By Emmanuel Ande Ivorgba, PhD. Executive Director, Centre for Faith and Community Development (CFCD)

INTRODUCTION

The traditional concept of leadership is based on the notion that leaders are selected to command control and make final decisions for the collective group. However, through this viewpoint, leadership is viewed not only as an exercise of authority but also on the legal grounds. As societies become more complex, technical demands of the state grow, and decision authority becomes specialized. We are more naturally concerned with what leaders do with the job, and what they are and their behavior. In a country of high-rank public-private sector bureaucracy, leaders at different management hierarchical levels play a major role in shaping the direction of political life. They contribute to our understanding about the role of political leadership in policy formulation.

Nigeria, with its vast amount of natural resources, is currently undergoing rapid economic decline. There is a high incidence of poverty, escalating inflation, balance of payment problems, as well as heavy debt-servicing problems. The root cause of this economic problem stems from the pursuit of an inappropriate economic policy. The dominance of poor leadership in policy formulation in Nigeria can clearly be identified as the main source of the problems. Political leadership is pivotal and significant in shaping the economic landscape of any nation (Klarin, 2020). The quality of any nation’s political leadership can significantly determine or influence such nation’s overall economic development trajectory. Nigeria is blessed with a vibrant human population, abundance of natural resources. These resources, coupled with the great entrepreneurial spirit and resilience of the citizens, have positioned Nigeria as a potential continental economic powerhouse. Unfortunately, and disappointedly so, weak institutional frameworks, coupled with corruption, policy inconsistencies and other numerous governance challenges, have constituted stumbling blocks to the country’s inability to effectively and efficiently harness its economic potential (Ogunleye & Adeleye, 2018).

