The European Union’s latest statement on Gaza, following the Cairo Summit on March 4, underscores its alignment with Arab-led reconstruction efforts while reinforcing its position on security and governance in the region. The statement reflects a complex balancing act between supporting Palestinian state-building, ensuring Israel’s security, and maintaining diplomatic cohesion with Arab partners.

Backing the Arab Plan: A Shift Toward Regional Solutions

The EU’s endorsement of the Arab Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, adopted by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), signals a growing recognition of regional leadership in resolving the Gaza crisis. By engaging with Arab states, the EU appears to acknowledge the necessity of a broader coalition to oversee Gaza’s post-conflict governance, an approach that could reduce unilateral Western influence and increase local legitimacy.

This move aligns with previous EU efforts to position itself as a diplomatic actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, often working in parallel with the United States but emphasizing multilateralism. The EU’s willingness to engage with Arab partners suggests a strategic calculation: recognizing that a sustainable Gaza plan will require buy-in from both Palestinian and regional stakeholders, particularly given the divisions between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas.

Exclusion of Hamas: A Clear Red Line

One of the strongest elements of the EU’s statement is its unequivocal stance that Hamas must have no future role in Gaza. This reflects long-standing EU policy—Hamas is classified as a terrorist organization by the bloc—but the direct phrasing in the statement underscores that Brussels sees the group as a fundamental obstacle to any lasting peace framework.

By reinforcing this position, the EU aligns with Israeli security concerns while also backing the Palestinian Authority as the legitimate governing body. However, this raises a significant practical challenge: while international actors may seek to sideline Hamas, the group retains significant support within Gaza, as well as military capabilities that could make any transition of power difficult.

The Palestinian Authority’s Role: A Conditional Endorsement

The EU’s commitment to strengthening the Palestinian Authority and its reform program suggests a conditional approach—backing the PA, but with the expectation of governance improvements. This reflects broader concerns, including within Arab states, over the PA’s capacity to effectively govern Gaza, particularly given its weakened legitimacy and governance struggles in the West Bank.

The EU’s financial and political support for PA-led governance in Gaza would likely come with expectations of reform, addressing corruption, security coordination, and administrative efficiency. Yet, the PA’s ability to reassert control over Gaza, particularly after 17 years of Hamas rule, remains an open question.

Ceasefire, Hostages, and a Political Horizon

The EU’s call for the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement aligns with ongoing diplomatic efforts by the US, Egypt, and Qatar to secure an end to hostilities. However, the statement notably avoids specific measures for enforcement, reflecting the EU’s limited leverage in mediating between Hamas and Israel.

By reaffirming its commitment to a two-state solution, the EU maintains its long-standing policy framework, but the feasibility of such an outcome remains highly contested. Israeli government policies, Palestinian political divisions, and regional dynamics continue to pose obstacles, raising questions about how the EU intends to translate diplomatic statements into actionable policy.

Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction: The Immediate Focus

The EU’s emphasis on scaling humanitarian aid reflects the urgent crisis on the ground, with Gaza’s infrastructure severely damaged and civilian suffering at critical levels. However, the challenge remains how to ensure aid reaches those in need without bolstering Hamas’s influence—a concern that has historically complicated international assistance efforts in the region.

A Strategic but Limited Role

The EU’s statement signals a commitment to engage with Arab states, support Palestinian governance reform, and push for security guarantees for Israel. However, its ability to influence the realities on the ground remains constrained by regional actors, political divisions, and security concerns.

Moving forward, the EU’s role may hinge on its ability to bridge the gap between international diplomatic frameworks and local political realities—a challenge that has long defined its engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The argument is often made about food, as well as about dozens of other “strategic goods”, that we must be self-sufficient in the face of threats to peace around the world.

The argument itself is very old, old enough for the self-sufficiency argument, as well as the feasibility of actually being self-sufficient, to have finally graduated to the status of political myth. Yet this is, unfortunately, a myth that refuses to die. One that continuously puts European nations on the path towards fragile supply chains.

The conflict in Ukraine has disrupted Black Sea agricultural exports, pushing prices higher, and exacerbating high energy and fertilizer costs. As major exporters of grain and vegetable oil, conflict around the Black Sea is significantly disrupting shipping.

In Sudan, the combined effects of conflict, economic crisis, and poor harvests are significantly affecting people’s access to food and have doubled the number of people facing acute hunger in Sudan to around 18 million. The higher grain prices from the war in Ukraine was the final nail.

If fighting in Gaza escalates across the Middle East, (which, fortunately, is looking less likely) it could spark a second energy crisis which could send food and fuel prices spiralling. The World Bank warned that if the conflict were to intensify, it could result in significant price hikes for oil and exacerbate food insecurity, both within the Middle East and globally.

It should be obvious that the most secure food supply, steel supply or fuel supply is one that draws from as many sources as possible, so that if one dries up, or is caught up in a military or diplomatic calamity, then the supply is able to be recovered by increasing trade through the many alternative channels. Its how Qatar, cut off during the blockade in 2017, was able to continue largely unaffected despite being shut off from all its neighbours and producing itself almost no food at all.

The myth’s enduring popularity largely is down to the way it interacts with our basic human psychology. Most of our mental heuristics are learn for much more simplistic problems. The way we’ve learnt to survive is by hoarding and sitting on as large a pile of food as possible. We’re also naturally disinclined to trust our neighbours, let alone rely on them.

Breaking though our prehistoric instincts and embracing what are therefore the counter-intuitive tenets of free trade is thus quite a tall order. Perhaps it explains why free trade remains so unpopular compared to protectionism despite the overwhelmingly positive record that free trade can claim for itself, singlehandedly lifting billions out of poverty.

