Africa

The Fulani and Jihadism in West Africa (II)

Published

1 year ago

September 22, 2023

By Teodor Dechev

The previous part of this analysis, entitled “Sahel – Conflicts, Coups and Migration Bombs”, addressed the issue of the rise of terrorist activity in West Africa and the inability to end the guerrilla war waged by Islamic radicals against government troops in Mali, Burkina Faso , Niger, Chad and Nigeria. The issue of the ongoing civil war in the Central African Republic was also discussed.

One of the important conclusions is that the intensification of the conflict is fraught with the high risk of a “migration bomb” that would lead to unprecedented migration pressure along the entire southern border of the European Union. An important circumstance is also the possibilities of Russian foreign policy to manipulate the intensity of conflicts in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and the Central African Republic. [39] With its hand on the “counter” of a potential migration explosion, Moscow could easily be tempted to use induced migration pressure against EU states that are generally already designated as hostile.

In this risky situation, a special role is played by the Fulani people – an ethnic group of semi-nomads, migratory livestock breeders who inhabit the strip from the Gulf of Guinea to the Red Sea and number 30 to 35 million people according to various data. Being a people who have historically played a very important role in the penetration of Islam into Africa, especially West Africa, the Fulani are a huge temptation for Islamic radicals, despite the fact that they profess the Sufi school of Islam, which is undoubtedly the most tolerant, as and the most mystical.

Unfortunately, as will be seen from the analysis below, the issue is not just about religious opposition. The conflict is not only ethno-religious. It is socio-ethno-religious, and in recent years, the effects of the wealth accumulated through corruption, converted into livestock ownership – the so-called neo-pastoralism – have begun to exert an additional strong influence. This phenomenon is particularly characteristic of Nigeria and will be the subject of the third part of this analysis.

The Fulani and Jihadism in Central Mali: Between Change, Social Rebellion and Radicalization

While Operation Serval succeeded in 2013 in pushing back the jihadists who had taken over northern Mali, and Operation Barhan prevented them from returning to the front line, forcing them into hiding, the attacks not only did not stop, but spread to the central part of Mali (in the area of the bend of the Niger River, also known as Massina). In general, terrorist attacks increased after 2015.

Jihadists are certainly not in control of the region as they were in northern Mali in 2012 and are forced into hiding. They do not have a “monopoly on violence” as militias have been created to fight them, sometimes with the support of the authorities. However, targeted attacks and killings are increasing, and insecurity has reached such a level that the region is no longer under real government control. Many civil servants have left their posts, a significant number of schools have been closed, and the recent presidential elections could not be held in a number of municipalities.

To some extent, this situation is the result of “contagion” from the North. Pushed out of the northern cities, which they held under control for several months after failing to create an independent state, forced to “behave more discreetly”, the jihadist armed groups, looking for new strategies and new ways of operating, were able to take advantage of the factors of instability in the Central region to gain new influence.

Some of these factors are common to both the central and northern regions. However, it would be wrong to believe that the serious incidents that have regularly occurred in the central part of Mali for years after 2015 are just a continuation of the northern conflict.

In fact, other weaknesses are more specific to the central regions. The targets of local communities exploited by jihadists are very different. While the Tuareg in the north claimed the independence of Azaouad (a region which is actually mythical – it never corresponded to any political entity of the past, but which separates for the Tuareg all the regions in the north of Mali), the communities represented in the central regions , do not make comparable political claims, insofar as they make any claims at all.

The significance of the difference between the role of the Fulani in northern events and in the central regions, which is emphasized by all observers, is telling. Indeed, the founder of the Masina Liberation Front, the most important of the armed groups involved, Hamadoun Kufa, who was killed on November 28, 2018, was ethnically Fulani, as were the vast majority of his fighters. [38]

Few in the north, the Fulani are numerous in the central regions and concerned like most other communities by the increased competition between migratory herders and settled farmers that is occurring in the region, they suffer more from it due to historical and cultural circumstances.

The defining trends in the region and the Sahel as a whole, which make it difficult for nomads and settled people to live together, are essentially two:

• climate change, already underway in the Sahel region (rainfall has decreased by 20% in the last 40 years), forces nomads to seek new grazing areas;

• population growth, which forces farmers to seek new land, has a particular impact in this already densely populated region. [38]

If the Fulani, as migratory herders, are particularly troubled by the inter-communal competition these developments bring about, it is on the one hand because this competition pits them against almost all other communities (the region is home to the Fulani, Tamashek, Songhai, Bozo, Bambara and the Dogon), and on the other hand, because the Fulani are particularly affected by other developments related more to state policies:

• even if the Malian authorities, unlike what has happened in other countries, have never theorized on the issue of the interest or necessity of settlement, the fact is that development projects are more aimed at settled people. Most often this is due to donor pressure, usually in favor of abandoning nomadism, considered less compatible with modern state building and limiting access to education;

• the introduction in 1999 of decentralization and municipal elections, which, although they gave the Fulani people the opportunity to bring the community’s demands to the political stage, mainly contributed to the emergence of new elites and thereby to the questioning of traditional structures, based on customs, history and religion. The people of the Fulani people felt these transformations particularly strongly, inasmuch as the social relations in their community are ancient. These changes were also initiated by the state, which they had always considered “imported” from the outside, a product of a Western culture far removed from their own. [38]

This effect is, of course, limited within the vicissitudes of decentralization policy. However, it is a fact in a number of municipalities. And undoubtedly the “feeling” of such transformations is stronger than their real impact, especially among the Fulani who tend to consider themselves “victims” of this policy.