Economic development is a measure of the increase of per capita income, which is itself, a function of the growth rate of national income (Mankiw & Taylor, 2014). National income growth depends largely on, political leadership stability as well as the appropriate economic policies implemented by the political leadership. Also, insights into the influence of political leadership on the socio-economic development enable one to understand the roots of the poverty trap in which many developing nations are stuck. Understanding why countries have the type of leaders they do have and what determines a politician to govern well or govern poorly help us appreciate the positions of governance. This paper seeks to explore the intricate and dynamic relationship between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria. The paper will briefly examine the historical context, challenges and opportunities in Nigeria’s economic landscape, key policy decisions, and governance structures to unravel the impact of political leadership on key economic indicators such as job creation, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, GDP growth, and foreign direct investment. The paper will provide insights into how effective leadership can catalyze positive economic transformation and propel inclusive growth and development in Nigeria. BACKGROUND With a human population of over 230 million, and rich in natural resources, Nigeria, popularly referred to as the “Giant of Africa” (UK Essays, 2018), and continental powerhouse (Akindele, et al. 2012), holds vast potential for economic growth and development. Despite this abundance of human and natural resources, the country has faced numerous complex challenges and struggles on its path to economic prosperity. Nigeria has experienced significant political, social, and economic changes since its independence from British colonial rule in 1960. Political leadership continues to play a central role in Nigeria’s fate. In general, the effects of political stability on economic development underscore the fact that political opportunities drive the economic policies in countries, especially those that are external as opposed to internal factors. The effectiveness of political leadership in providing the best opportunities for economic policies is also important because the nature of the stability is driven by how the political market works in various countries. Overall, many different types of political markets lead to different types of policy commitments. The impact of political leadership attributes is manifested through varying degrees of political stability, democratization, income inequality, and governance quality. The historical context of Nigeria’s economic development efforts has been shaped by a complex interplay of factors. These include the legacies of the colonial era, post-independence governance structures, the discovery of oil and Nigeria’s dependence on oil, political instability and social inequalities, among others. The country has experienced long periods of military rule, and military coups, disrupting democratic processes, with profound repercussions on economic management and policy consistency. While the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the 1950s provided a unique opportunity for the transformation of Nigeria’s economy and acceleration of the development process, the country’s over-reliance and dependence on oil revenues, and neglect of particularly, manufacturing and agriculture, exposed the country’s economy to external shocks and volatility. This has been further compounded by the mismanagement of oil revenues and the absence of, or lack of diversification. Different administrations and political leaders in Nigeria, have implemented several economic policies that have generated both positive and negative impacts on the nation’s economy. Additionally, the socio-political dynamics coupled with regional disparities, ethno-religious tensions, poverty, youth unemployment, among others, underscore the multidimensional complexities that Nigeria’s political leaders must address in order to foster inclusive and sustainable national economic growth. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NIGERIA From the beginning, the political leadership has been infused with a degree of military dominance and military interests. Their unwillingness to relinquish control of governance and the economy exposed Nigeria’s leadership to ineffective policies that advocate autocracy, preserve tradition, uphold the old methods instead of developing creative and entrepreneurial elements to thrive when addressing economic development and socio[1]economic change. Political leadership in Nigeria is primarily dedicated to self-interests and strategies. This inadequacy largely refuses them from seeing the need for Nigeria to devise and implement the strategic economic development policies rather than the traditional growth-based doctrines provided and promoted by international economic analysts and international economic ideologues. The autocratic policy models are directed at reinforcing figureheads and also provide ‘cocktail’ solutions primarily to maintain political rivalry. As a result, policy leadership evolves less in the way of the country’s economic and social development. An important characteristic of Nigeria’s political leadership is the role of ethnic and religious affiliations in shaping political alliances and power structures. Ethno-religious dynamics and blocs have played a significant role in determining political outcomes and leadership appointments (Akande, 2016). This has often resulted in a fragmented political landscape, with leaders often prioritizing the interests of their own ethnic or religious groups over those of the nation as a whole. Also, the legacy of military rule has had a lasting impact on Nigeria’s political leadership. Many former military leaders have transitioned into civilian politics, bringing with them a hierarchical and authoritarian style of leadership that has at times undermined democratic principles (Ojo, 2017). This has contributed to a culture of strongman politics, where leaders often centralize power and suppress dissent to maintain control. There have been efforts, in recent years, to reform the country’s political leadership and improve governance standards, through initiatives such as anti-corruption campaigns and electoral reforms, to address some of the challenges facing the country’s leadership (Adesina, 2020). However, progress in this direction has been very slow, and entrenched power structures continue to pose obstacles to meaningful change. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW In analyzing how political leaders influence economic performance in Nigeria, one should be cognizant of the fact that it is the interaction of the political elite with the economic cycle that provides insight into how political institutions mediate the influence of the political elite on the economy. Nigerian society has experienced considerable political upheaval. Income inequality has increased since the 1960s, and democratic political structures have not been effectively adapted to reflect the changes in social structures influenced by modernization. The erratic progress of democracy in Nigeria and its inability to cope with the pressures of rapid modernization have led to an erosion of belief in the efficacy of the social system. Decades of authoritarian or military rule in Nigeria have had a negative impact on the quality of governance and the standard of living of most Nigerians. Nigeria’s economic development has been greatly influenced by a variety of historical, social, and political factors, including pre-colonial trade, colonial exploitation, post-independence policies, and the oil boom. In the pre-colonial period, several thriving economies with very extensive trade networks existed. For example, the Yoruba city- states existed in the southwest, the Benin Kingdom in the southeast and the Hausa kingdoms in the north, engaged in agriculture and craft production, and traded, not only among themselves, but with coastal and trans-Saharan traders (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Then came the Colonial Era, which lasted from 1861-1960, and significantly altered Nigeria’s economic landscape. During this period, the British concentrated on extraction and exportation of raw materials to feed the European Industrial Revolution. The economy was designed to produce cash crops like groundnuts, palm oil, cocoa and others to serve British interests (Ake, 1981). The Post-Independence Industrialization period, from 1960-1970 sought to transform the colonial economic structure and accelerate Nigeria’s industrial development (Ekundare, 1973). Economic development plans were then designed by the government to promote and support the diversification of the country’s economy from agriculture towards industrialization and infrastructural development. This was followed, in the 1970s, by the period of Nigeria’s Oil Boom, where the problem of the country was not money but how to spend it. Oil contributed about 90% of foreign exchange earnings and over 80% of government revenues. The result was increased urbanization and investments in the development of infrastructure, but agriculture and other sectors were practically neglected (Osoba, 1996). With support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Nigeria adopted the Structural Adjustment Program in 1986. This was in response to the challenges of rising debt and falling oil prices. An important goal of the SAP was to liberalize Nigeria’s economy, support private enterprise and minimize state involvement. However, the immediate social impact of the SAP was increased poverty and inequality (Iyoha & Oriakhi, 2002). In 2004, the Nigeria launched the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), focusing on poverty reduction, economic diversification and infrastructure development. The NEEDS focused on the promotion of good governance practices, private sector participation, and social development programs (Soludo, 2017). the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (ERGP) was launched in 2007 by the government to support and boost agriculture, manufacturing and services (Kalejaiye & Aliyu, 2013). Another policy, the Vision 2020 Agendafollowed in 2009. The goal of the Vision 2020 was to position Nigeria as one of the top 20 economies in the world by 2020. It focused on key sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services, and called for investment in human capital development and infrastructure (Ibrahim, 2020). Since 1990 to date, the country has witnessed a mixture of economic growth and setbacks. While there has been some form of stability in terms of democratic governance and political stability, corruption-induced challenges, the lack of economic diversification away from oil and lack of basic infrastructure still remain.

