Africa
Sahel – conflicts, coups and migration bombs (I)
by Teodor Dechev
The beginning of the new cycle of violence in the Sahel countries can be tentatively linked to the Arab Spring. The link isn’t really symbolic and it’s not related to someone’s “inspirational example”. The direct link is related to the participation of the Tuareg armed militias, which for decades have been fighting for the creation of an independent state – mostly in the northern part of Mali. [1]
During the civil war in Libya, during the lifetime of Muammar Gaddafi, the Tuareg militias sided with him, but after his death, they returned to Mali with all their heavy and light weapons. The sudden appearance of much stronger than before Tuareg paramilitaries, who are literally armed to the teeth, is bad news for the authorities in Mali, but also for other countries in the region. The reason is that a transformation has taken place among the Tuareg and some of their armed factions have “rebranded” themselves from fighters for national independence into Uzhkim Islamist militant formations. [2]
This phenomenon, in which ethnocentric formations with a long history, suddenly embrace “jihadi” slogans and practices, the author of these lines calls “double bottom organizations”. Such phenomena are not a specialty of West Africa alone, such is the “God’s Resistance Army” in Uganda, as well as various Islamist armed formations in the southernmost islands of the Philippine archipelago. [2], [3]
Things in West Africa came together in such a way that after 2012-2013, the region became a battleground where “franchises” of global terrorist networks, which to a greater or lesser extent can be called “terrorist” disorganizations”, due to their particular structure, rules and leadership, which are the negation of classical organizations. [1], [2]
In Mali, the Tuareg, newly minted Islamists, in confrontation with al-Qaeda but in alliance with Salafist formations that did not belong to either the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, attempted to create an independent state in northern Mali. [2] In response, the Malian authorities launched a military operation against the Tuareg and jihadists, which was supported by France with a mandate from the UN Security Council – under the so-called UN Stabilization Mission in Mali – Minusma.
Operations Serval and Barhan begin one after the other, Operation Serval is a French military operation in Mali conducted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. The resolution was voted on at the request of the Malian authorities, with no one, including Russia, objecting, let alone a Security Council veto. The goal of the operation with the mandate of the UN is to defeat the forces of the jihadists and the Tuareg “organizations with a double bottom” in the northern part of Mali, which are beginning to make their way to the central part of the country.
In the course of the operation, three of the five leaders of the Islamists were killed – Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, Abdel Krim and Omar Ould Hamaha. Mokhtar Belmokhtar fled to Libya and Iyad ag Ghali escaped to Algeria. Operation Serval (named after the famously lovable African wild cat) ended on 15 July 2014 to be succeeded by Operation Barhan, which began on 1 August 2014.
Operation Barhan is taking place on the territory of five Sahel countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. 4,500 French soldiers are participating, and the five countries of the Sahel (G5 – Sahel) are training about 5,000 soldiers to join the anti-terrorist operations.
The attempt to secede the northern part of Mali into some kind of Tuareg-Islamist state failed. Operations “Serval” and “Barkhan” are achieving their immediate objectives. The ambitions of Islamists and “double bottom organizations” are over. The bad thing is that this does not put an end to the violence and, accordingly, to the hostilities in the Sahel. Although defeated and forced to think first and foremost about how to hide from the forces of France and the G5-Sahel countries, the Islamic radicals are turning to guerrilla warfare, turning at times into simple banditry.
Although after the Serwal and Barkhan operations, the Islamic radicals are no longer able to achieve any strategic successes, at least at first sight, the number of attacks against civilians is not decreasing, but in certain places is increasing. This creates an extremely nervous and unhealthy environment, which is taken advantage of by ambitious military men who do not share the view that the army belongs in the barracks.
On the one hand, the African army is a social elevator. It enables a person to rise to some kind of meritocratic principle. On the other hand, the practice of military coups in Africa is so widespread that aspiring army commanders do not seem to consider it a crime at all.
As STATISTA data shows, between January 1950 and July 2023 there were about 220 successful and failed coup attempts in Africa, accounting for almost half (44 percent of all coup attempts in the world. Including failed attempts, Sudan tops the list of African countries with the most coups since 1950 with a total of 17. After Sudan, Burundi (11), Ghana and Sierra Leone (10) are the countries with the most coup attempts since the mid-20th century.
In today’s situation in the Sahel, following the initial advance of radical Islamists and “double bottom organizations” in northern Mali and the corresponding counterattack by the armed forces of the G5 Sahel countries and France, the main concern is personal security of people. Some citizens of different countries in the region share similar feelings, which can be summed up in the aphorism of a citizen of Burkina Faso: “During the day we tremble lest the military from the regular army come, and at night we tremble lest the Islamists come.”
It is precisely this situation that gives courage to certain circles among the military to reach for power. This is basically justified by the thesis that the current government does not cope with the terror imposed by Islamic radicals. It should be noted that the moment was chosen quite precisely – on the one hand, the jihadists are defeated and their ability to permanently seize territories is not so great. At the same time, attacks by Islamic radicals remain very dangerous and deadly for many civilians. Thus, the military in some countries take advantage of the work done by the UN and G5 Sahel forces against troublemakers and at the same time (quite hypocritically) raise the issue that their territories are not pacified and their “competence” is needed intervention.
One might argue that at one point Burkina Faso, where the authorities are believed to have secure control of just 60 percent of the country’s territory as of early 2022, has proved to be an exception. [40] This is true, but only in parts. It should be clear that Islamic radicals do not exercise control over the remaining 40 percent of the territory in the sense that the word “control” could be used under the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq or the attempt to secede the northern Tuareg-populated part slow down. There is no local administration here that has been installed by the Islamists, and no de facto control at least over basic communications. It’s just that the rebels can commit crimes with relative impunity, and that’s why critics of the government at the time (and probably the current one as well) believe that this part of the country’s territory is not under the control of the authorities. [9], [17], [40]
In any case, the undeniably extremely painful issue of constant attacks by Islamic radicals has given moral justification (at least in their own eyes) for the military in some Sahel countries to take power by force, justifying their actions with concern for the security of the people. The last such coup to hit the region was the coup d’état in Niger, where General Abdurahman Tiani seized power on 26 July 2023. [22]
It is important to say here that the coup in Gabon, which is arguably the most recent possible coup in West Africa, cannot be seen in the same context as that created by the processes taking place in the Sahel countries. [10], [14] Unlike Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, there is no hostilities between government forces and Islamic radicals in Gabon, and the coup is aimed, at least for now, against the presidential family, the Bongo family, who already rule Gabon 56 years.
Anyway, it should be emphasized that after the period of relative calm between 2013 and 2020, there were 13 coup attempts in Africa, including in Sudan, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali. [4], [32]
Here we have to point out as somewhat related to the current new maelstrom of political instability in West Africa, particularly in the Sahel, the ongoing violence in the Central African Republic (CAR), where two civil wars have been fought back-to-back. The first, known as the Central African Republic Bush War, began in 2004 and ended formally with a de jure peace agreement in 2007, and de facto in March 2013. The second, known as the “civil war in the Central African Republic” (Central African Republic Civil War), began in April 2013 and has not ended to this day, although government troops have now laid hands on the largest part of the territory of the country they once controlled.
Needless to say, a country that is extremely poor, its human development index is at the lowest possible levels of the ranking (the last place, at least until 2021 was reserved for Niger) and the risk of undertaking any economic activity is extremely high, is practically a “failed state” and sooner or later becomes prey to various political and military vultures. To this category we can in good conscience refer Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan from the group of countries considered in this analysis.
At the same time, the list of countries in Africa where the Russian private military company Wagner has been confirmed to have a noticeable and government-agreed presence includes Mali, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Madagascar. [4], [39]
A comparison between the list of “failed states” ravaged by civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, military coups and other such misfortunes and the list of countries where PMC Wagner mercenaries “work” ostensibly in favor of legitimate governments shows a remarkable coincidence.
Mali, the Central African Republic and South Sudan feature prominently on both lists. There is still no confirmed data on the official presence of PMC “Wagner” in Burkina Faso, but there are enough indications of Russian intervention and support in favor of the latest coup plotters in the country, not to mention the rampant pro-Russian sentiments, already to the fact that the mercenaries of the late Prigozhin had already managed to “distinguish themselves” in the neighboring country of Mali. [9], [17]
In fact, PMC Wagner’s “appearances” in the Central African Republic and in Mali should rather cause horror among Africans. Russian mercenaries’ penchant for mass slaughter and brutality have been public since the Syrian period in their appearances, but their exploits in Africa, especially in the aforementioned CAR and Mali, are also well documented. [34] At the end of July 2022, the commander of French forces in the UN-flagged Operation Barhan, General Laurent Michon, directly accused PMC Wagner of “looting Mali”. [24]
In fact, as already mentioned above, the events in Mali and Burkina Faso are connected and follow the same pattern. The “contagion” of radical Islamist violence started in Mali. It went through a Tuareg-Islamist insurgency in the north of the country and, after the defeat of the rebels by the UN forces and the G5 – Sahel, then took the form of guerrilla warfare, violence against the civilian population and outright banditry in the middle part of Mali, where he sought the support of the Fulani or Fulbe people (a very important issue that will be analyzed in detail later) and moved to Burkina Faso. Analysts even talked about Burkina Faso becoming the “new epicenter of violence”. [17]
However, an important detail is that in August 2020, a military coup overthrew the elected president of Mali – Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. This had a bad effect on the fight against the jihadists, because the military that came to power looked with distrust on the UN force, which consisted mainly of French soldiers. They rightly suspected that the French did not approve of the military coup. That is why the new, self-appointed authorities in Mali hastened to demand the termination of UN operations (especially the French) in Mali. At that very moment, the country’s military rulers were more afraid of the UN-mandated French forces on their territory than of Islamic radicals.
The UN Security Council ended the peacekeeping operation in Mali very quickly and the French began to withdraw, apparently without much regret. Then the military junta in Bamako remembered that the guerilla war of the Islamic radicals had not ended at all and sought other external help, which appeared in the form of PMC “Wagner” and the Russian Federation, which is always ready to serve like-minded statesmen. Events developed very quickly and PMC “Wagner” left deep footprints of its shoes in the sands of Mali. [34], [39]
The coup in Mali triggered the “domino effect” – two coups followed in one year in Burkina Faso (!), and then in Niger and Gabon. The pattern and motivations (or rather justifications) for carrying out the coups in Burkina Faso were identical to those in Mali. After 2015, violence, sabotage and armed attacks by Islamic radicals increased sharply. The various “franchises” of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (the Islamic State of West Africa, the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, etc.) and independent Salafist formations have killed thousands of civilians, and the number of “internally displaced”, you understand – refugees has exceeded two million people. Thus, Burkina Faso acquired the dubious reputation of being “the new epicenter of the Sahel conflict.” [9]
On January 24, 2022, the military in Burkina Faso, led by Paul-Henri Damiba, overthrew President Roch Kabore, who had ruled the country for six years, after several days of rioting in the capital, Ouagadougou. [9], [17], [32] But on September 30, 2022, for the second time in the same year, another coup was carried out. The self-appointed president Paul-Henri Damiba was overthrown by the equally ambitious captain Ibrahim Traore. After ousting the current president, Traore also dissolved the transitional government created by Damiba and suspended (finally) the constitution. In no uncertain terms, the army spokesman said that a group of officers had decided to remove Damiba because of his inability to deal with the armed insurgency of Islamic radicals. That he belongs to the same institution that has failed to deal with jihadists under two successive presidents for about seven years does not faze him at all. Moreover, he openly states that “in the last nine months” (that is, right after the military coup in January 2022 with his participation), “the situation has worsened”. [9]
In general, a model of violent seizure of power is being created in countries where there is an intensification of the subversive work of Islamic radicals. Once the UN forces (understand the “bad” French and the G5 – Sahel troops) break the offensive drive of the jihadists and the fighting remains in the sphere of guerilla warfare, sabotage and attacks on the civilian population, the local military in a given country considers that its hour has struck; it is said that the fight against radical Islamists is not successful and … takes power.