Finally, historical reminiscences should not be neglected, although they should not be overestimated either. In the imagination of the Fulani, the Masina Empire (of which Mopti is the capital) represents the golden age of the central regions of Mali. The legacy of this empire includes, in addition to social structures specific to the community and a certain attitude to religion: the Fulani live and perceive themselves as supporters of pure Islam, in the air of the Sufi brotherhood of the Quadriyya, sensitive to the strict application of the injunctions of the Koran.

The jihad preached by leading figures in the Masina empire was different from that preached by the terrorists currently operating in Mali (who had directed their message to other Muslims whose practices were not considered to conform to the founding text). Kufa’s attitude towards the leading figures in the Masina empire was ambiguous. He often referred to them, but again he desecrated the mausoleum of Sekou Amadou. However, the Islam practiced by the Fulani appears to be potentially compatible with some aspects of Salafism that jihadist groups regularly claim as their own. [2]

A new trend seems to be emerging in the central regions of Mali in 2019: gradually the initial motivations for joining purely local jihadist groups appear to be more ideological, a trend that is reflected in the questioning of the Malian state and modernity in general. Jihadi propaganda, which proclaims the rejection of state control (imposed by the West, which is complicit in it) and emancipation from the social hierarchies produced by colonization and the modern state, finds a more “natural” echo among the Fulani than among other ethnic groups . [38]

The regionalization of the Fulani question in the Sahel region

Expansion of the conflict towards Burkina Faso

The Fulani are the majority in the Sahelian part of Burkina Faso, which borders Mali (in particular the provinces of Soum (Jibo), Seeno (Dori) and Ouadlan (Gorom-Goom), which border the regions of Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao) of Mali). and also with Niger – with the Tera and Tillaberi regions. A strong Fulani community also lives in Ouagadougou, where it occupies much of the Dapoya and Hamdalaye neighbourhoods.

At the end of 2016, a new armed group appeared in Burkina Faso that claimed to belong to the Islamic State – Ansarul Al Islamia or Ansarul Islam, whose main leader was Malam Ibrahim Dicko, a Fulani preacher who, like Hamadoun Koufa in Central Mali, made himself known through numerous attacks against Burkina Faso’s defense and security forces and against schools in the provinces of Sum, Seeno and Deleted. [38] During the restoration of government forces’ control over northern Mali in 2013, the Malian armed forces captured Ibrahim Mallam Diko. But he was released after the insistence of the leaders of the Fulani people in Bamako, including the former Speaker of the National Assembly – Aly Nouhoum Diallo.

The leaders of Ansarul Al Islamia are former fighters of MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa – Movement for unity and jihad in West Africa, by “unity” should be understood as “monotheism” – Islamic radicals are extreme monotheists) from central Mali. Malam Ibrahim Dicko is now presumed dead and his brother Jafar Dicko succeeded him as the head of Ansarul Islam. [38]

However, the action of this group remains geographically limited for now.

But, as in central Mali, the entire Fulani community is seen as complicit with the jihadists, who are targeting settled communities. In response to terrorist attacks, settled communities formed their own militias to defend themselves.

Thus, in early January 2019, in response to an armed attack by unidentified persons, residents of Yirgou attacked Fulani-populated areas for two days (January 1 and 2), killing 48 people. A police force was dispatched to restore calm. At the same time, a few miles away, in Bankass Cercle (an administrative subdivision of the Mopti region of Mali), 41 Fulani were killed by Dogons. [14], [42]

The situation in Niger

Unlike Burkina Faso, Niger has no terrorist groups operating from its territory, despite Boko Haram’s attempts to establish itself in the border regions, especially on the Diffa side, winning over young Nigeriens who feel that the economic situation in the country deprives them of a future. So far, Niger has been able to counter these attempts.

These relative successes are explained in particular by the importance that the Nigerien authorities attach to security issues. They allocate a very large part of the national budget to them. The Nigerien authorities have allocated significant funds to strengthen the army and police. This assessment is made taking into account the available opportunities in Niger. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world (in last place according to the human development index in the ranking of the United Nations Development Program – UNDP) and it is very difficult to combine efforts in favor of security with the policy of initiating a development process.

The Nigerian authorities are very active in regional cooperation (in particular with Nigeria and Cameroon against Boko Haram) and very willingly accept on their territory foreign forces provided by Western countries (France, USA, Germany, Italy).

Moreover, the authorities in Niger, just as they were able to take measures that largely quelled the Tuareg problem, more successfully than their Malian counterparts, also showed greater attention to the Fulani issue than they do in Mali.

However, Niger could not completely avoid the contagion of terror coming from neighboring countries. The country is regularly the target of terrorist attacks, carried out both in the southeast, in the border regions with Nigeria, and in the west, in the regions near Mali. These are attacks from the outside – operations led by Boko Haram in the southeast and operations coming from the Ménaka region in the west, which is a “privileged breeding ground” for the Tuareg insurgency in Mali.

Attackers from Mali are often Fulani. They do not have the same power as Boko Haram, but it is even more difficult to prevent their attacks because the porosity of the border is high. Many of the Fulani involved in the attacks are Nigerien or of Nigerien descent – many Fulani migratory herders were forced to leave Niger and settle in neighboring Mali when irrigated land development in the Tillaberi region reduced their grazing land in the 1990s. [38]

Since then, they have been involved in the conflicts between the Malian Fulani and the Tuareg (Imahad and Dausaki). Since the last Tuareg uprising in Mali, the balance of power between the two groups has shifted. By then, the Tuareg, who had already rebelled several times since 1963, already had many weapons at their disposal.

