Henry Kissinger would complain that he did not know who to contact in Europe during a crisis. Xi Jinping might have the opposite issue. According to the number of European officials who visited Beijing in the last few weeks, Beijing would have to make several phone calls to the EU to understand their position in an urgent situation.

In just two weeks, China received the leaders of Spain, France, the EU Commission president, and the German foreign minister (a fifth visit by the EU’s chief of foreign policy, Josep Borrell was cancelled at the very last minute).

Most observers saw the different, and even conflicting visions expressed by these visits as a further setback to the EU’s public image. They also confirmed that it is far from being a “strategic” international actor.

These analyses, while not entirely unjustified in their conclusions, misunderstand largely the nature of the threat that the emerging competition between China and the US poses to the EU.

If you want to avoid being cornered or taken for granted by your partners, it is wise to use diversified messages that engage different audiences.

Consider the different messages that the EU sent to China (and indirectly to the US) at Beijing. The European leaders addressed China with a wide range of opinions: from Pedro Sanchez’s encouraging words on their Ukraine peace plan to Ursula von der Leyen’s call for China to respect international order to French President Emmanuel Macron’s tiredness of US ‘Messianism,’ to German Foreign Minister Annalena Bärbock’s call for Taiwan’s integrity.

Some see this as a symbol of the EU’s notorious incoherence when it comes to foreign policy.

It is not clear why these goals – hoping for peace in Ukraine and supporting Kyiv; opposing a change in the status Taiwan; and urging China respect international rules, while keeping communication open with Beijing – should be seen as being incompatible.

They may appear to be so to those who adhere to a polarising Cold War logic when it comes international affairs. The EU is not obliged to adopt the same view of the world as the US or China.

A polycentric and (literally), multilingual foreign policy, is the right statecraft tool, for a power who won’t let its interests be defined by geopolitical competition.

After all, the EU is not the only actor in global politics that navigates cross-cutting interests and values. Even the adamantly Atlanticist UK, under Rishi sunak, has tried to tone down the anti-China rhetoric that was so prominent during the Boris Johnson/Liz Truss years, in order to keep the channels of economic exchange open.

In the same way, projecting a variety of values and preferences on a global scale reflects the diversity of opinion among the 27 member states with different economic and strategic priorities.

By judging the EU by the standards set by nation-states such as the US and China, we misunderstand the nature of European Foreign Policy and underestimate its ability to use nuance in an age of black-and white polarisation. True, the heterogeneity within foreign policy voices can often lead to indecision. It is a rich toolbox that the EU can use to engage different actors in various circumstances.

The EU’s greatest asset is its ability to use a variety of foreign policy discourses. It keeps a systemic competitor like China on their toes while signaling to a partner such as the US that Europe has distinct interests to protect. Contrary to conventional wisdom the EU’s varied foreign policy message is a sign of an union that makes its choices and does not allow others to dictate their choices to it.