Undoubtedly, a comfortable situation – the Islamic radicals no longer have the strength to enter your capital and establish some form of “Islamic State” for you, and at the same time, the fighting is far from over and there is something to scare the population. A separate issue is that a large part of the population is afraid of their “native” army for a number of reasons. They range from the irresponsibility of army commanders to disparities in the tribal affiliation of the same generals.
To all this, the frank horror of the methods of “Wagner”, who are supporters of “radical actions” and “industrial logging”, has already been added. [39]
It is here that we must leave for a moment the long flight over the history of the Islamic penetration into West Africa and pay attention to a coincidence that is most likely not accidental. In search of human resources for their cause, especially after being largely abandoned by the Tuareg militias following the failure of the insurgency in northern Mali, Islamic radicals are turning to the Fulani, a semi-nomadic people of hereditary herders who engage in migratory pastoralism in a belt from the Gulf of Guinea to the Red Sea, south of the Sahara desert.
The Fulani (also known as Fula, Fulbe, Hilani, Philata, Fulau, and even Pyol, depending on which of the many languages spoken in the region) are one of the first African peoples to convert to Islam and by virtue of their lifestyle and livelihood are to a certain extent marginalized and discriminated against. In fact, the geographical distribution of the Fulani looks like this:
The Fulani number approximately 16,800,000 in Nigeria out of a total population of 190 million; 4,900,000 in Guinea (with capital Conakry) out of 13 million inhabitants); 3,500,000 in Senegal out of a country of 16 million; 3,000,000 in Mali out of 18.5 million inhabitants; 2,900,000 in Cameroon out of 24 million inhabitants; 1,600,000 in Niger out of 21 million inhabitants; 1,260,000 in Mauritania out of 4.2 million inhabitants; 1,200,000 in Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) out of a population of 19 million; 580,000 in Chad out of a population of 15 million; 320,000 in The Gambia out of a population of 2 million; 320,000 in Guinea-Bissau out of a population of 1.9 million; 310,000 in Sierra Leone out of a population of 6.2 million; 250,000 in the Central African Republic of 5.4 million inhabitants (with researchers stressing that this is half of the country’s Muslim population, which in turn is about 10% of the population); 4,600 in Ghana out of a population of 28 million; and 1,800 in Côte d’Ivoire out of a population of 23.5 million. [38] A Fulani community has also been established in Sudan along the pilgrimage route to Mecca. Unfortunately, the Sudanese Fulani are the least studied community and their numbers was not assessed during official censuses.[38]
As a percentage of the population, the Fulani make up 38% of the population in Guinea (with capital Conakry), 30% in Mauritania, 22% in Senegal, just under 17% in Guinea-Bissau, 16% in Mali and Gambia, 12% in Cameroon, almost 9% in Nigeria, 7.6% in Niger, 6.3% in Burkina Faso, 5% in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, just under 4% of the population in Chad and very small shares in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire Ivory. [38]
Several times in history, the Fulani have created empires. Three examples can be cited:
• In the 18th century, they established the theocratic state of Futa-Jalon in Central Guinea;
• In the 19th century, the Massina Empire in Mali (1818 – 1862), established by Sekou Amadou Barii, then Amadou Sekou Amadou, who succeeded in conquering the great city of Timbuktu.
• Also in the 19th century, the Sokoto Empire was established in Nigeria.
These empires proved to be unstable state entities, however, and today, there is no state that is controlled by the Fulani. [38]
As already noted, traditionally the Fulani are migratory, semi-nomadic pastoralists. They have remained so for the most part, even if it is considered that a number of them have gradually become settled, both because of the limitations imposed on them by the continuous expansion of the desert in certain regions, and because of their dispersion, and because some governments have created programs aimed at guiding the nomadic population to a sedentary lifestyle. [7], [8], [11], [19], [21], [23], [25], [42]
The vast majority of them are Muslims, almost all of them in a number of countries. Historically, they played an important role in the penetration of Islam into West Africa.
The Malian writer and thinker Amadou Hampate Bâ (1900-1991), who himself belongs to the Fulani people, recalling the way in which they are perceived by other communities, makes a comparison with the Jews, as much as the Jews before the creation of Israel , they have been dispersed in many countries, where they generate repeated insults from other communities, which do not vary much from country to country: the Fulani are often perceived by others as prone to communitarianism, nepotism and treachery. [38]
The traditional conflicts in the migration areas of the Fulani, between them, on the one hand, as semi-nomadic herders and settled farmers of different ethnic groups, on the other, and the fact that they are more present than other ethnic groups in a large number of countries (and therefore in contact with different groups of the population), doubtless contribute to the explanation of this reputation, too often maintained by the population with which they entered into opposition and dispute. [8], [19], [23], [25], [38]
The idea that they are pre-emptively developing vectors of jihadism is much more recent and can be explained by the role of the Fulani in the noted not so long ago rise of terrorism in the central part of Mali – in the Masina region and in the bend of the Niger River . [26], [28], [36], [41]
When talking about the emerging points of contact between the Fulani and the “Jihadists”, it must always be borne in mind that historically throughout Africa, conflicts have arisen and continue to exist between settled farmers and pastoralists, who are usually nomadic or semi-nomadic and have the practice of migrating and moving with their herds. Farmers accuse cattle herders of ravaging their crops with their herds, and herders complain of livestock theft, difficult access to water bodies and hindrances to their movement. [38]
But since 2010, the increasingly numerous and deadly conflicts have taken on a completely different dimension, especially in the Sahel region. Hand-to-hand combat and club fights have been replaced by shooting with Kalashnikov assault rifles. [5], [7], [8], [41]
The continuous expansion of agricultural land, imposed by very rapid population growth, gradually limits the areas for grazing and animal husbandry. Meanwhile, severe droughts in the 1970s and 1980s prompted herders to migrate south to areas where settled people were unaccustomed to competing with nomads. In addition, the priority given to policies for the development of intensive animal husbandry tend to marginalize nomads. [12], [38]
Left out of development policies, migrant pastoralists often feel discriminated against by the authorities, feel that they live in a hostile environment and mobilize to protect their interests. In addition, terrorist groups and militias fighting in West and Central Africa are trying to use their frustration to win them over. [7], [10], [12], [14], [25], [26]
At the same time, the majority of pastoral nomads in the region are Fulani, who are also the only nomads to be found in all countries of the region.
The nature of some of the Fulani empires mentioned above, as well as the distinct warlike tradition of the Fulani, has led many observers to believe that Fulani involvement in the emergence of terrorist jihadism in central Mali since 2015 is in some sense a combined product of the historical heritage and identity of the Fulani people, who are presented as the bête noire (“black beast”). The participation of the Fulani in the growth of this terrorist threat in Burkina Faso or even in Niger seems to confirm this view. [30], [38]
When talking about the historical legacy, it should be noted that the Fulani played an important role in the resistance against French colonialism, especially in Futa-Jalon and the surrounding regions – the territories that would become the French colonies of Guinea, Senegal and French Sudan.
Furthermore, the important distinction must be made that while the Fulani played an important role in the creation of a new terrorist center in Burkina Faso, the situation in Niger is different: it is true that there are periodic attacks by groups composed of Fulani, but these are external attackers. coming from Mali. [30], [38]
In practice, however, the situation of the Fulani varies greatly from country to country, whether it is their way of life (degree of settlement, level of education, etc.), the way they perceive themselves, or even the way , according to which they are perceived by others.
Before proceeding with a more in-depth analysis of the various modes of interaction between the Fulani and the jihadists, a significant coincidence should be noted, to which we will return towards the end of this analysis. It was stated that the Fulani live scattered in Africa – from the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean in the west, to the shores of the Red Sea in the east. They live practically along one of the most ancient trade routes in Africa – the route running immediately along the southern edge of the Sahara desert, which to this day is also one of the most important routes along which migratory agriculture takes place in the Sahel .
If, on the other hand, we look at the map of the countries where PMC “Wagner” carries out official activities, in aid of the relevant government forces (regardless of whether the government is at all legal or came to power as a result of a recent coup – see especially Mali and Burkina Faso ), we will see that there is a serious overlap between the countries where the Fulani reside and where the “Wagnerovites” operate.
On the one hand, this can be attributed to coincidence. PMC “Wagner” relatively successfully parasitises countries where there are severe internal conflicts, and if they are civil wars – even better. With Prigozhin or without Prigozhin (some people still consider him alive), PMC “Wagner” will not budge from its positions. Firstly, because it has to fulfill contracts for which money has been taken, and secondly, because such is the geopolitical mandate of the central government in the Russian Federation.
There is no greater falsification than the declaration of “Wagner” as a “private military company” – PMC. One would rightly ask what is “private” about a company that was created at the behest of the central government, armed by it, assigned tasks of prime importance (first in Syria, then elsewhere), provides it is “personal staff”, through the parole of prisoners with heavy sentences. With such “service” by the state, it is more than misleading, it is downright perverse, to call “Wagner” a “private company”.
PMC “Wagner” is an instrument of the realization of Putin’s geopolitical ambitions and is responsible for the penetration of “Russky Mir” in places where it is not “hygienic” for the regular Russian army to appear in all its parade official form. The company usually appears where there is great political instability to offer its services like a modern-day Mephistopheles. The Fulani have the misfortune of living in places where political instability is very high, so at first glance their clash with PMC Wagner should not come as a surprise.
On the other hand, however, the opposite is also true. “Wagner” PMCs extremely methodically “moved” along the route of the already mentioned ancient trade route – today’s key migratory cattle-breeding route, part of which even coincides with the route of many African nations for the Hajj in Mecca. The Fulani are about thirty million people and if they are radicalized, they could cause a conflict that would have the character of at least an all-African war.
Up to this point in our time, countless regional wars have been fought in Africa with huge casualties and incalculable damage and destruction. But there are at least two wars that claim the albeit unofficial labels of “African world wars”, in other words – wars that involved a large number of countries on the continent and beyond. These are the two wars in the Congo (today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo). The first lasted from October 24, 1996 to May 16, 1997 (more than six months) and led to the replacement of the dictator of the then country of Zaire – Mobuto Sese Seko with Laurent-Désiré Kabila. 18 countries and paramilitary organizations are directly involved in the hostilities, supported by 3 + 6 countries, some of which are not completely open. The war was also to some extent triggered by the genocide in neighboring Rwanda, which led to a wave of refugees in the DR Congo (then Zaire).
As soon as the First Congo War ended, the victorious Allies came into conflict with each other and it quickly turned into the Second Congo War, also known as the “Great African War”, which lasted almost five years, from August 2, 1998 to July 18, 2003. The number of paramilitary organizations involved in this war is almost impossible to ascertain, but suffice it to say that on the side of Laurent-Désiré Kabila are fighting contingents from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Sudan, while against the regime in Kinshasa are Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. As researchers always emphasize, some of the “helpers” intervene completely uninvited.