Convincing the current generation of European politicians to diversify their food supply will always be hard – but the gains are massive if they can see the light.

Regions like Latin America and Southeast Asia stand out as regions where the EU does far too little strategic trade. Being in different hemispheres means that the seasons are opposite (or have massively different climates in the case of Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia), so the benefits to mutual supply chains are naturally complementary. Such countries are primed for mutually beneficial trade to boost strategic security.

Countries like Argentina produce large amounts of meat, something the EU sanitary and phytosanitary rules (SPS) make much more difficult to import than it need be. Malaysia is the world’s largest exporter of palm oil, producing the oils and fats needed across dozens of food categories. Compared to other main oilseeds, such as soybean, rapeseed, and sunflower, which can be grown domestically, oil palm is the highest-yielding oil crop. Making it cheaper and easier to import would mean food security in times of instability, and cheaper staples in times of peace by driving down costs.

More trade also means more influence and more transparency in supply chains. Taking the Malays as an example again, their agrifood industry is embracing the use of blockchain technology and traceability to prove that their products are environmentally friendly and deforestation-free. Trade makes economically viable massive environmental efforts to protect the environment. Conversely, it creates interdependence with regions around the world which reduce the likelihood of conflict or international rulebreaking generally.

The great French economist Frédéric Bastiat wrote that ““When goods don’t cross borders, Soldiers will”. He observed the power of interdependence as a peacekeeper. Diversifying trade is therefore both preparation and prevention. Politicians must overcome their primitive instincts and let the goods flow.

For the past few days, the Israeli Prime Minister has been focusing his criticism on Qatar, not knowing where to turn and, above all, in the face of a flood of worldwide criticism of his hard-line strategy in Gaza and the way out of the war. He even recently accused Doha of being indirectly responsible for 7 October. While Qatar has been manoeuvring to negotiate with the Islamist organisation for the past three months, it is also endangering the hostages, many of whom are still being held in Gaza.

Quite surprising to now accuse Qatar of bearing the burden of what is happening, even though Netanyahu acknowledged in 2019 that it was important to support Hamas in order to continue to weaken the Palestinian Authority and prevent the creation of a Palestinian state. Bibi’s policy has always been to deal with the Islamist organisation to the detriment of Abbas’s Palestinian Authority. The division of power between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was the perfect tool to condemn the formation of a Palestinian state.

Netanyahu’s absurd attack on Doha when we know that the Hebrew state helped support Sheikh Yassin, its founder, in 1988, always with the aim of dividing the Palestinians as much as possible. Despite its anti-Jewish doctrine, Israel has supported the development of the most radical branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and has played with fire. Just as the Americans supported the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets, the Hebrew state thought it could use a few bearded men to weaken Yasser Arafat’s Fatah for good. Charles Enderlin, former France 2 correspondent in Israel, has published a number of articles and books explaining the complacency of the Israeli right towards Hamas, the emergence of which would certainly doom a future state for the Palestinians once again.

Finally, it’s absurd when you consider that Qatar has been harbouring Hamas leaders at the request of the Americans (and Israelis) so that it can negotiate the day they are needed. And since 7 October, alas, that day has arrived in an attempt to save the lives of almost 140 Israeli hostages still being held by Hamas in Gaza. Today, however, the powerless international community is trying to bring about a ceasefire and a halt to bombing in Gaza after the deaths of nearly 25,000 Gazans, mostly women and children, since mid-October.

If no lasting political solution emerges from the military response to Israel’s worst attack in decades, following the deaths of nearly 1,400 people in Israel in 48 hours, then once again a temporary solution will be adopted that will have to last, to prevent the Israelis and Palestinians of Gaza from killing each other to the last man. And in any case, it is unlikely to be the creation of the Palestinian state that the Israeli government still does not want. Even less so today, even if it would perhaps be the first guarantor of the security of the Jewish state.

Who can help put an end to the noise of weapons and get diplomacy back on track in the Middle East? The United States and Europe are still trying, with the support of Egypt and Qatar, which Netanyahu is suddenly criticising in order to absolve himself of his major responsibility. In a general geopolitical context in which the major Western powers are increasingly marginalised as peacemakers, as are the major international organisations that are supposed to ensure respect for international law, it is above all the regional powers that for several years have been regaining control of their zone of influence or putting forward their talent as peace mediators to have a say in the concert of nations in crisis or at war. As far as the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is concerned, the United States, which for years has been disengaging from Middle Eastern conflict zones, can do little, especially as Joe Biden’s term of office, which is irrevocably drawing to a close, further weakens his capacity for influence and action, if his administration has had any over the last three years. The European Union, mired in the Ukrainian crisis, has long since lost its diplomatic capacity and remains forever a political dwarf in the cacophonous symphony of world powers. That leaves Egypt and Qatar above all. Traditionally, Egypt, which has been at peace with Israel since 1977 and the Camp David Accords, has always managed in recent years, since the arrival of President Sissi, to negotiate a pause in hostilities between Israel and Gaza. Cairo’s relations with the Hamas movement are cordial and enable it to reconcile its points of view with Tel Aviv on each occasion.

The player that can probably make the most of the situation, and in the continuity of what it has been doing for years, from the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan, is Qatar, which has had a relationship with Israel for a long time, something that Netanyahu forgets. Qatar’s proximity to these Islamist movements, such as the Taliban at the time of the negotiations with the Americans in 2018, is a key asset for Doha. It dates back precisely to the time when Washington asked the Emirate to keep an eye on its leaders. With the American base at Al Oudeid, the largest American off-ground base in the world, Doha saw its capacity to one day monetise this “service rendered” for its credibility and its de facto proximity to the enemies of many, and to see itself emerge as a key regional peace mediator.

Originally published at Info-Today.eu