The Fulani of Niger were “militarized” when the Ganda Izo militia was formed in 2009. (The creation of this armed militia was the result of the ongoing split in a historically older militia – “Ganda Koi”, with which “Ganda Izo” is basically in a tactical alliance. Since “Ganda Izo” aimed to fighting the Tuareg, the Fulani people joined it (both Malian Fulani and Niger Fulani), after which many of them were integrated into MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa – Movement for Unity (monotheism) and jihad in West Africa) and then in ISGS (Islamic State in the Great Sahara). [38]

The balance of power between the Tuareg and Dausaki, on the one hand, and the Fulani, on the other, is changing accordingly, and by 2019 it is already much more balanced. As a result, new clashes occur, often leading to the death of dozens of people on both sides. In these skirmishes, international counter-terrorist forces (particularly during Operation Barhan) in some cases created ad hoc alliances with the Tuareg and Dausak (particularly with the MSA), who, following the conclusion of the peace agreement with the Malian government, engaged in the fight against terrorism.

The Fulani of Guinea

Guinea with its capital Conakry is the only country where the Fulani are the largest ethnic group, but not the majority – they are about 38% of the population. Although they originate from Central Guinea, the central part of the country that includes cities such as Mamu, Pita, Labe and Gaual, they are present in every other region where they have migrated in search of better living conditions.

The region is not affected by jihadism and the Fulani are not and have not been particularly involved in violent clashes, except for traditional conflicts between migratory herders and settled people.

In Guinea, the Fulani control most of the country’s economic power and largely the intellectual and religious forces. They are the most educated. They become literate very early, first in Arabic and then in French through the French schools. Imams, teachers of the Holy Qur’an, senior officials from the interior of the country and from the diaspora are in their majority Fulani. [38]

However, we can wonder about the future as the Fulani have always been victims of [political] discrimination since independence to be kept away from political power. The other ethnic groups feel encroached upon by these traditional nomads who come to tear up their best lands to build the most prosperous businesses and the glitziest residential neighborhoods. According to the other ethnic groups in Guinea, if the Fulani come to power, they will have all the power and given the mentality attributed to them, they will be able to keep it and keep it forever. This perception was reinforced by the fiercely hostile speech of Guinea’s first president, Sekou Toure, against the Fulani community.

From the earliest days of the independence struggle in 1958, Sekou Toure who is from the Malinke people and his supporters have been facing the Fulani of Bari Diawandu. After coming to power, Sekou Toure assigned all important positions to people from the Malinke people. The exposure of alleged Fulani conspiracies in 1960 and especially in 1976 provided him with a pretext for the elimination of important Fulani figures (notably in 1976, Telly Diallo, who was the first Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, a highly respected and prominent figure, is imprisoned and deprived of food until he dies in his dungeon). This alleged plot was an opportunity for Sekou Toure to deliver three speeches denouncing the Fulani with extreme malice, calling them “traitors” who “only think of money…”. [38]

In the first democratic elections in 2010, Fulani candidate Cellou Dalein Diallo came out on top in the first round, but all ethnic groups joined forces in the second round to prevent him from becoming president, handing power to Alpha Conde , whose origin is from the Malinke people.

This situation is increasingly unfavorable to the Fulani people and generates frustration and disappointment which the recent democratization (2010 elections) has allowed to be publicly expressed.

The next presidential election in 2020, in which Alpha Condé will not be able to run for re-election (the constitution prohibits a president from serving more than two terms), will be an important deadline for the development of relations between the Fulani and other ethnic communities in Guinea.

Some interim conclusions:

It would be extremely tendentious to speak of any pronounced propensity among the Fulani for “jihadism”, much less of such a propensity that was induced by the history of the former theocratic empires of this ethnic group.

When analyzing the risk of the Fulani siding with radical Islamists, the complexity of Fulani society is often overlooked. So far, we have not gone into the depth of the social structure of the Fulani, but in Mali, for example, it is very complex and hierarchical. It is logical to expect that the interests of the constituent parts of Fulani society may differ and become the cause of conflicting behavior or even division within the community.

As for central Mali, the tendency to challenge the established order, which is said to drive many Fulani to join the jihadist ranks, is sometimes the result of young people in the community acting against the will of the more the adults. Likewise, young Fulani people have sometimes tried to take advantage of municipal elections, which, as explained, have often been seen as an opportunity to produce leaders who are not traditional notables) – these young people sometimes consider more the adults as participants in these traditional “notabilities”. This creates opportunities for internal conflicts – including armed conflicts – between people of the Fulani people. [38]

There is no doubt that the Fulani are predisposed to ally themselves with opponents of the established order – something fundamentally inherent to nomads. Furthermore, in consequence of their geographical dispersion, they are doomed to always remain in the minority and subsequently to be unable to influence decisively the fate of the countries in which they live, even when exceptionally they seem to have such an opportunity and believe that it is legitimate, as is the case in Guinea.

The subjective perceptions arising from this state of affairs fuel the opportunism that the Fulani have learned to cultivate when they are in trouble – when they are faced with detractors who see them as threatening foreign bodies while they themselves live as victims, discriminated against and doomed of marginalization.

Part three follows

Sources used:

The complete list of the literature used in the first and the current second part of the analysis is given at the end of the first part of the analysis published under the title “Sahel – conflicts, coups and migration bombs”. Only those sources cited in the second part of the analysis – “The Fulani and “Jihadism” in West Africa” are given here.

[2] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, “Double bottom” or “schizophrenic bifurcation”? The interaction between ethno-nationalist and religious-extremist motives in the activities of some terrorist groups, Sp. Politics and Security; Year I; no. 2; 2017; pp. 34 – 51, ISSN 2535-0358 (in Bulgarian).