In the course of the war, the president of the DR Congo, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, died and was replaced by Joseph Kabila. Besides all the possible cruelty and destruction, the war is also remembered for the total extermination of 60,000 pygmy civilians (!), as well as about 10,000 pygmy warriors. The war ended with an agreement that saw the formal withdrawal of all foreign forces from DR Congo, the appointment of Joseph Kabila as interim president, and the swearing in of four pre-agreed vice presidents, depending on the interests of all warring parties. In 2006, general elections were held, as they might be held in a Central African country that has experienced two consecutive intercontinental wars within more than six years.
The example of the two wars in the Congo can give us some rough idea of what could happen if a war was ignited in the Sahel involving the 30 million Fulani people. We cannot doubt that a similar scenario has long been considered in the countries of the region, and especially in Moscow, where they probably think that with the engagements of PMC “Wagner” in Mali, Algeria, Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR and Cameroon ( as well as in the DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Madagascar), they “keep their hand on the counter” of a large-scale conflict that could be provoked out of necessity.
Moscow’s ambitions to be a factor in Africa are not from yesterday at all. In the USSR, there was an exceptionally prepared school of intelligence officers, diplomats and, above all, military specialists who were ready to intervene in one or another region of the continent if necessary. A large part of the countries in Africa were mapped by the Soviet General Administration of Geodesy and Cartography (back in 1879 – 1928) and the “Wagners” can count on very good information support.
There are strong indications of strong Russian influence in carrying out the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso. At this stage, there are no allegations of Russian involvement in the Niger coup, with US Secretary of State Blinken personally dismissing such a possibility. The latter, of course, does not mean at all that during his lifetime Prigozhin did not welcome the coup plotters and did not offer the services of his “private” military company.
In the spirit of the former Marxist traditions, here too Russia operates with a minimum program and a maximum program. The minimum is to “set foot” in more countries, seize “outposts”, create influence among local elites, especially among the military, and exploit as many valuable local minerals as possible. PMC “Wagner” has already achieved results in this regard.
The maximum program is to gain control over the entire Sahel region and let Moscow decide what will happen there – peace or war. Someone would reasonably say: “yes, of course – it makes sense to collect the money of the coup governments and dig up as much valuable mineral resources as possible. But what the hell do the Russians need to control the existence of the Sahel countries?”.
The answer to this reasonable question lies in the fact that in the event of a military conflict in the Sahel, flows of refugees will rush to Europe. These will be masses of people that cannot be contained by police forces alone. We will witness scenes and ugly sights with a huge propaganda charge. Most likely, European countries will try to accept part of the refugees, at the expense of detaining others in Africa, who will have to be supported by the EU due to their complete defenselessness.
For Moscow, all this would be a paradisiacal scenario that Moscow would not hesitate to set in motion at a given moment, if given the opportunity. It is clear that the capacity of France to play the role of a major peacekeeping force is in question, and also in question is the desire of France to continue to perform such functions, especially after the case in Mali and the termination of the UN mission there. In Moscow, they are not worried about carrying out nuclear blackmail, but what is left for detonating a “migration bomb”, in which there is no radioactive radiation, but the effect can still be devastating.
Precisely for these reasons, the processes in the Sahel countries should be followed and studied in depth, including by Bulgarian scientists and specialists. Bulgaria is at the forefront of the migration crisis and the authorities in our country are obliged to exert the necessary influence on the policy of EU in order to be prepared for such “contingencies”.
Part two follows
Sources used:
[1] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, The Rise of Global Terrorist Disorganizations. Terrorist franchising and rebranding of terrorist groups, Jubilee collection in honor of the 90th anniversary of Prof. D.I.N. Toncho Trandafilov, VUSI Publishing House, pp. 192 – 201 (in Bulgarian).
[2] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, “Double bottom” or “schizophrenic bifurcation”? The interaction between ethno-nationalist and religious-extremist motives in the activities of some terrorist groups, Sp. Politics and Security; Year I; no. 2; 2017; pp. 34 – 51, ISSN 2535-0358 (in Bulgarian).
[3] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, Terrorist “franchises” of the Islamic State seize bridgeheads in the Philippines. The environment of the Mindanao island group offers excellent conditions for the strengthening and growth of terrorist groups with a “double bottom”, Research Papers of the Graduate School of Security and Economics; Volume III; 2017; pp. 7 – 31, ISSN 2367-8526 (in Bulgarian).
[4] Fleck, Anna, A renewed wave of coups in Africa?, 03/08/2023, blacksea-caspia (in Bulgarian).
[5] Ajala, Olayinka, New drivers of conflict in Nigeria: an analysis of the clashes between farmers and pastoralists, Third World Quarterly, Volume 41, 2020, Issue 12, (published online 09 September 2020), pp. 2048-2066
[6] Benjaminsen, Tor A. and Boubacar Ba, Fulani-Dogon killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, African Security, Vol. 14, 2021, Issue 1, (Published online: 13 May 2021)
[7] Boukhars, Anouar and Carl Pilgrim, In Disorder, they Thrive: How Rural Distress Fuels Militancy and Banditry in the Central Sahel, March 20, 2023, Middle East Institute
[8] Brottem, Leif and Andrew McDonnell, Pastoralism and Conflict in the Sudano-Sahel: A Review of the Literature, 2020, Search for Common Ground
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About the author:
Teodor Dechev has been a full-time associate professor at the Higher School of Security and Economics (VUSI) – Plovdiv (Bulgaria) since 2016.
He taught at New Bulgarian University – Sofia and at VTU “St. St. Cyril and Methodius”. He currently teaches at VUSI, as well as at UNSS. His main teaching courses are: Industrial relations and security, European industrial relations, Economic sociology (in English and Bulgarian), Ethnosociology, Ethno-political and national conflicts, Terrorism and political assassinations – political and sociological problems, Effective development of organizations.
He is the author of more than 35 scientific works on fire resistance of building structures and resistance of cylindrical steel shells. He is the author of over 40 works on sociology, political science and industrial relations, including the monographs: Industrial relations and security – part 1. Social concessions in collective bargaining (2015); Institutional Interaction and Industrial Relations (2012); Social Dialogue in the Private Security Sector (2006); “Flexible Forms of Work” and (Post) Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (2006).
He co-authored the books: Innovations in collective bargaining. European and Bulgarian aspects; Bulgarian employers and women at work; Social Dialogue and Employment of Women in the Field of Biomass Utilization in Bulgaria. More recently he has been working on issues of the relationship between industrial relations and security; the development of global terrorist disorganizations; ethnosociological problems, ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts.
Member of the International Labor and Employment Relations Association (ILERA), the American Sociological Association (ASA) and the Bulgarian Association for Political Science (BAPN).
Social democrat by political convictions. In the period 1998 – 2001, he was Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Policy. Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” from 1993 to 1997. Director of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” in 2012 – 2013. Deputy Chairman and Chairman of SSI in the period 2003 – 2011. Director of “Industrial Policies” at AIKB since 2014 .to this day. Member of NSTS from 2003 to 2012.
Author
By Emmanuel Ande Ivorgba, PhD. Executive Director, Centre for Faith and Community Development (CFCD)
INTRODUCTION
The traditional concept of leadership is based on the notion that leaders are selected to command control and make final decisions for the collective group. However, through this viewpoint, leadership is viewed not only as an exercise of authority but also on the legal grounds. As societies become more complex, technical demands of the state grow, and decision authority becomes specialized. We are more naturally concerned with what leaders do with the job, and what they are and their behavior. In a country of high-rank public-private sector bureaucracy, leaders at different management hierarchical levels play a major role in shaping the direction of political life. They contribute to our understanding about the role of political leadership in policy formulation.
Nigeria, with its vast amount of natural resources, is currently undergoing rapid economic decline. There is a high incidence of poverty, escalating inflation, balance of payment problems, as well as heavy debt-servicing problems. The root cause of this economic problem stems from the pursuit of an inappropriate economic policy. The dominance of poor leadership in policy formulation in Nigeria can clearly be identified as the main source of the problems. Political leadership is pivotal and significant in shaping the economic landscape of any nation (Klarin, 2020). The quality of any nation’s political leadership can significantly determine or influence such nation’s overall economic development trajectory. Nigeria is blessed with a vibrant human population, abundance of natural resources. These resources, coupled with the great entrepreneurial spirit and resilience of the citizens, have positioned Nigeria as a potential continental economic powerhouse. Unfortunately, and disappointedly so, weak institutional frameworks, coupled with corruption, policy inconsistencies and other numerous governance challenges, have constituted stumbling blocks to the country’s inability to effectively and efficiently harness its economic potential (Ogunleye & Adeleye, 2018).
