paid Piper and his Unchanged Tune. Nigerian Forum.
5. Ajakaiye, O., & Adedeji, O. (2018). Colonialism and Economic Development in Nigeria: A Review of Its Impact. Journal of African Development Studies, 11(2), 45-60.
6. Central Bank of Nigeria. (2022). Annual Report. Retrieved from [cbn.gov.ng](https://www.cbn.gov.ng)
7. Ekanade, O. (2014). *The Dynamics of Forced Neoliberalism in Nigeria since the 1980s*. Ibadan: Indiana University Press.
8. Ekundare, R. O. (1973). _An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960_. Africana Publishing Corporation.
9. Falola, T., & Heaton, M. M. (2008). _A History of Nigeria_. Cambridge University Press.
10. Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Investment. (2022). Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP). Retrieved from [trade.gov.ng](https://www.trade.gov.ng)
11. Ibrahim, A. B. (2020). Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP): A Pathway to Sustainable Development in Nigeria. Nigerian Journal of Economic Development, 33(2), 55-70.
12. Iyoha, M. A., & Oriakhi, D. E. (2002). Explaining African Economic Growth Performance: The Case of Nigeria (Draft Final Report). African Economic Research Consortium.
13. Kalejaiye, P. O., & Alliyu, N. (2013). The Rise of China and Africa’s Economic Transformation: An Analysis of Nigerian Trade Relations with China. _Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development_, 4(5), 62-72.
14. Klarin, J. (2020). The Role of Political Leadership in Economic Development. Economic Journal, 25(3), 35-50
15. Lewis, P. M. (2007). *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*. University of Michigan Press.
16. Mankiw, N.G., & Taylor, M.P. (2014). Economics. Cengage Learning.
17. Marx. K. (1867). Capital: Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
18. Mills, C. W. (2005). “Globalizing Historical Materialism: A Conversation with Charles Mills.” Socialism and Democracy, 19(1), 177-202.
19. National Bureau of Statistics. (2022). Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report. Retrieved from [nigerianstat.gov.ng] (https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng)
20. Nnanna, O. J. (2019). Economic Reform and Governance in Nigeria: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects. Journal of African Economic Development, 14(4), 120-135.
21. Nordhaus, William D. “The political business cycle.” The Review of Economic Studies 42.1 (1975): 169-190.
22. North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.
23. Ogunleye, O., & Adeleye, I. (2018). Challenges of Economic Development in Nigeria: The Role of
Policy Inconsistencies and Institutional Frameworks. Journal of African Economics, 42(2), 65-80.
24. Ojo, O. (2017). Military Rule, Democracy Transition, and Political Leadership in Nigeria. Journal of African Political Studies, 4(3), 112-128.
25. Oyekola, K. (2015). Oil Wealth and Economic Development in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities. African Development Review, 17(2), 78-94.
26. Onyishi, E. (2018). Political Instability and Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria. Journal of Political Economy, 35(1), 124-139.
27. Osoba, S. O. (1996). Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives. _Review of African Political Economy_, 23(69), 371-386.
28. PwC. (2023). The rise of fintech in Nigeria: Challenges and opportunities. Retrieved from [pwc.com] (https://www.pwc.com).
29. Ross, M. L. (2015). The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review. Developments in the Economics of Natural Resources, 25(1), 35-50.
30. Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell.
31. Soludo, C. (2017). Oil, Economic Diversification, and Sustainable Development in Nigeria. Nigerian Journal of Economic Policy, 30(3), 72-88.
32. UK Essays. (2018). Why is Nigeria Called the Giant of Africa? Retrieved from
[https://www.ukessays.com/](https://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/why-is-nigeria-called-the[1]giant-of-africa.php).
33. Utomi, P. (2013). *Nigeria’s Path to Progress: Towards Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development*. Lagos: Africana Leadership Academy
First publication: International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (ISSN 2454-6186), vol. VIII, issue VII, July 2024, p. 1274-1282, https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.807106 Received: 17 June 2024; Revised: 30 June 2024; Accepted: 04 July 2024; Published: 07 August 2024.
Illustrative Photo by Christina Morillo: https://www.pexels.com/photo/black-and-gray-laptop-computer-turned-on-doing-computer-codes-1181271/
Author
Scott Bessent’s Net Worth 2024: A Look at How Much Money He’s Earned
Does Conor McGregor Have Kids? About His Children
Scott Bessent’s Husband: Is the Billionaire Secretary of Treasury Nominee Married?
-
Travel6 days ago
The making of a Catalan classic: Panellets for the people
-
Sports4 days agoATP Finals, Jannik Sinner’s joy: “Happy and proud to be Italian”
-
Sports6 days agoStefan Edberg has no doubts about Jannik Sinner
-
Sports4 days agoCivitanova leaves crumbs to Modena
-
Sports4 days agoNBA, Cleveland stronger than everything and everyone: 15-0
-
Sports5 days agoJake Paul apologizes to fans, “I didn’t mean to hurt them too much”
-
Sports6 days agoNBA: fifth win in a row for LA Lakers, Boston at the buzzer
-
Health & Society5 days agoFemale circumcision in Russia – exists and is not punished