[14] Cline, Lawrence E., Jihadist Movements in the Sahel: Rise of the Fulani?, March 2021, Terrorism and Political Violence, 35 (1), pp. 1-17

[38] Sangare, Boukary, Fulani people and Jihadism in Sahel and West African countries, February 8, 2019, Observatoire of Arab-Muslim World and Sahel, The Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)

[39] The Soufan Center Special Report, Wagner Group: The Evolution of a Private Army, Jason Blazakis, Colin P. Clarke, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sean Steinberg, The Soufan Center, June 2023

[42] Waicanjo, Charles, Transnational Herder-Farmer Conflicts and Social Instability in the Sahel, May 21, 2020, African Liberty.

Photo by Kureng Workx: https://www.pexels.com/photo/a-man-in-red-traditional-clothing-taking-photo-of-a-man-13033077/

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Erin Silvia

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Africa

Shadows Over Democracy in Mozambique

Published

1 month ago

October 21, 2024

Cynthia Robinson

In a deeply concerning development in Mozambique’s political landscape, the European Union (EU) has condemned the recent killings of two prominent figures: Elvino Dias, a legal advisor to Presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, and opposition politician Paulo Guambe. The EU stated that these politically motivated murders have no place in a democracy and expressed its heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the deceased.

The EU’s strong condemnation comes in the wake of alarming reports regarding the violent dispersal of political supporters following last week’s elections in Mozambique. The Union has called for an immediate, thorough, and transparent investigation into the killings, demanding justice for those responsible and clarity on the circumstances surrounding these outrageous crimes. The EU reiterated its hope for a timely response from the Mozambican Government, emphasizing that a quick and effective inquiry is essential to restore public confidence.

In addition to seeking accountability for the murders, the EU has urged all parties to exercise restraint during this turbulent post-electoral period. The organization underlined the importance of respecting fundamental freedoms and political rights, asserting that strong protective measures for all candidates are crucial to ensuring their safety and fostering a more stable political environment.

Meanwhile, the European Union Election Observation Mission remains actively engaged in Mozambique, closely assessing the ongoing electoral process. The EU expects the country’s Election Management Bodies to uphold integrity in their operations, ensuring that the electoral process is conducted with due diligence and transparency—reflecting the will of the Mozambican people.

As the nation grapples with the implications of these political killings, the international community watches closely, hoping for accountability, peace, and the preservation of democratic values in Mozambique.

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Cynthia Robinson

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Africa

The European Union and Morocco: Navigating Trade Relations and Geopolitical Issues

Published

1 month ago

October 14, 2024

Nicole Edenedo

The European Union and the Agreements with Morocco: An In-Depth Analysis of Recent Developments

The European Union (EU) has recently taken crucial decisions regarding its fisheries and agriculture agreements with Morocco, a matter that raises complex economic, political and legal issues. These agreements, which allow European vessels access to Moroccan waters and facilitate the import of Moroccan agricultural products into the European market, are essential for both parties. However, they are also marked by tensions linked to the Western Sahara issue.

Legal background to the agreements

The fisheries and agriculture agreements between the EU and Morocco have been renewed several times since they were first signed. However, their legitimacy has been called into question, notably following rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In 2016, the CJEU annulled a fisheries agreement, arguing that it failed to comply with international law, particularly with regard to the rights of the Saharan people. The Court stressed that the resources of Western Sahara cannot be exploited without the consent of its people, leading to a re-evaluation of existing agreements.

Morocco’s position and international support

Morocco has championed an autonomy initiative for Western Sahara, proposing a solution that would allow the territory to enjoy a degree of autonomy while remaining under Moroccan sovereignty. This initiative has received the support of over 100 nations, including major geopolitical players such as the United States, France, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Germany and Spain. This international support is crucial for Morocco, as it strengthens its position on the international stage and enables it to legitimize its actions regarding the Western Sahara.

Morocco maintains that the proposed autonomy is the best solution for ensuring stability and development in the region. The Moroccan authorities maintain that this initiative could encourage dialogue and cooperation between the various stakeholders, while guaranteeing respect for the rights of local populations.

Reactions from the Polisario Front

In contrast, the Polisario Front, which claims independence for Western Sahara and is supported by Algeria, advocates a referendum on self-determination for the Saharan people. This position has historically enjoyed some international support, but is currently less popular in the current geopolitical context.

The difficulties of implementing a referendum are manifold. Analysts point out that issues such as voter registration, factional tensions and security concerns make it a complex option. Moreover, international support for the Polisario Front has waned in recent years, further complicating its position.

Economic consequences of the agreements

The fisheries and agriculture agreements are of vital importance to the Moroccan economy. The fishing industry, in particular, is an essential source of income and employment, especially in coastal regions. Access to the European market enables Moroccan fishermen to sell their products at a competitive price, while meeting the growing demand for seafood products in Europe.

At the same time, the agricultural agreement also opens up opportunities for Morocco to export agricultural products, promoting the development of Moroccan agriculture. For the EU, these agreements guarantee a stable supply of food products while supporting sustainable fishing, which is crucial in the context of growing concerns about food security in Europe.

Future challenges

The challenges facing the EU and Morocco are many. The need to reconcile economic interests with the requirements of international law and humanitarian concerns is paramount. The situation in Western Sahara continues to be a sticking point influencing EU negotiations and decisions.

The EU seeks to maintain advantageous trade relations with Morocco while respecting the principles of international law. The complexity of this situation calls for continuous and constructive dialogue between the various parties, in order to find lasting solutions that are acceptable to all.