Economic development is a measure of the increase of per capita income, which is itself, a function of the growth rate of national income (Mankiw & Taylor, 2014). National income growth depends largely on, political leadership stability as well as the appropriate economic policies implemented by the political leadership. Also, insights into the influence of political leadership on the socio-economic development enable one to understand the roots of the poverty trap in which many developing nations are stuck. Understanding why countries have the type of leaders they do have and what determines a politician to govern well or govern poorly help us appreciate the positions of governance. This paper seeks to explore the intricate and dynamic relationship between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria. The paper will briefly examine the historical context, challenges and opportunities in Nigeria’s economic landscape, key policy decisions, and governance structures to unravel the impact of political leadership on key economic indicators such as job creation, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, GDP growth, and foreign direct investment. The paper will provide insights into how effective leadership can catalyze positive economic transformation and propel inclusive growth and development in Nigeria. BACKGROUND With a human population of over 230 million, and rich in natural resources, Nigeria, popularly referred to as the “Giant of Africa” (UK Essays, 2018), and continental powerhouse (Akindele, et al. 2012), holds vast potential for economic growth and development. Despite this abundance of human and natural resources, the country has faced numerous complex challenges and struggles on its path to economic prosperity. Nigeria has experienced significant political, social, and economic changes since its independence from British colonial rule in 1960. Political leadership continues to play a central role in Nigeria’s fate. In general, the effects of political stability on economic development underscore the fact that political opportunities drive the economic policies in countries, especially those that are external as opposed to internal factors. The effectiveness of political leadership in providing the best opportunities for economic policies is also important because the nature of the stability is driven by how the political market works in various countries. Overall, many different types of political markets lead to different types of policy commitments. The impact of political leadership attributes is manifested through varying degrees of political stability, democratization, income inequality, and governance quality. The historical context of Nigeria’s economic development efforts has been shaped by a complex interplay of factors. These include the legacies of the colonial era, post-independence governance structures, the discovery of oil and Nigeria’s dependence on oil, political instability and social inequalities, among others. The country has experienced long periods of military rule, and military coups, disrupting democratic processes, with profound repercussions on economic management and policy consistency. While the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the 1950s provided a unique opportunity for the transformation of Nigeria’s economy and acceleration of the development process, the country’s over-reliance and dependence on oil revenues, and neglect of particularly, manufacturing and agriculture, exposed the country’s economy to external shocks and volatility. This has been further compounded by the mismanagement of oil revenues and the absence of, or lack of diversification. Different administrations and political leaders in Nigeria, have implemented several economic policies that have generated both positive and negative impacts on the nation’s economy. Additionally, the socio-political dynamics coupled with regional disparities, ethno-religious tensions, poverty, youth unemployment, among others, underscore the multidimensional complexities that Nigeria’s political leaders must address in order to foster inclusive and sustainable national economic growth. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA From the beginning, the political leadership has been infused with a degree of military dominance and military interests. Their unwillingness to relinquish control of governance and the economy exposed Nigeria’s leadership to ineffective policies that advocate autocracy, preserve tradition, uphold the old methods instead of developing creative and entrepreneurial elements to thrive when addressing economic development and socio[1]economic change. Political leadership in Nigeria is primarily dedicated to self-interests and strategies. This inadequacy largely refuses them from seeing the need for Nigeria to devise and implement the strategic economic development policies rather than the traditional growth-based doctrines provided and promoted by international economic analysts and international economic ideologues. The autocratic policy models are directed at reinforcing figureheads and also provide ‘cocktail’ solutions primarily to maintain political rivalry. As a result, policy leadership evolves less in the way of the country’s economic and social development. An important characteristic of Nigeria’s political leadership is the role of ethnic and religious affiliations in shaping political alliances and power structures. Ethno-religious dynamics and blocs have played a significant role in determining political outcomes and leadership appointments (Akande, 2016). This has often resulted in a fragmented political landscape, with leaders often prioritizing the interests of their own ethnic or religious groups over those of the nation as a whole. Also, the legacy of military rule has had a lasting impact on Nigeria’s political leadership. Many former military leaders have transitioned into civilian politics, bringing with them a hierarchical and authoritarian style of leadership that has at times undermined democratic principles (Ojo, 2017). This has contributed to a culture of strongman politics, where leaders often centralize power and suppress dissent to maintain control. There have been efforts, in recent years, to reform the country’s political leadership and improve governance standards, through initiatives such as anti-corruption campaigns and electoral reforms, to address some of the challenges facing the country’s leadership (Adesina, 2020). However, progress in this direction has been very slow, and entrenched power structures continue to pose obstacles to meaningful change. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW In analyzing how political leaders influence economic performance in Nigeria, one should be cognizant of the fact that it is the interaction of the political elite with the economic cycle that provides insight into how political institutions mediate the influence of the political elite on the economy. Nigerian society has experienced considerable political upheaval. Income inequality has increased since the 1960s, and democratic political structures have not been effectively adapted to reflect the changes in social structures influenced by modernization. The erratic progress of democracy in Nigeria and its inability to cope with the pressures of rapid modernization have led to an erosion of belief in the efficacy of the social system. Decades of authoritarian or military rule in Nigeria have had a negative impact on the quality of governance and the standard of living of most Nigerians. Nigeria’s economic development has been greatly influenced by a variety of historical, social, and political factors, including pre-colonial trade, colonial exploitation, post-independence policies, and the oil boom. In the pre-colonial period, several thriving economies with very extensive trade networks existed. For example, the Yoruba city- states existed in the southwest, the Benin Kingdom in the southeast and the Hausa kingdoms in the north, engaged in agriculture and craft production, and traded, not only among themselves, but with coastal and trans-Saharan traders (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Then came the Colonial Era, which lasted from 1861-1960, and significantly altered Nigeria’s economic landscape. During this period, the British concentrated on extraction and exportation of raw materials to feed the European Industrial Revolution. The economy was designed to produce cash crops like groundnuts, palm oil, cocoa and others to serve British interests (Ake, 1981). The Post-Independence Industrialization period, from 1960-1970 sought to transform the colonial economic structure and accelerate Nigeria’s industrial development (Ekundare, 1973). Economic development plans were then designed by the government to promote and support the diversification of the country’s economy from agriculture towards industrialization and infrastructural development. This was followed, in the 1970s, by the period of Nigeria’s Oil Boom, where the problem of the country was not money but how to spend it. Oil contributed about 90% of foreign exchange earnings and over 80% of government revenues. The result was increased urbanization and investments in the development of infrastructure, but agriculture and other sectors were practically neglected (Osoba, 1996). With support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Nigeria adopted the Structural Adjustment Program in 1986. This was in response to the challenges of rising debt and falling oil prices. An important goal of the SAP was to liberalize Nigeria’s economy, support private enterprise and minimize state involvement. However, the immediate social impact of the SAP was increased poverty and inequality (Iyoha & Oriakhi, 2002). In 2004, the Nigeria launched the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), focusing on poverty reduction, economic diversification and infrastructure development. The NEEDS focused on the promotion of good governance practices, private sector participation, and social development programs (Soludo, 2017). the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) was launched in 2007 by the government to support and boost agriculture, manufacturing and services (Kalejaiye & Aliyu, 2013). Another policy, the Vision 2020 Agendafollowed in 2009. The goal of the Vision 2020 was to position Nigeria as one of the top 20 economies in the world by 2020. It focused on key sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services, and called for investment in human capital development and infrastructure (Ibrahim, 2020). Since 1990 to date, the country has witnessed a mixture of economic growth and setbacks. While there has been some form of stability in terms of democratic governance and political stability, corruption-induced challenges, the lack of economic diversification away from oil and lack of basic infrastructure still remain.
The influence of political leadership on the economy has been evident in various policies, decisions, and actions taken by those in power. One key example of this can be seen in their management of the country’s vast natural resources, particularly oil. Nigeria is a major oil producer, and the country’s political leaders have often used revenue from the oil sector to fund government programs and projects. Unfortunately, mismanagement, corruption, and lack of diversification have led to a situation where the economy remains heavily reliant on oil, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices (Oyekola, 2015). In order to attract investments and spur economic development, sound economic policies, infrastructural development and regulatory frameworks are very essential. However, political instability, policy inconsistency, and corruption have often deterred investors, leading to suboptimal economic performance (Onyishi, 2018). Also, decisions in respect to government spending, currency stability, taxations and interest rates, are important factors that influence economic performance. Purposeful and effective political leadership in these areas can lead to sustainable economic growth, while poor decisions, as Nigeria’s experience has shown, exacerbate economic challenges(Akinbobola, 2019).
Nigeria has just as much potential as almost any other developed country and can show the same improvement if their government becomes truly transparent and accountable, focusing on creating a conducive enabling environment for organizing Nigerian civil society to generate growth. The importance of political instability and poor governance to the decline of Nigeria’s business climate is not limited to discouraging large foreign investors, but it also affects small and medium-sized businesses. Banks are also affected in several ways by the political instability and poor governance of the country. Political instability contributes to a high-risk credit market and reduced access to credit for the private sector. The financial sector is one area in which scientific and internal market work can be done to establish how poor governance affects Nigeria’s economy.
POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORIES
The literature on political economy (Mills, 2005) as well as political business cycle theory (Nordhaus & William, D, 1975) is rich with reasons why politicians in particular would want to shape economies. They have incentives to gain from various forms of rent seeking. Classical and neoliberal economists have come up with mechanisms through which leaders can manipulate areas of the economy to stay in power. Politicians also agree to a social contract with citizens to provide public goods in return for a mandate to govern. There are incentives for politicians to supply public goods to maintain power. Politicians may choose to use economic policy to expand a country’s productive capacity or improve national welfare as part of their stewardship. This may involve providing an enabling environment where the private sector flourishes and produces many desirable goods and services. Politicians can also manipulate the economy by trading off some economic policy in exchange for political survival. Political leaders remain the most important economic agents whose intentions to grow the economy can impact on aggregate productivity and improve economic outcomes.
Political economy theories offer insights into the complex interplay of institutions, interests and power, as well as different perspectives on the relationship between economics and politics. Some key political economy theories include:
a. The Classical Political Economy Theory, which began around the 18th and 19th centuries, was very prominent and promoted by great thinkers and renowned economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, among others. The classical political economy theory emphasizes minimal government intervention, free markets and self-interests in driving economic outcomes. Proponents of the classical political economy theory believe that overall economic prosperity through the invisible hand mechanism (Smith, 1776), would result from self-interest.
b. The Marxist Political Economy Theory: Developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the Marxist political economy theory deals with the relationship between social classes, labour and capital. The foundation of this theory is that capitalism is inherently exploitative, hence proponents of Marxist political economy theory advocate for the overthrow of the capitalist system (Marx, 1867), and the establishment of a classless society rooted in the common ownership of th means of production.
c. The Institutional Political Economy Theory: The Institutional Political Economy Theory is described as a fusion of economic analysis with political science and sociological insights, in order to properly examine how economic behaviour and outcomes are shaped by institutions. The theory highlights the significance and influence of formal and informal rules and norms, including power structures in economic decision-making (North, 1990). Institutions have the capacity to either promote or hinder economic development and social welfare.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA
Economic growth is a significant contributor and necessary component of economic development. Economic development is the creation of enabling conditions that promote and stimulate rapid and substantial increase in the basic material well-being of the majority. This is achievable by the implementation of political leadership policies to promote economic growth through land reforms, capital intensive industrialization, educational stimulus and effective public health system. Economic development must be measured through such areas as the reduction in the opportunities for malnutrition, the considerable reduction in high infant mortality rates, the availability of potable water, the availability of access to quality educational material, the growth of public health, greater opportunities for employment, the gradual socio-economic level generated by the majority of the people whereby an average level of society is established, the reduction in the level of high inflation and unemployment, indices of per-capita income, and through the efficient allocation of resources in regulating the type of social relationships. The term “economic development” can be viewed from the perspective of a false dichotomy in the development process. The dichotomy resulted due to the identifying of economic development with the advancement of the “center” (the more developed and industrialized countries, usually capitalist, on the one hand) and the possibilities of the “periphery” (viz the less developed, under-developed, undeveloped or developing countries, often countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the other. What the political economist referred to frequently as “economic growth” – a sustained increase in the output of goods and services of a country, usually measured at one sector of the economy most times through the increase of the Gross National product (as one of the forms of indicators of economic development) is often confused with economic development itself. Historically, Nigeria’s economic development has evolved significantly, shaped by its rich endowment of natural resources, governmental policies, and its interactions within the global economy. Nigeria’s oil and gas sector accounts for about 90% of export earnings and more than 50% of government revenue (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2022). This over-dependence on oil and gas has made the country’s economy highly susceptible to global oil price fluctuations. Efforts have been intensified in recent times, to diversify the economy through the development of the agricultural sector, which accounts for about 70% of the labour force and about 24% of the country’s GDP (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022). The Manufacturing sector, though still nascent, holds great promise, in terms of its contributions to the nation’s GDP. This is the clear focus of the Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP), designed to support the manufacturing sector to become globally competitive by increasing the sector’s manufacturing base (Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, 2022). The services sector has recorded the fastest growth in Nigeria, with telecommunications driving the expansion of mobile telephony and internet penetration. The financial services industry has been revolutionized, enhancing financial inclusion (PwC, 2023). Despite such progress, especially in the services sector, Nigeria’s economic development is still hampered by challenges of corruption, insecurity, political instability, and unacceptable unemployment rate, especially among the country’s youth population. Poverty is also widespread, as a significant portion of the country’s human population continues to live below the poverty line. Nigeria’s political leaders are today, also strained by contemporary socio-economic and geopolitical problems.
INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The interplay between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria is profound and deeply influential, presenting a mix of opportunities and challenges over the years. Depending on the nature of leadership, sometimes military and sometimes civilian, centralized versus decentralized, this interplay between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria has been marked by significant shifts. Persistent issues such as corruption and political instability remain significant barriers. The path to sustainable economic development in Nigeria depends largely on the emergence of transparent, accountable, and effective political leadership. Economic policies and outcomes are directly impacted by political leadership. For example, Nigeria witnessed significant regional disparities due to political and ethnic tensions, during Nigeria First Republic (1960-1966), which greatly influenced developmental policies and economic development decisions (Falola & Heaton, 2008). From the late 1960s to late 1990s, the Nigeria witnessed long periods of military regimes, with centralized control over decision-making and economic resources. Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999, signaling a significant turning point for the nation’s political and economic landscape. The Federal Government then, led by President Olusegun Obasanjo, from 1999- 2007, initiated significant economic policies, including banking sector reforms, privatization and the war against corruption to promote Nigeria’s growth and economic stability (Utomi, 2013). Despite these encouraging efforts, corruption, insurgency, political instability, and inadequate infrastructure have continued to impede substantial economic progress. Resources that could be applied for economic development have been drained by political corruption, due to large-scale mismanagement and embezzlement of funds by political leaders (Ekanade, 2014), significantly hampering Nigeria’s economic development. The establishment of institutions such as the ICPC and the EFCC demonstrates leadership commitment to combating corruption. However, the effectiveness of these institutions has depended largely, on the leadership’s commitment and political climate (Agbiboa, 2012). Political leadership seeks to recast the economy, the rules of the institution of property and production, and the distributional benefits from economic growth and stability; it seeks to redistribute property and production, enunciates and enforces written and principled rules of commercial behavior so that technology, skills, knowledge, and other means of production are deployed efficiently at the levels of the corporate sector, while acceptable distributional privileges are punctuated; and it seeks to protect and defend property rights, and to regulate the conduct and behavior of economic agents within the terms of written and enforced rules. The governance structure can either facilitate or obstruct the realization of the aim and objectives of political leadership.
CONCLUSION
Political leadership is fundamental in the process of governance, towards the achievement of desirable objectives, including economic development, social integration, public well-being, and such other related goals. However, political leaders could impact the economy in diverse ways, such as their political orientation and ideology. Furthermore, political leadership is expected to engineer the economy towards greater performance through various operative mechanisms like policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and the evaluation of policies. It is these functions that allow political leaders to use public resources to create value for the improvement of the living standards of a country, while at the same time working to broaden social welfare, for instance, by increasing employment. Although political leadership’s corresponding influence on economic development can have significant consequences, either through its impact on policy change driven by its transfer of power from one set of political actors to another, or by altering expectations and beliefs, political regimes can shape patterns of economic development and distributions. Such leaders can act as a model, man of action, great communicator, or transformational leader, while others have been seen as people of vision pursuit focusing on creativity and risk persuasiveness inspiring trust to make things happen, society builder, nation-builder(s), nation transformer, and many more. Good political leadership creates an environment that promotes economic development. Intriguingly, corruption at all levels of governance, poor accountability and transparency have been identified as the bane of the underdevelopment of many African nations including Nigeria. To find solutions to these problems, this work has investigated the influence of political leadership on economic development in Nigeria. The paper is anchored on the legitimacy theory which emphasizes the importance of public confidence and trust in government-to-government effectiveness. The study adopted the quasi-experimental research design with the secondary source of data as the only source of data collection. Data analyzed were obtained from secondary sources using content analysis. The research found out that political leadership influences economic development in Nigeria ranging from ineffective utilization of resources, embezzlement of public funds, bad governance, poor service, and inadequate level of socialization, and encouragement of corrupt practices among public officials. This paper suggests that more attention should be paid to the challenges at the institutional structure and the political system in Nigeria. These challenges call for significant measures aimed at promoting good political leadership in Nigeria. For Nigeria to attain her worthy goals as a competitive and prospering nation, Nigerians must commit to re-establishing value for the common good, a good society, community, dialogue, tolerance, fraternity, and self-identity, fostering a mutual sense of belonging in full participation and well-being. Furthermore, initiating agile services reflecting due transparency and encouraging responsibility among all its leaders at all levels, in good faith and uprightness, and manifesting self-pride. To this end, the paper advocates for the urgent need for enhancing moral leadership and promoting genuine politics in terms of the inviolability of life, perennial morals, and the preservation of the human environment, and democracy for social and civil rights.
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When political leaders are unjust, oppressive and manipulative, it becomes difficult to share the goals of the elite, and consequently stifle efforts toward growth and development. However, and usefully, vision, political will, attributes of democratic inclusiveness and transformational qualities make great leaders capable of leading development and country mobilization into prosperity, democracy and development. A sense of national interest as the cardinal point of leadership informs the communal spirit of visionary political leadership in building and remolding the structure of a nation state. In conclusion, all historical trajectories to high growth in emerging economies were marked by focused attention to structural change by political leadership. In this sense, an inclusive approach and response from the political leadership in Nigeria places some optimism in the quest for long-term growth and economic progress. Leadership at the level of nation-states had a greater impact on growth and development than at any higher level. A developing country’s own leadership had the major responsibility to initiate, guide and pace its growth process. History and successful models of change provide a message of hope, that with the right policies, attributes and dispositions of its leaders, good countries can become better. However, at other times political leaders thwart the development of their nations through corrupt practices and greed that undermines development objectives.
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19. National Bureau of Statistics. (2022). Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report. Retrieved from [nigerianstat.gov.ng] (https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng)
20. Nnanna, O. J. (2019). Economic Reform and Governance in Nigeria: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects. Journal of African Economic Development, 14(4), 120-135.
21. Nordhaus, William D. “The political business cycle.” The Review of Economic Studies 42.1 (1975): 169-190.
22. North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.
23. Ogunleye, O., & Adeleye, I. (2018). Challenges of Economic Development in Nigeria: The Role of
Policy Inconsistencies and Institutional Frameworks. Journal of African Economics, 42(2), 65-80.
24. Ojo, O. (2017). Military Rule, Democracy Transition, and Political Leadership in Nigeria. Journal of African Political Studies, 4(3), 112-128.
25. Oyekola, K. (2015). Oil Wealth and Economic Development in Nigeria: Challenges and Opportunities. African Development Review, 17(2), 78-94.
26. Onyishi, E. (2018). Political Instability and Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria. Journal of Political Economy, 35(1), 124-139.
27. Osoba, S. O. (1996). Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives. _Review of African Political Economy_, 23(69), 371-386.
28. PwC. (2023). The rise of fintech in Nigeria: Challenges and opportunities. Retrieved from [pwc.com] (https://www.pwc.com).
29. Ross, M. L. (2015). The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review. Developments in the Economics of Natural Resources, 25(1), 35-50.
30. Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell.
31. Soludo, C. (2017). Oil, Economic Diversification, and Sustainable Development in Nigeria. Nigerian Journal of Economic Policy, 30(3), 72-88.
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[https://www.ukessays.com/](https://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/why-is-nigeria-called-the[1]giant-of-africa.php).
33. Utomi, P. (2013). *Nigeria’s Path to Progress: Towards Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development*. Lagos: Africana Leadership Academy
First publication: International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (ISSN 2454-6186), vol. VIII, issue VII, July 2024, p. 1274-1282, https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.807106 Received: 17 June 2024; Revised: 30 June 2024; Accepted: 04 July 2024; Published: 07 August 2024.
Illustrative Photo by Christina Morillo: https://www.pexels.com/photo/black-and-gray-laptop-computer-turned-on-doing-computer-codes-1181271/
Author
The presidential election in Senegal is already noteworthy before it even happens on 25 February 2024. This is because President Macky Sall told the world last summer that he would be stepping down and would not run in the election, thereby fully respecting the end of his constitutional term. As he put it, he has great faith in the country and its people to continue after his presidency. His stance is in striking contrast to the current trend on the continent for military coups and presidents clinging on to power long after their constitutional terms have ended.
In an interview with Africa Report, President Sall said:
“Senegal is more than just me, it’s full of people capable of taking Senegal to the next level. Personally, I believe in hard work and keeping one’s word. It may be old-fashioned, but it’s worked for me so far and I don’t see why I should change my nature.”
He added,
“The real issue is the conditions under which African countries are forced into debt, at high rates. Above all, unlike other countries, we are unable to obtain loans for more than 10 or 12 years, even when we want to build a hydroelectric power station to combat global warming … That’s the real struggle for Africans.”
As for his own resignation, he said,
“You have to know how to turn the page: I’ll do what Abdou Diouf did and retire completely. Then I’ll see how I can redeploy my energies, because I still have a bit [of that] left, by the grace of God.”
There is speculation that he will be offered several prestigious roles, especially around giving an international voice to Africa. In particular, his name has been associated with the African Union’s newly acquired seat at the G20.
He is active in debates about global governance, including financial governance, and vocal about what he believes are necessary reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. He is also a powerful voice on climate change, emphasising that Africa’s share of global pollution is less than four percent and that it is unjust to tell the African continent it cannot use fossil fuels or have them financed.
He is expected to be called upon for peace-making roles and is considered a favourite for the prize of $5m that Mo Ibrahim awards to an Africa leader who has demonstrated good governance and respect for term limits. Some of these roles are already being granted.
The OECD and France named him in November 2023 as the 4P’s (Paris Pact for People and Planet) special envoy from January. The statement said President Sall’s personal commitment will play a decisive role in mobilising all the players of goodwill and signatories to the 4P.
President Sall’s legacy on the international stage, including his former role of Chair of the African Union, is well-respected. He has championed the cancellation of African debt and strengthening the fight against terrorism. He has also been influential in his rejection of the military coups that have taken place in Africa since 2020 and the efforts to reverse them.
Of course two of the earlier coups were in Mali, Senegal’s biggest trading partner. These were followed by a coup in another neighbour, Guinea, and a failed attempt in next-door Guinea-Bissau. President Sall was chair of the African Union when a coup struck in Burkina Faso for the second time within 2022. He played a leading role in the response of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to every coup, including one in Niger in July.
As head of the African Union last year, he drove efforts to broker the Black Sea grain deal that has allowed crucial shipments of Ukrainian grain to reach African countries despite the Russian invasion. He is also appreciated for his role in forcing out dictator Yahya Jammeh in neighbouring Gambia in 2017.
As for Senegal’s future, President Sall said,
“We are on the right track, despite the crisis linked to the Covid-19 pandemic and the effects of the war in Ukraine. After spending the last decade filling in the gaps in infrastructure, electricity, and water, we need to encourage the private sector to invest more in our country so that, in the future, the state can focus more on social issues, agriculture and food sovereignty.”
Senegal’s reputation as a democracy has only been further cemented by President Sall’s willingness to step down and his instruction to his government to ensure free and transparent elections on 25 February 2024 and a smooth transition. It is to be hoped that this example will inspire a better year ahead across the continent, in terms of democracy and respect for the rule of law and term limits.
Author
The relationship between the Fulani, corruption and neo-pastoralism, i.e. the purchase of large herds of cattle by wealthy city dwellers to hide ill-gotten money.
By Teodor Detchev
The previous two parts of this analysis, titled “The Sahel – Conflicts, Coups and Migration Bombs” and “The Fulani and Jihadism in West Africa”, discussed the rise of terrorist activity in West Africa and the inability to end the guerrilla warfare waged by Islamic radicals against government troops in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Nigeria. The issue of the ongoing civil war in the Central African Republic was also discussed.
One of the important conclusions is that the intensification of the conflict is fraught with the high risk of a “migration bomb” that would lead to unprecedented migration pressure along the entire southern border of the European Union. An important circumstance is also the possibilities of Russian foreign policy to manipulate the intensity of conflicts in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and the Central African Republic. With its hand on the “counter” of a potential migration explosion, Moscow could easily be tempted to use induced migration pressure against EU states that are generally already designated as hostile.
In this risky situation, a special role is played by the Fulani people – an ethnic group of semi-nomads, migratory livestock breeders who inhabit the strip from the Gulf of Guinea to the Red Sea and number 30 to 35 million people according to various data. Being a people who have historically played a very important role in the penetration of Islam into Africa, especially West Africa, the Fulani are a huge temptation for Islamic radicals, despite the fact that they profess the Sufi school of Islam, which is undoubtedly the most tolerant, as and the most mystical.