Future prospects

In the future, the EU may consider modifications to its agreements to ensure their compliance with international legal standards while safeguarding its economic interests. Enhanced dialogue between the EU and Morocco will be essential to navigate these complexities. Morocco’s international support could also play a key role in future discussions, influencing EU decisions.

In summary, the EU’s decision on fisheries and agriculture agreements with Morocco represents a delicate balance between economic interests, legal considerations and humanitarian issues. Future discussions will need to take these various aspects into account to achieve sustainable solutions, while recognizing the international context that shapes this dynamic. The future of EU-Morocco relations will depend on the ability of both parties to overcome current challenges and cooperate constructively for the development of the region.

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Nicole Edenedo

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Africa

The Impact of Political Leadership on Economic Development in Nigeria

Published

3 months ago

August 22, 2024

Hlaffiliate

By Emmanuel Ande Ivorgba, PhD. Executive Director, Centre for Faith and Community Development (CFCD)

INTRODUCTION

The traditional concept of leadership is based on the notion that leaders are selected to command control and make final decisions for the collective group. However, through this viewpoint, leadership is viewed not only as an exercise of authority but also on the legal grounds. As societies become more complex, technical demands of the state grow, and decision authority becomes specialized. We are more naturally concerned with what leaders do with the job, and what they are and their behavior. In a country of high-rank public-private sector bureaucracy, leaders at different management hierarchical levels play a major role in shaping the direction of political life. They contribute to our understanding about the role of political leadership in policy formulation.

Nigeria, with its vast amount of natural resources, is currently undergoing rapid economic decline. There is a high incidence of poverty, escalating inflation, balance of payment problems, as well as heavy debt-servicing problems. The root cause of this economic problem stems from the pursuit of an inappropriate economic policy. The dominance of poor leadership in policy formulation in Nigeria can clearly be identified as the main source of the problems. Political leadership is pivotal and significant in shaping the economic landscape of any nation (Klarin, 2020). The quality of any nation’s political leadership can significantly determine or influence such nation’s overall economic development trajectory. Nigeria is blessed with a vibrant human population, abundance of natural resources. These resources, coupled with the great entrepreneurial spirit and resilience of the citizens, have positioned Nigeria as a potential continental economic powerhouse. Unfortunately, and disappointedly so, weak institutional frameworks, coupled with corruption, policy inconsistencies and other numerous governance challenges, have constituted stumbling blocks to the country’s inability to effectively and efficiently harness its economic potential (Ogunleye & Adeleye, 2018).