Unfortunately, as will be seen from the analysis below, the issue is not just about religious opposition. The conflict is not only ethno-religious. It is socio-ethno-religious, and in recent years, the effects of the wealth accumulated through corruption, converted into livestock ownership – the so-called “neopastorism” – have begun to exert an additional strong influence. This phenomenon is particularly characteristic of Nigeria and is the subject of the present third part of the analysis.
The Fulani in Nigeria
Being the most populous country in West Africa with 190 million inhabitants, Nigeria, like many countries in the region, is characterized by a kind of dichotomy between the South, populated mainly by Yoruba Christians, and the North, whose population is mainly Muslim, with a large part of it is the Fulani who, as everywhere, are migratory animal breeders. Overall, the country is 53% Muslim and 47% Christian.
The “central belt” of Nigeria, crossing the country from east to west, including in particular the states of Kaduna (north of Abuja), Bunue-Plateau (east of Abuja) and Taraba (southeast of Abuja), is a meeting point between these two worlds , the scene of frequent incidents in a never-ending cycle of vendettas between farmers, usually Christian (who accuse Fulani herdsmen of allowing their herds to damage their crops) and nomadic Fulani pastoralists (who complain of cattle theft and the increasing establishment of farms in areas traditionally accessible to their animal migration routes).
These conflicts have intensified in recent times, as the Fulani also seek to expand the migration and grazing routes of their herds to the south, and the northern grasslands suffer from increasingly severe drought, while the farmers of the south, in the conditions of particularly high dynamics of population growth, seek to establish farms further north.
After 2019, this antagonism took a dangerous turn in the direction of identity and religious affiliation between the two communities, which became irreconcilable and governed by different legal systems, especially since Islamic law (Sharia) was reintroduced in 2000 in twelve northern states. (Islamic law was in force until 1960, after which it was abolished with Nigeria’s independence). From the Christians’ point of view, the Fulani want to “Islamize” them – if necessary by force.
This view is fueled by the fact that Boko Haram, which targets mostly Christians, seeks to use the armed militias used by the Fulani against their opponents, and that indeed a number of these fighters have joined the ranks of the Islamist group. Christians believe that the Fulani (along with the Hausa, who are related to them) provide the core of Boko Haram’s forces. This is an exaggerated perception given the fact that a number of Fulani militias remain autonomous. But the fact is that by 2019 the antagonism had worsened. [38]
Thus, on June 23, 2018, in a village inhabited mostly by Christians (of the Lugere ethnic group), an attack attributed to the Fulani led to heavy casualties – 200 killed.
The election of Muhammadu Buhari, who is a Fulani and former leader of the largest Fulani cultural association, Tabital Pulaakou International, as President of the Republic did not help to reduce tensions. The president is often accused of surreptitiously supporting his Fulani parents instead of instructing security forces to crack down on their criminal activities.
The situation of the Fulani in Nigeria is also indicative of some new trends in the relationship between migratory pastoralists and settled farmers. Sometime in the year 2020, researchers have already established indisputably a noticeable increase in the number of conflicts and clashes between pastoralists and farmers.[5]
Neaopastoralims and Fulani
Issues and facts such as climate change, expanding deserts, regional conflicts, population growth, human trafficking and terrorism have been invoked in attempts to explain this phenomenon. The problem is that none of these questions fully explain the sharp increase in the use of small arms and light weapons by several groups of pastoralists and sedentary farmers. [5]
Olayinka Ajala dwells on this question in particular, who examines the changes in the ownership of livestock over the years, which he calls “neopastoralism”, as a possible explanation for the increase in the number of armed clashes between these groups.
The term neopastoralism was first used by Matthew Luizza of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to describe the subversion of the traditional form of pastoral (migratory) animal husbandry by wealthy urban elites who venture to invest and engage in such animal husbandry to conceal stolen or ill-gotten assets. (Luizza, Matthew, African herders have been pushed into destitution and crime, November 9th, 2017, The Economist). [8]
For his part, Olayinka Ajala defines neo-pastoralism as a new form of livestock ownership characterized by the ownership of large herds of livestock by people who are not pastoralists themselves. These flocks were accordingly served by hired shepherds. Working around these herds often necessitates the use of sophisticated weapons and ammunition, stemming from the need to hide stolen wealth, proceeds of trafficking, or income obtained through terrorist activity, with the express purpose of making a profit for investors. It is important to note that Ajala Olayinka’s definition of non-pastoralism does not include investments in cattle financed by legal means. Such exist, but they are few in number and therefore they do not fall within the scope of the author’s research interest.[5]
Grazing migratory livestock farming is traditionally small-scale, herds are family-owned and usually associated with particular ethnic groups. This farming activity is associated with various risks, as well as with the considerable effort required to move livestock hundreds of kilometers in search of pasture. All this makes this profession not so popular and it is engaged in by several ethnic groups, among which the Fulani stand out, for whom it has been a main occupation for many decades. Besides being one of the largest ethnic groups in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, some sources put the Fulani in Nigeria at about 17 million people. In addition, cattle are often seen as a source of security and an indicator of wealth, and for this reason traditional pastoralists engage in cattle sales on a very limited scale.
Traditional Pastoralism
Neopastoralism differs from traditional pastoralism in terms of the form of livestock ownership, the average size of herds, and the use of weapons. While the traditional average herd size varies between 16 and 69 head of cattle, the size of non-pastoral herds usually ranges between 50 and 1,000 head of cattle, and the engagements around them often involve the use of firearms by hired herdsmen. [8], [5]
Although it was previously common in the Sahel for such larger herds to be accompanied by armed soldiers, nowadays livestock ownership is increasingly seen as a means of concealing ill-gotten wealth from corrupt politicians. Furthermore, while traditional pastoralists strive for good relations with farmers to maintain their symbiotic interaction with them, mercenary herders have no incentive to invest in their social relationships with farmers because they possess weapons that can be used to intimidate the farmers. [5], [8]
In Nigeria in particular, there are three main reasons for the emergence of neo-pastoralism. The first is that livestock ownership seems a tempting investment because of the ever-increasing prices. A sexually mature cow in Nigeria can costs US$1,000 and this makes cattle breeding an attractive field for potential investors. [5]
Secondly, there is a direct link between neo-pastoralism and corrupt practices in Nigeria. A number of researchers have argued that corruption is at the root of most of the insurgencies and armed insurgencies in the country. In 2014, one of the measures taken by the government to curb corruption, especially money laundering, was introduced. This is the Bank Verification Number (BVN) entry. The purpose of BVN is to monitor bank transactions and reduce or eliminate money laundering. [5]
The Bank Verification Number (BVN) uses biometric technology to register each customer with all Nigerian banks. Each customer is then issued a unique identification code that links all their accounts so that they can easily monitor transactions between multiple banks. The aim is to ensure that suspicious transactions are easily identified as the system captures the images and fingerprints of all bank customers, making it difficult for illegal funds to be deposited into different accounts by the same person. Data from in-depth interviews revealed that the BVN made it harder for political office-holders to hide illicit wealth, and a number of accounts linked to politicians and their cronies, fed with allegedly stolen funds, were frozen after its introduction.
The Central Bank of Nigeria reported that “several billions of naira (Nigeria’s currency) and millions in other foreign currencies were trapped in accounts at a number of banks, with the owners of these accounts suddenly ceasing to do business with them. Eventually, over 30 million “passive” and unused accounts have been identified since the introduction of BVN in Nigeria by 2020. [5]
In-depth interviews conducted by the author revealed that many people who had deposited large sums of money in Nigerian banks immediately before the introduction of the Bank Verification Number (BVN) rushed to withdraw it. A few weeks before the deadline for anyone using banking services to obtain a BVN, bank officials in Nigeria are witnessing a veritable river of cash being cashed en masse from various branches in the country. Of course, it cannot be said that all this money was stolen or the result of abuses of power, but it is an established fact that many politicians in Nigeria are switching to paid cash because they do not want to be subject to bank monitoring. [5]
At this very moment, flows of ill-gotten funds have been diverted into the agricultural sector, with an impressive number of livestock being purchased. Financial security experts agree that since the introduction of BVN, there has been a sharp rise in the number of people using ill-gotten wealth to buy livestock. Considering the fact that in 2019 an adult cow costs 200,000 – 400,000 Naira (600 to 110 USD) and that there is no mechanism to establish the ownership of cattle, it is easy for the corrupt to buy hundreds of cattle for millions of Naira. This leads to an increase in livestock prices, with a number of large herds now being owned by people who have nothing to do with cattle breeding as a job and a daily life, with some of the owners even from regions that are too far from grazing areas. [5]
As discussed above, this creates another major security risk in the rangeland area, as mercenary herdsmen are very often well-armed.
Thirdly, neopastoralists explain the new pattern of neopatrimonial relationships between owners and pastoralists with the increased level of poverty among those engaged in the industry. Despite the increase in livestock prices over the past few decades and despite the expansion of livestock farming in the export market, poverty among migrant livestock farmers has not decreased. On the contrary, according to data from Nigerian researchers, in the last 30-40 years, the number of poor herdsmen has increased sharply. (Catley, Andy and Alula Iyasu, Moving up or moving out? A Rapid Livelihoods and Conflict Analysis in Mieso-Mulu Woreda, Shinile Zone, Somali Region, Ethiopia, April 2010, Feinstein International Center).
For those at the bottom of the social ladder in the pastoral community, working for owners of large herds becomes the only option for survival. In the neo-pastoral setting, increasing poverty among the pastoralist community, which drives traditional migratory herders out of business, makes them easy prey for “absentee owners” as cheap labour. In some places where members of the political cabinet own the cattle, members of the pastoral communities or herders of the specific ethnic groups who have been involved in this activity for centuries, often receive their remuneration in the form of funding presented as “support for local communities”. In this way, illegally obtained wealth is legitimized. This patron-client relationship is particularly prevalent in northern Nigeria (home to the largest number of traditional migratory herders, including the Fulani), who are perceived as being assisted by the authorities in this way. [5]
In this case, Ajala Olayinka uses the case of Nigeria as a case study to explore in depth these new patterns of conflict given that it has the largest concentration of livestock in the West African region and the Sub – Saharan Africa – about 20 million head of cattle. Accordingly, the number of pastoralists is also very high compared to other regions, and the scale of conflicts in the country is very serious. [5]
It must be emphasized here that it is also about a geographical shift of the center of gravity and of pastoral migration agriculture and the conflicts related to it from the countries of the Horn of Africa, where in the past it was most advocated to West Africa and in particular – to Nigeria. Both the amount of livestock raised and the scale of the conflicts are gradually being transferred from the countries of the Horn of Africa to the west, and currently the focus of these problems is now in Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. The correctness of this statement is fully confirmed by the data of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Again according to the same source, Nigeria’s clashes and subsequent deaths are ahead of other countries with similar problems.
Olayinka’s findings are based on field research and the use of qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews conducted in Nigeria between 2013 and 2019. [5]
Broadly speaking, the study explains that traditional pastoralism and migratory pastoralism are gradually giving way to neopastoralism, a form of pastoralism that is characterized by much larger herds and increased use of weapons and ammunition to protect them. [5]
One of the key consequences of non-pastoralism in Nigeria is the serious increase in the number of incidents and consequently the dynamics of livestock theft and kidnapping in rural areas. This in itself is not a new phenomenon and has been observed for a long time. According to researchers such as Aziz Olanian and Yahaya Aliyu, for decades, cattle rustling was “localized, seasonal, and carried out with more traditional weapons with a low level of violence.” (Olaniyan, Azeez and Yahaya Aliyu, Cows, Bandits and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling in Northern Nigeria, In: Africa Spectrum, Vol. 51, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 93 – 105).