Economic development is a measure of the increase of per capita income, which is itself, a function of the growth rate of national income (Mankiw & Taylor, 2014). National income growth depends largely on, political leadership stability as well as the appropriate economic policies implemented by the political leadership. Also, insights into the influence of political leadership on the socio-economic development enable one to understand the roots of the poverty trap in which many developing nations are stuck. Understanding why countries have the type of leaders they do have and what determines a politician to govern well or govern poorly help us appreciate the positions of governance. This paper seeks to explore the intricate and dynamic relationship between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria. The paper will briefly examine the historical context, challenges and opportunities in Nigeria’s economic landscape, key policy decisions, and governance structures to unravel the impact of political leadership on key economic indicators such as job creation, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, GDP growth, and foreign direct investment. The paper will provide insights into how effective leadership can catalyze positive economic transformation and propel inclusive growth and development in Nigeria. BACKGROUND With a human population of over 230 million, and rich in natural resources, Nigeria, popularly referred to as the “Giant of Africa” (UK Essays, 2018), and continental powerhouse (Akindele, et al. 2012), holds vast potential for economic growth and development. Despite this abundance of human and natural resources, the country has faced numerous complex challenges and struggles on its path to economic prosperity. Nigeria has experienced significant political, social, and economic changes since its independence from British colonial rule in 1960. Political leadership continues to play a central role in Nigeria’s fate. In general, the effects of political stability on economic development underscore the fact that political opportunities drive the economic policies in countries, especially those that are external as opposed to internal factors. The effectiveness of political leadership in providing the best opportunities for economic policies is also important because the nature of the stability is driven by how the political market works in various countries. Overall, many different types of political markets lead to different types of policy commitments. The impact of political leadership attributes is manifested through varying degrees of political stability, democratization, income inequality, and governance quality. The historical context of Nigeria’s economic development efforts has been shaped by a complex interplay of factors. These include the legacies of the colonial era, post-independence governance structures, the discovery of oil and Nigeria’s dependence on oil, political instability and social inequalities, among others. The country has experienced long periods of military rule, and military coups, disrupting democratic processes, with profound repercussions on economic management and policy consistency. While the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the 1950s provided a unique opportunity for the transformation of Nigeria’s economy and acceleration of the development process, the country’s over-reliance and dependence on oil revenues, and neglect of particularly, manufacturing and agriculture, exposed the country’s economy to external shocks and volatility. This has been further compounded by the mismanagement of oil revenues and the absence of, or lack of diversification. Different administrations and political leaders in Nigeria, have implemented several economic policies that have generated both positive and negative impacts on the nation’s economy. Additionally, the socio-political dynamics coupled with regional disparities, ethno-religious tensions, poverty, youth unemployment, among others, underscore the multidimensional complexities that Nigeria’s political leaders must address in order to foster inclusive and sustainable national economic growth. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA From the beginning, the political leadership has been infused with a degree of military dominance and military interests. Their unwillingness to relinquish control of governance and the economy exposed Nigeria’s leadership to ineffective policies that advocate autocracy, preserve tradition, uphold the old methods instead of developing creative and entrepreneurial elements to thrive when addressing economic development and socio[1]economic change. Political leadership in Nigeria is primarily dedicated to self-interests and strategies. This inadequacy largely refuses them from seeing the need for Nigeria to devise and implement the strategic economic development policies rather than the traditional growth-based doctrines provided and promoted by international economic analysts and international economic ideologues. The autocratic policy models are directed at reinforcing figureheads and also provide ‘cocktail’ solutions primarily to maintain political rivalry. As a result, policy leadership evolves less in the way of the country’s economic and social development. An important characteristic of Nigeria’s political leadership is the role of ethnic and religious affiliations in shaping political alliances and power structures. Ethno-religious dynamics and blocs have played a significant role in determining political outcomes and leadership appointments (Akande, 2016). This has often resulted in a fragmented political landscape, with leaders often prioritizing the interests of their own ethnic or religious groups over those of the nation as a whole. Also, the legacy of military rule has had a lasting impact on Nigeria’s political leadership. Many former military leaders have transitioned into civilian politics, bringing with them a hierarchical and authoritarian style of leadership that has at times undermined democratic principles (Ojo, 2017). This has contributed to a culture of strongman politics, where leaders often centralize power and suppress dissent to maintain control. There have been efforts, in recent years, to reform the country’s political leadership and improve governance standards, through initiatives such as anti-corruption campaigns and electoral reforms, to address some of the challenges facing the country’s leadership (Adesina, 2020). However, progress in this direction has been very slow, and entrenched power structures continue to pose obstacles to meaningful change. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW In analyzing how political leaders influence economic performance in Nigeria, one should be cognizant of the fact that it is the interaction of the political elite with the economic cycle that provides insight into how political institutions mediate the influence of the political elite on the economy. Nigerian society has experienced considerable political upheaval. Income inequality has increased since the 1960s, and democratic political structures have not been effectively adapted to reflect the changes in social structures influenced by modernization. The erratic progress of democracy in Nigeria and its inability to cope with the pressures of rapid modernization have led to an erosion of belief in the efficacy of the social system. Decades of authoritarian or military rule in Nigeria have had a negative impact on the quality of governance and the standard of living of most Nigerians. Nigeria’s economic development has been greatly influenced by a variety of historical, social, and political factors, including pre-colonial trade, colonial exploitation, post-independence policies, and the oil boom. In the pre-colonial period, several thriving economies with very extensive trade networks existed. For example, the Yoruba city- states existed in the southwest, the Benin Kingdom in the southeast and the Hausa kingdoms in the north, engaged in agriculture and craft production, and traded, not only among themselves, but with coastal and trans-Saharan traders (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Then came the Colonial Era, which lasted from 1861-1960, and significantly altered Nigeria’s economic landscape. During this period, the British concentrated on extraction and exportation of raw materials to feed the European Industrial Revolution. The economy was designed to produce cash crops like groundnuts, palm oil, cocoa and others to serve British interests (Ake, 1981). The Post-Independence Industrialization period, from 1960-1970 sought to transform the colonial economic structure and accelerate Nigeria’s industrial development (Ekundare, 1973). Economic development plans were then designed by the government to promote and support the diversification of the country’s economy from agriculture towards industrialization and infrastructural development. This was followed, in the 1970s, by the period of Nigeria’s Oil Boom, where the problem of the country was not money but how to spend it. Oil contributed about 90% of foreign exchange earnings and over 80% of government revenues. The result was increased urbanization and investments in the development of infrastructure, but agriculture and other sectors were practically neglected (Osoba, 1996). With support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Nigeria adopted the Structural Adjustment Program in 1986. This was in response to the challenges of rising debt and falling oil prices. An important goal of the SAP was to liberalize Nigeria’s economy, support private enterprise and minimize state involvement. However, the immediate social impact of the SAP was increased poverty and inequality (Iyoha & Oriakhi, 2002). In 2004, the Nigeria launched the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), focusing on poverty reduction, economic diversification and infrastructure development. The NEEDS focused on the promotion of good governance practices, private sector participation, and social development programs (Soludo, 2017). the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) was launched in 2007 by the government to support and boost agriculture, manufacturing and services (Kalejaiye & Aliyu, 2013). Another policy, the Vision 2020 Agendafollowed in 2009. The goal of the Vision 2020 was to position Nigeria as one of the top 20 economies in the world by 2020. It focused on key sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services, and called for investment in human capital development and infrastructure (Ibrahim, 2020). Since 1990 to date, the country has witnessed a mixture of economic growth and setbacks. While there has been some form of stability in terms of democratic governance and political stability, corruption-induced challenges, the lack of economic diversification away from oil and lack of basic infrastructure still remain.

The influence of political leadership on the economy has been evident in various policies, decisions, and actions taken by those in power. One key example of this can be seen in their management of the country’s vast natural resources, particularly oil. Nigeria is a major oil producer, and the country’s political leaders have often used revenue from the oil sector to fund government programs and projects. Unfortunately, mismanagement, corruption, and lack of diversification have led to a situation where the economy remains heavily reliant on oil, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices (Oyekola, 2015). In order to attract investments and spur economic development, sound economic policies, infrastructural development and regulatory frameworks are very essential. However, political instability, policy inconsistency, and corruption have often deterred investors, leading to suboptimal economic performance (Onyishi, 2018). Also, decisions in respect to government spending, currency stability, taxations and interest rates, are important factors that influence economic performance. Purposeful and effective political leadership in these areas can lead to sustainable economic growth, while poor decisions, as Nigeria’s experience has shown, exacerbate economic challenges(Akinbobola, 2019).