According to them, during this long (but seemingly long-gone) period, cattle rustling and the well-being of migratory herders went hand in hand, and cattle rustling was even seen as “a tool for resource redistribution and territorial expansion by pastoralist communities”. .
To prevent anarchy from occurring, the leaders of the pastoral communities had created rules for cattle rustling (!) that did not allow violence against women and children. Killings during cattle theft were also prohibited.
These rules have been in place not only in West Africa, as reported by Olanian and Aliyu, but also in East Africa, south of the Horn of Africa, for example in Kenya, where Ryan Trichet reports a similar approach. (Triche, Ryan, Pastoral conflict in Kenya: transforming mimetic violence to mimetic blessings between Turkana and Pokot communities, African journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 81-101).
At that time, migratory animal husbandry and pastoralism were practiced by specific ethnic groups (the Fulani prominent among them) who lived in highly connected and interwoven communities, sharing a common culture, values and religion, which helped to resolve the disputes and conflicts that arose. resolve without escalating into extreme forms of violence. [5]
One of the main differences between cattle stealing in the distant past, a few decades ago, and today is the logic behind the act of stealing. In the past, the motive for stealing cattle was either to restore some losses in the family herd, or to pay the bride price at a wedding, or to equalize some differences in wealth between individual families, but figuratively speaking “it was not marketable oriented and the main motive for the theft is not the pursuit of any economic goal”. And here this situation has been in effect in both West and East Africa. (Fleisher, Michael L., “War is good for Thieving!”: the Symbiosis of Crime and Warfare among the Kuria of Tanzania, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2002, pp. 131 -149).
Quite the opposite has been the case in the last decade, during which we have witnessed livestock thefts motivated mostly by considerations of economic prosperity, which are figuratively speaking “market oriented”. It is mostly stolen for profit, not out of envy or extreme necessity. To some extent, the spread of these approaches and practices can also be attributed to circumstances such as the rising cost of livestock, the increased demand for meat due to population growth, and the ease with which weapons can be obtained. [5]
Aziz Olanian and Yahaya Aliyu’s research establishes and proves indisputably the existence of a direct link between neo-pastoralism and the increased volume of livestock theft in Nigeria. Events in several African countries have increased arms proliferation (proliferation) in the region, with mercenary neo-herdsmen being supplied with “herd protection” weapons, which are also used in cattle theft.
Arms proliferation
This phenomenon took on a whole new dimension after 2011, when tens of thousands of small arms spread from Libya to a number of countries in the Sahel Sahara, as well as to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. These observations have been fully confirmed by the “expert panel” established by the UN Security Council, which, among other things, also examines the conflict in Libya. Experts note that the uprising in Libya and the subsequent fighting have led to an unprecedented proliferation of weapons not only in Libya’s neighboring countries, but also across the continent.
According to UN Security Council experts who have collected detailed data from 14 African countries, Nigeria is one of the most affected by the rampant proliferation of arms originating in Libya. Arms are smuggled into Nigeria and other countries through the Central African Republic (CAR), with these shipments fueling conflict, insecurity and terrorism in several African countries. (Strazzari, Francesco, Libyan Arms and Regional Instability, The International Spectator. Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 49, Issue 3, 2014, pp. 54-68).
Although the Libyan conflict has long been and continues to be the main source of arms proliferation in Africa, there are other active conflicts that are also fueling the flow of arms to various groups, including the neo-pastoralists in Nigeria and the Sahel. The list of these conflicts includes South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Central African Republic, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is estimated that in the month of March 2017 there were over 100 million small arms and light weapons (SALW) in crisis zones around the world, with a significant number of them being used in Africa.
The illegal arms trade industry thrives in Africa, where “porous” borders are common around most countries, with weapons moving freely across them. While most of the smuggled weapons end up in the hands of insurgent and terrorist groups, migratory herders are also increasingly using small arms and light weapons (SALW). For example, pastoralists in Sudan and South Sudan have been openly displaying their small arms and light weapons (SALW) for more than 10 years. Although many traditional herders can still be seen in Nigeria herding cattle with sticks in hand, a number of migrant herders have been spotted with small arms and light weapons (SALW) and some have been accused of being involved in cattle rustling. Over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in the number of cattle thefts, resulting in the deaths of not only traditional herders, but also farmers, security agents and other citizens. (Adeniyi, Adesoji, The Human Cost of Uncontrolled Arms in Africa, Cross-national research on seven African countries, March 2017, Oxfam Research Reports).
Apart from hired herdsmen who use the weapons at their disposal to engage in cattle rustling, there are also professional bandits who mainly engage in armed cattle rustling in some parts of Nigeria. Neo-herdsmen often claim that they need protection from these bandits when explaining the arming of herdsmen. Some of the livestock breeders interviewed stated that they carry weapons to protect themselves from bandits who attack them with the intention of stealing their cattle. (Kuna, Mohammad J. and Jibrin Ibrahim (eds.), Rural banditry and conflicts in northern Nigeria, Center for Democracy and Development, Abuja, 2015, ISBN: 9789789521685, 9789521685).
The National Secretary of the Miyetti Allah Livestock Breeders Association of Nigeria (one of the largest livestock breeders’ associations in the country) states: “If you see a Fulani man carrying an AK-47, it is because cattle rustling has become so rampant that one he wonders if there is any security in the country at all”. (Fulani national leader: Why our herdsmen carry AK47s., May 2, 2016, 1;58 pm, The News).
The complication comes from the fact that weapons acquired to prevent cattle rustling are also freely used when there is conflict between herdsmen and farmers. This clash of interests around migratory livestock has led to an arms race and created a battlefield-like environment as a growing number of traditional herders have also resorted to carrying weapons to defend themselves along with their livestock. The changing dynamics are leading to new waves of violence and are often collectively referred to as “pastoral conflict”. [5]
An increase in the number and intensity of severe clashes and violence between farmers and herders is also believed to be a consequence of the growth of neo-pastoralism. Excluding deaths resulting from terrorist attacks, clashes between farmers and herdsmen accounted for the largest number of conflict-related deaths in 2017. (Kazeem, Yomi, Nigeria now has a bigger internal security threat than Boko Haram, January 19, 2017, Quarz).
Although clashes and feuds between farmers and migratory herders are centuries old, that is, they date back to before the colonial era, the dynamics of these conflicts have changed dramatically. (Ajala, Olayinka, Why clashes are on the rise between farmers and herdsmen in the Sahel, May 2nd, 2018, 2.56 pm CEST, The Conversation).
In the pre-colonial period, pastoralists and farmers often lived side by side in a symbiosis due to the form of agriculture and the size of the herds. Livestock grazed on the stubble left by farmers after harvest, most often during the dry season when migratory herders moved their livestock further south to graze there. In exchange for the assured grazing and right of access granted by the farmers, the cattle excrement was used by the farmers as a natural fertilizer for their farmlands. These were times of smallholder farms and family ownership of herds, and both farmers and ranchers benefited from their understanding. From time to time, when grazing livestock destroyed farm produce and conflicts arose, local conflict resolution mechanisms were implemented and differences between farmers and pastoralists were ironed out, usually without resorting to violence. [5] In addition, farmers and migratory herders often created grain-for-milk exchange schemes that strengthened their relationships.
However, this model of agriculture has undergone several changes. Issues such as changes in the pattern of agricultural production, the population explosion, the development of market and capitalist relations, climate change, the shrinking of the area of Lake Chad, competition for land and water, the right to use migratory pastoral routes, drought and the expansion of the desert ( desertification), increased ethnic differentiation and political manipulations have been cited as reasons for the changes in the dynamics of the farmer-migratory livestock breeder relationship. Davidheiser and Luna identify the combination of colonization and the introduction of market-capitalist relations in Africa as one of the main causes of conflict between pastoralists and farmers on the continent. (Davidheiser, Mark and Aniuska Luna, From Complementarity to Conflict: A Historical Analysis of Farmet – Fulbe Relations in West Africa, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, pp. 77 – 104).
They argue that changes in land ownership laws that occurred during the colonial era, combined with changes in farming techniques following the adoption of modern farming methods such as irrigated agriculture and the introduction of “schemes to accustom migratory pastoralists to a settled life”, violate the former symbiotic relationship between farmers and pastoralists, increasing the likelihood of conflict between these two social groups.
The analysis that Davidheiser and Luna offer argues that the integration between market relations and modern modes of production has led to a shift from “exchange-based relations” between farmers and migratory herders to “marketization and commodification” and commoditization of production), which increases the demand pressure for natural resources between the two countries and destabilizes the previously symbiotic relationship.
Climate change has also been cited as one of the main causes of conflict between farmers and herders in West Africa. In a quantitative study conducted in Kano State, Nigeria in 2010, Haliru identified the encroachment of desert into agricultural land as a major source of resource struggle leading to conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in northern Nigeria. (Halliru, Salisu Lawal, Security Implication of Climate Change Between Farmers and Cattle Rearers in Northern Nigeria: A Case Study of Three Communities in Kura Local Government of Kano State. In: Leal Filho, W. (eds) Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2015).
Changes in rainfall levels have altered pastoralist migration patterns, with pastoralists moving further south into areas where their herds would not normally have grazed in previous decades. An example of this is the effect of prolonged droughts in the Sudan-Sahel desert region, which have become severe since 1970. (Fasona, Mayowa J. and A.S. Omojola, Climate Change, Human Security and Communal Clashes in Nigeria, 22 – 23 June 2005, Proceedings of International Workshop on Human Security and Climate Change, Holmen Fjord Hotel, Asker near Oslo, Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS), Oslo).
This new pattern of migration increases the pressure on land and soil resources, leading to conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. In other cases, the increase in population of farming and herding communities has also contributed to the pressure on the environment.
Although the issues listed here have contributed to the deepening of the conflict, there has been a noticeable difference in the past few years in terms of intensity, types of weapons used, methods of attack and the number of deaths recorded in the conflict. The number of attacks has also increased significantly over the past decade, most notably in Nigeria.
Data from the ACLED database shows that the conflict has become more severe since 2011, highlighting a possible link to the Libyan civil war and the resulting arms proliferation. Although the number of attacks and the number of casualties have increased in most of the countries affected by the Libyan conflict, the numbers for Nigeria confirm the scale of the increase and the importance of the problem, highlighting the need for a much deeper understanding of the key elements of the conflict.
According to Olayinka Ajala, two main relationships stand out between the manner and intensity of attacks and non-pastoralism. Firstly, the type of weapons and ammunition used by the herdsmen and secondly, the people involved in the attacks. [5] A key finding in his research is that weapons purchased by pastoralists to protect their livestock are also used to attack farmers when there are disagreements over grazing routes or the destruction of farmland by itinerant pastoralists. [5]
According to Olayinka Ajala, in many cases the types of weapons used by the attackers give the impression that the migrant herders have outside support. Taraba State in North-Eastern Nigeria is cited as such an example. After long-running attacks by herdsmen in the state, the federal government has deployed soldiers near the affected communities to prevent further attacks. Despite the deployment of troops in the affected communities, several attacks were still carried out with lethal weapons, including machine guns.
The Chairman of Takum Area Local Government, Taraba State, Mr. Shiban Tikari in an interview with “Daily Post Nigeria” stated, “The herdsmen who are now coming to our community with machine guns are not the traditional herdsmen we know and deal with lived years in a row; I suspect they may have been released members of Boko Haram. [5]
There is very strong evidence that parts of the herding communities are fully armed and are now acting as militias. For example, one of the leaders of the herding community boasted in an interview that his group had successfully carried out attacks on several farming communities in northern Nigeria. He claimed that his group was no longer afraid of the military and stated: “We have over 800 [semi-automatic] rifles, machine guns; the Fulani now have bombs and military uniforms.” (Salkida, Ahmad, Exclusive on Fulani herdsmen: “We have machine guns, bombs and military uniforms”, Jauro Buba; 07/09/2018). This statement was also confirmed by many others interviewed by Olayinka Ajala.
The types of weapons and ammunition used in herdsmen’s attacks on farmers are not available to traditional herdsmen and this rightly casts suspicion on the neo-herdsmen. In an interview with an army officer, he claimed that poor pastoralists with small herds could not afford automatic rifles and the types of weapons used by the attackers. He said: “on reflection, I wonder how a poor herdsman can afford a machine gun or hand grenades used by these attackers?
Every enterprise has its own cost-benefit analysis, and local shepherds could not invest in such weapons to protect their small flocks. For someone to spend huge sums of money to buy these weapons, they must either have invested heavily in these herds or intend to steal as many cattle as possible to recoup their investment. This further points to the fact that organized crime syndicates or cartels are now involved in migratory livestock”. [5]
Another respondent stated that traditional herders cannot afford the price of the AK47, which sells for US$1,200 – US$1,500 on the black market in Nigeria. Also, in 2017, the Member of Parliament representing Delta State (South-South Region) in the House of Assembly, Evans Ivuri, stated that an unidentified helicopter regularly makes deliveries to some herdsmen in the Owre-Abraka Wilderness in the state, where they reside with their cattle. According to the legislator, more than 5,000 cattle and about 2,000 shepherds reside in the forest. These claims further indicate that the ownership of these cattle is highly questionable.
According to Olayinka Ajala, the second link between the mode and intensity of attacks and non-pastoralism is the identity of the people involved in the attacks. There are several arguments about the identity of the herdsmen involved in the attacks on farmers, with many of the attackers being herdsmen.
In many areas where farmers and ranchers have coexisted for decades, farmers know the ranchers whose herds graze around their farms, the periods they bring their livestock, and the average size of the herds. Nowadays, there are complaints that herd sizes are larger, herdsmen are strangers to farmers and are armed with dangerous weapons. These changes make the traditional management of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists more difficult and sometimes impossible. [5]
The Chairman of Ussa Local Government Council – Taraba State, Mr. Rimamsikwe Karma, has stated that the herdsmen who have carried out a series of attacks on farmers are not the ordinary herdsmen that local people know, saying they are “strangers”. The head of the Council stated that “the shepherds who came after the army to the territory governed by our council are not friendly to our people, for us they are unknown persons and they kill people”. [5]
This claim has been confirmed by the Nigerian military, which has said that the migrant herdsmen who have been involved in violence and attacks on farmers were “sponsored” and not traditional herdsmen. (Fabiyi, Olusola, Olaleye Aluko and John Charles, Benue: Killer herdsmen are sponsored, says military, April 27-th, 2018, Punch).
The Kano State Police Commissioner explained in an interview that many of the arrested armed herdsmen are from countries such as Senegal, Mali and Chad. [5] This is further evidence that increasingly mercenary herders are replacing traditional herders.
It is important to note that not all conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in these regions are due to neo-pastoralism. Recent events show that many traditional migratory herders are already carrying weapons. Also, some of the attacks on farmers are reprisals and reprisals for killing livestock by farmers. Although many mainstream media in Nigeria claim that herdsmen are the aggressors in most of the conflicts, in-depth interviews reveal that some of the attacks on settled farmers are in retaliation for killings of herdsmen’s livestock by farmers.
For example, the Berom ethnic group in Plateau State (one of the largest ethnic groups in the region) has never hidden its disdain for pastoralists and has sometimes resorted to slaughtering their livestock to prevent grazing on their lands. This led to retaliation and violence by the herdsmen, resulting in the slaughter of hundreds of people from the Berom ethnic community. (Idowu, Aluko Opeyemi, Urban Violance Dimension in Nigeria: Farmers and Herders Onslaught, AGATHOS, Vol. 8, Issue 1 (14), 2017, p. 187-206); (Akov, Emmanuel Terkimbi, The resource-conflict debate revisited: Untangling the case of farmer-herdsmen clashes in the North Central region of Nigeria, Vol. 26, 2017, Issue 3, African Security Review, pp. 288 – 307).
In response to increasing attacks on farmers, several farming communities have formed patrols to prevent attacks on their communities or launched counter-attacks on herding communities, further increasing animosity between the groups.
Ultimately, although the ruling elite generally understand the dynamics of this conflict, politicians often play a significant role in either reflecting or obscuring this conflict, potential solutions, and the response of the Nigerian state. Although potential solutions such as pasture expansion have been discussed at length; disarming the armed herdsmen; benefits for farmers; securitization of farming communities; addressing climate change issues; and fighting cattle rustling, the conflict was filled with political calculations, which naturally made its resolution very difficult.
Regarding the political accounts, there are several questions. First, linking this conflict to ethnicity and religion often diverts attention from the underlying issues and creates division between previously integrated communities. While almost all herders are of Fulani origin, most of the attacks are directed against other ethnic groups. Instead of addressing the issues identified as underlying the conflict, politicians often emphasize the ethnic motivations for it to increase their own popularity and create “patronage” as in other conflicts in Nigeria. (Berman, Bruce J., Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism, Vol. 97, Issue 388, African Affairs, July 1998, pp. 305 – 341); (Arriola, Leonardo R., Patronage and Political Stability in Africa, Vol. 42, Issue 10, Comparative Political Studies, October 2009).
In addition, powerful religious, ethnic and political leaders often engage in political and ethnic manipulations while vehemently addressing the problem, often fueling rather than defusing tensions. (Princewill, Tabia, The politics of the poor man’s pain: Herdsmen, farmers and elite manipulation, January 17, 2018, Vanguard).
Second, the grazing and ranching debate is often politicized and painted in a way that tends toward either the marginalization of the Fulani or the preferential treatment of the Fulani, depending on who is involved in the debates. In June 2018, after several states affected by the conflict decided individually to introduce anti-grazing laws in their territories, the Federal Government of Nigeria, in an attempt to end the conflict and offer some adequate solution, announced plans to spend 179 billion naira (about 600 million US dollars) for the construction of livestock farms of the “ranch” type in ten states of the country. (Obogo, Chinelo, Uproar over proposed cattle ranches in 10 states. Igbo, Middle Belt, Yoruba groups reject FG’s plan, June 21st, 2018, The Sun).
While several groups outside pastoralist communities argued that pastoralism was a private business and should not incur public expenditure, the migratory pastoralist community also rejected the idea on the grounds that it was designed to oppress the Fulani community, affecting the freedom of movement of the Fulani. Several members of the livestock community claimed that the proposed livestock laws “are being used by some people as a campaign to win votes in the 2019 elections”. [5]
The politicization of the issue, combined with the government’s casual approach, makes any step towards resolving the conflict unattractive to the parties involved.
Thirdly, the Nigerian government’s reluctance to outlaw groups that have claimed responsibility for attacks on farming communities in retaliation for killing livestock is linked to the fear of a breakdown in the patron-client relationship. Although the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) justified the killing of dozens of people in Plateau State in 2018 as revenge for the killing of 300 cows by farming communities, the government refused to take any action against the group claiming that it is a socio-cultural group representing the interests of the Fulani. (Umoru, Henry, Marie-Therese Nanlong, Johnbosco Agbakwuru, Joseph Erunke and Dirisu Yakubu, Plateau massacre, retaliation for lost 300 cows – Miyetti Allah, June 26, 2018, Vanguard).This has led many Nigerians to think that the group was deliberately taken under the protection of the government because the incumbent president at the time (President Buhari) is from the Fulani ethnic group.
In addition, the inability of Nigeria’s ruling elite to deal with the impact of the neo-pastoral dimension of the conflict poses serious problems. Instead of addressing the reasons why pastoralism is becoming increasingly militarized, the government is focusing on the ethnic and religious dimensions of the conflict. In addition, many owners of large herds of cattle belong to influential elites with considerable influence, making it difficult to prosecute criminal activities. If the neo-pastoral dimension of the conflict is not properly assessed and an adequate approach to it is not adopted, there will probably be no change in the situation in the country and we will even witness the deterioration of the situation.
Sources used:
The complete list of the literature used in the first and second parts of the analysis is given at the end of the first part of the analysis, published under the title “Sahel – conflicts, coups and migration bombs”. Only those sources cited in the present third part of the analysis – “The Fulani, Neopastoralism and Jihadism in Nigeria” are given below.
Additional sources are given within the text.
[5] Ajala, Olayinka, New drivers of conflict in Nigeria: an analysis of the clashes between farmers and pastoralists, Third World Quarterly, Volume 41, 2020, Issue 12, (published online 09 September 2020), pp. 2048-2066,
[8] Brottem, Leif and Andrew McDonnell, Pastoralism and Conflict in the Sudano-Sahel: A Review of the Literature, 2020, Search for Common Ground,
[38] Sangare, Boukary, Fulani people and Jihadism in Sahel and West African countries, February 8, 2019, Observatoire of Arab-Muslim World and Sahel, The Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS).
Photo by Tope A. Asokere: https://www.pexels.com/photo/low-angle-view-of-protesters-with-a-banner-5632785/
Note about the author:
Teodor Detchev has been a full-time associate professor at the Higher School of Security and Economics (VUSI) – Plovdiv (Bulgaria) since 2016.
He taught at New Bulgarian University – Sofia and at VTU “St. St. Cyril and Methodius”. He currently teaches at VUSI, as well as at UNSS. His main teaching courses are: Industrial relations and security, European industrial relations, Economic sociology (in English and Bulgarian), Ethnosociology, Ethno-political and national conflicts, Terrorism and political assassinations – political and sociological problems, Effective development of organizations.
He is the author of more than 35 scientific works on fire resistance of building structures and resistance of cylindrical steel shells. He is the author of over 40 works on sociology, political science and industrial relations, including the monographs: Industrial relations and security – part 1. Social concessions in collective bargaining (2015); Institutional Interaction and Industrial Relations (2012); Social Dialogue in the Private Security Sector (2006); “Flexible Forms of Work” and (Post) Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (2006).
He co-authored the books: Innovations in collective bargaining. European and Bulgarian aspects; Bulgarian employers and women at work; Social Dialogue and Employment of Women in the Field of Biomass Utilization in Bulgaria. More recently he has been working on issues of the relationship between industrial relations and security; the development of global terrorist disorganizations; ethnosociological problems, ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts.
Member of the International Labor and Employment Relations Association (ILERA), the American Sociological Association (ASA) and the Bulgarian Association for Political Science (BAPN).
Social democrat by political convictions. In the period 1998 – 2001, he was Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Policy. Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” from 1993 to 1997. Director of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” in 2012 – 2013. Deputy Chairman and Chairman of SSI in the period 2003 – 2011. Director of “Industrial Policies” at AIKB since 2014 .to this day. Member of NSTS from 2003 to 2012.
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