Nigeria has just as much potential as almost any other developed country and can show the same improvement if their government becomes truly transparent and accountable, focusing on creating a conducive enabling environment for organizing Nigerian civil society to generate growth. The importance of political instability and poor governance to the decline of Nigeria’s business climate is not limited to discouraging large foreign investors, but it also affects small and medium-sized businesses. Banks are also affected in several ways by the political instability and poor governance of the country. Political instability contributes to a high-risk credit market and reduced access to credit for the private sector. The financial sector is one area in which scientific and internal market work can be done to establish how poor governance affects Nigeria’s economy.

POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORIES

The literature on political economy (Mills, 2005) as well as political business cycle theory (Nordhaus & William, D, 1975) is rich with reasons why politicians in particular would want to shape economies. They have incentives to gain from various forms of rent seeking. Classical and neoliberal economists have come up with mechanisms through which leaders can manipulate areas of the economy to stay in power. Politicians also agree to a social contract with citizens to provide public goods in return for a mandate to govern. There are incentives for politicians to supply public goods to maintain power. Politicians may choose to use economic policy to expand a country’s productive capacity or improve national welfare as part of their stewardship. This may involve providing an enabling environment where the private sector flourishes and produces many desirable goods and services. Politicians can also manipulate the economy by trading off some economic policy in exchange for political survival. Political leaders remain the most important economic agents whose intentions to grow the economy can impact on aggregate productivity and improve economic outcomes.

Political economy theories offer insights into the complex interplay of institutions, interests and power, as well as different perspectives on the relationship between economics and politics. Some key political economy theories include:

a. The Classical Political Economy Theory, which began around the 18th and 19th centuries, was very prominent and promoted by great thinkers and renowned economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, among others. The classical political economy theory emphasizes minimal government intervention, free markets and self-interests in driving economic outcomes. Proponents of the classical political economy theory believe that overall economic prosperity through the invisible hand mechanism (Smith, 1776), would result from self-interest.

b. The Marxist Political Economy Theory: Developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the Marxist political economy theory deals with the relationship between social classes, labour and capital. The foundation of this theory is that capitalism is inherently exploitative, hence proponents of Marxist political economy theory advocate for the overthrow of the capitalist system (Marx, 1867), and the establishment of a classless society rooted in the common ownership of th means of production.

c. The Institutional Political Economy Theory: The Institutional Political Economy Theory is described as a fusion of economic analysis with political science and sociological insights, in order to properly examine how economic behaviour and outcomes are shaped by institutions. The theory highlights the significance and influence of formal and informal rules and norms, including power structures in economic decision-making (North, 1990). Institutions have the capacity to either promote or hinder economic development and social welfare.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Economic growth is a significant contributor and necessary component of economic development. Economic development is the creation of enabling conditions that promote and stimulate rapid and substantial increase in the basic material well-being of the majority. This is achievable by the implementation of political leadership policies to promote economic growth through land reforms, capital intensive industrialization, educational stimulus and effective public health system. Economic development must be measured through such areas as the reduction in the opportunities for malnutrition, the considerable reduction in high infant mortality rates, the availability of potable water, the availability of access to quality educational material, the growth of public health, greater opportunities for employment, the gradual socio-economic level generated by the majority of the people whereby an average level of society is established, the reduction in the level of high inflation and unemployment, indices of per-capita income, and through the efficient allocation of resources in regulating the type of social relationships. The term “economic development” can be viewed from the perspective of a false dichotomy in the development process. The dichotomy resulted due to the identifying of economic development with the advancement of the “center” (the more developed and industrialized countries, usually capitalist, on the one hand) and the possibilities of the “periphery” (viz the less developed, under-developed, undeveloped or developing countries, often countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the other. What the political economist referred to frequently as “economic growth” – a sustained increase in the output of goods and services of a country, usually measured at one sector of the economy most times through the increase of the Gross National product (as one of the forms of indicators of economic development) is often confused with economic development itself. Historically, Nigeria’s economic development has evolved significantly, shaped by its rich endowment of natural resources, governmental policies, and its interactions within the global economy. Nigeria’s oil and gas sector accounts for about 90% of export earnings and more than 50% of government revenue (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2022). This over-dependence on oil and gas has made the country’s economy highly susceptible to global oil price fluctuations. Efforts have been intensified in recent times, to diversify the economy through the development of the agricultural sector, which accounts for about 70% of the labour force and about 24% of the country’s GDP (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022). The Manufacturing sector, though still nascent, holds great promise, in terms of its contributions to the nation’s GDP. This is the clear focus of the Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP), designed to support the manufacturing sector to become globally competitive by increasing the sector’s manufacturing base (Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, 2022). The services sector has recorded the fastest growth in Nigeria, with telecommunications driving the expansion of mobile telephony and internet penetration. The financial services industry has been revolutionized, enhancing financial inclusion (PwC, 2023). Despite such progress, especially in the services sector, Nigeria’s economic development is still hampered by challenges of corruption, insecurity, political instability, and unacceptable unemployment rate, especially among the country’s youth population. Poverty is also widespread, as a significant portion of the country’s human population continues to live below the poverty line. Nigeria’s political leaders are today, also strained by contemporary socio-economic and geopolitical problems.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The interplay between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria is profound and deeply influential, presenting a mix of opportunities and challenges over the years. Depending on the nature of leadership, sometimes military and sometimes civilian, centralized versus decentralized, this interplay between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria has been marked by significant shifts. Persistent issues such as corruption and political instability remain significant barriers. The path to sustainable economic development in Nigeria depends largely on the emergence of transparent, accountable, and effective political leadership. Economic policies and outcomes are directly impacted by political leadership. For example, Nigeria witnessed significant regional disparities due to political and ethnic tensions, during Nigeria First Republic (1960-1966), which greatly influenced developmental policies and economic development decisions (Falola & Heaton, 2008). From the late 1960s to late 1990s, the Nigeria witnessed long periods of military regimes, with centralized control over decision-making and economic resources. Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999, signaling a significant turning point for the nation’s political and economic landscape. The Federal Government then, led by President Olusegun Obasanjo, from 1999- 2007, initiated significant economic policies, including banking sector reforms, privatization and the war against corruption to promote Nigeria’s growth and economic stability (Utomi, 2013). Despite these encouraging efforts, corruption, insurgency, political instability, and inadequate infrastructure have continued to impede substantial economic progress. Resources that could be applied for economic development have been drained by political corruption, due to large-scale mismanagement and embezzlement of funds by political leaders (Ekanade, 2014), significantly hampering Nigeria’s economic development. The establishment of institutions such as the ICPC and the EFCC demonstrates leadership commitment to combating corruption. However, the effectiveness of these institutions has depended largely, on the leadership’s commitment and political climate (Agbiboa, 2012). Political leadership seeks to recast the economy, the rules of the institution of property and production, and the distributional benefits from economic growth and stability; it seeks to redistribute property and production, enunciates and enforces written and principled rules of commercial behavior so that technology, skills, knowledge, and other means of production are deployed efficiently at the levels of the corporate sector, while acceptable distributional privileges are punctuated; and it seeks to protect and defend property rights, and to regulate the conduct and behavior of economic agents within the terms of written and enforced rules. The governance structure can either facilitate or obstruct the realization of the aim and objectives of political leadership.

CONCLUSION

Political leadership is fundamental in the process of governance, towards the achievement of desirable objectives, including economic development, social integration, public well-being, and such other related goals. However, political leaders could impact the economy in diverse ways, such as their political orientation and ideology. Furthermore, political leadership is expected to engineer the economy towards greater performance through various operative mechanisms like policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and the evaluation of policies. It is these functions that allow political leaders to use public resources to create value for the improvement of the living standards of a country, while at the same time working to broaden social welfare, for instance, by increasing employment. Although political leadership’s corresponding influence on economic development can have significant consequences, either through its impact on policy change driven by its transfer of power from one set of political actors to another, or by altering expectations and beliefs, political regimes can shape patterns of economic development and distributions. Such leaders can act as a model, man of action, great communicator, or transformational leader, while others have been seen as people of vision pursuit focusing on creativity and risk persuasiveness inspiring trust to make things happen, society builder, nation-builder(s), nation transformer, and many more. Good political leadership creates an environment that promotes economic development. Intriguingly, corruption at all levels of governance, poor accountability and transparency have been identified as the bane of the underdevelopment of many African nations including Nigeria. To find solutions to these problems, this work has investigated the influence of political leadership on economic development in Nigeria. The paper is anchored on the legitimacy theory which emphasizes the importance of public confidence and trust in government-to-government effectiveness. The study adopted the quasi-experimental research design with the secondary source of data as the only source of data collection. Data analyzed were obtained from secondary sources using content analysis. The research found out that political leadership influences economic development in Nigeria ranging from ineffective utilization of resources, embezzlement of public funds, bad governance, poor service, and inadequate level of socialization, and encouragement of corrupt practices among public officials. This paper suggests that more attention should be paid to the challenges at the institutional structure and the political system in Nigeria. These challenges call for significant measures aimed at promoting good political leadership in Nigeria. For Nigeria to attain her worthy goals as a competitive and prospering nation, Nigerians must commit to re-establishing value for the common good, a good society, community, dialogue, tolerance, fraternity, and self-identity, fostering a mutual sense of belonging in full participation and well-being. Furthermore, initiating agile services reflecting due transparency and encouraging responsibility among all its leaders at all levels, in good faith and uprightness, and manifesting self-pride. To this end, the paper advocates for the urgent need for enhancing moral leadership and promoting genuine politics in terms of the inviolability of life, perennial morals, and the preservation of the human environment, and democracy for social and civil rights.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When political leaders are unjust, oppressive and manipulative, it becomes difficult to share the goals of the elite, and consequently stifle efforts toward growth and development. However, and usefully, vision, political will, attributes of democratic inclusiveness and transformational qualities make great leaders capable of leading development and country mobilization into prosperity, democracy and development. A sense of national interest as the cardinal point of leadership informs the communal spirit of visionary political leadership in building and remolding the structure of a nation state. In conclusion, all historical trajectories to high growth in emerging economies were marked by focused attention to structural change by political leadership. In this sense, an inclusive approach and response from the political leadership in Nigeria places some optimism in the quest for long-term growth and economic progress. Leadership at the level of nation-states had a greater impact on growth and development than at any higher level. A developing country’s own leadership had the major responsibility to initiate, guide and pace its growth process. History and successful models of change provide a message of hope, that with the right policies, attributes and dispositions of its leaders, good countries can become better. However, at other times political leaders thwart the development of their nations through corrupt practices and greed that undermines development objectives.

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First publication: International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (ISSN 2454-6186), vol. VIII, issue VII, July 2024, p. 1274-1282, https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.807106 Received: 17 June 2024; Revised: 30 June 2024; Accepted: 04 July 2024; Published: 07 August 2024.

Illustrative Photo by Christina Morillo: https://www.pexels.com/photo/black-and-gray-laptop-computer-turned-on-doing-computer-codes-1181271/