The influence of political leadership on the economy has been evident in various policies, decisions, and actions taken by those in power. One key example of this can be seen in their management of the country’s vast natural resources, particularly oil. Nigeria is a major oil producer, and the country’s political leaders have often used revenue from the oil sector to fund government programs and projects. Unfortunately, mismanagement, corruption, and lack of diversification have led to a situation where the economy remains heavily reliant on oil, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices (Oyekola, 2015). In order to attract investments and spur economic development, sound economic policies, infrastructural development and regulatory frameworks are very essential. However, political instability, policy inconsistency, and corruption have often deterred investors, leading to suboptimal economic performance (Onyishi, 2018). Also, decisions in respect to government spending, currency stability, taxations and interest rates, are important factors that influence economic performance. Purposeful and effective political leadership in these areas can lead to sustainable economic growth, while poor decisions, as Nigeria’s experience has shown, exacerbate economic challenges(Akinbobola, 2019).

Nigeria has just as much potential as almost any other developed country and can show the same improvement if their government becomes truly transparent and accountable, focusing on creating a conducive enabling environment for organizing Nigerian civil society to generate growth. The importance of political instability and poor governance to the decline of Nigeria’s business climate is not limited to discouraging large foreign investors, but it also affects small and medium-sized businesses. Banks are also affected in several ways by the political instability and poor governance of the country. Political instability contributes to a high-risk credit market and reduced access to credit for the private sector. The financial sector is one area in which scientific and internal market work can be done to establish how poor governance affects Nigeria’s economy.

POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORIES

The literature on political economy (Mills, 2005) as well as political business cycle theory (Nordhaus & William, D, 1975) is rich with reasons why politicians in particular would want to shape economies. They have incentives to gain from various forms of rent seeking. Classical and neoliberal economists have come up with mechanisms through which leaders can manipulate areas of the economy to stay in power. Politicians also agree to a social contract with citizens to provide public goods in return for a mandate to govern. There are incentives for politicians to supply public goods to maintain power. Politicians may choose to use economic policy to expand a country’s productive capacity or improve national welfare as part of their stewardship. This may involve providing an enabling environment where the private sector flourishes and produces many desirable goods and services. Politicians can also manipulate the economy by trading off some economic policy in exchange for political survival. Political leaders remain the most important economic agents whose intentions to grow the economy can impact on aggregate productivity and improve economic outcomes.

Political economy theories offer insights into the complex interplay of institutions, interests and power, as well as different perspectives on the relationship between economics and politics. Some key political economy theories include:

a. The Classical Political Economy Theory, which began around the 18th and 19th centuries, was very prominent and promoted by great thinkers and renowned economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo, among others. The classical political economy theory emphasizes minimal government intervention, free markets and self-interests in driving economic outcomes. Proponents of the classical political economy theory believe that overall economic prosperity through the invisible hand mechanism (Smith, 1776), would result from self-interest.

b. The Marxist Political Economy Theory: Developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the Marxist political economy theory deals with the relationship between social classes, labour and capital. The foundation of this theory is that capitalism is inherently exploitative, hence proponents of Marxist political economy theory advocate for the overthrow of the capitalist system (Marx, 1867), and the establishment of a classless society rooted in the common ownership of th means of production.

c. The Institutional Political Economy Theory: The Institutional Political Economy Theory is described as a fusion of economic analysis with political science and sociological insights, in order to properly examine how economic behaviour and outcomes are shaped by institutions. The theory highlights the significance and influence of formal and informal rules and norms, including power structures in economic decision-making (North, 1990). Institutions have the capacity to either promote or hinder economic development and social welfare.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Economic growth is a significant contributor and necessary component of economic development. Economic development is the creation of enabling conditions that promote and stimulate rapid and substantial increase in the basic material well-being of the majority. This is achievable by the implementation of political leadership policies to promote economic growth through land reforms, capital intensive industrialization, educational stimulus and effective public health system. Economic development must be measured through such areas as the reduction in the opportunities for malnutrition, the considerable reduction in high infant mortality rates, the availability of potable water, the availability of access to quality educational material, the growth of public health, greater opportunities for employment, the gradual socio-economic level generated by the majority of the people whereby an average level of society is established, the reduction in the level of high inflation and unemployment, indices of per-capita income, and through the efficient allocation of resources in regulating the type of social relationships. The term “economic development” can be viewed from the perspective of a false dichotomy in the development process. The dichotomy resulted due to the identifying of economic development with the advancement of the “center” (the more developed and industrialized countries, usually capitalist, on the one hand) and the possibilities of the “periphery” (viz the less developed, under-developed, undeveloped or developing countries, often countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on the other. What the political economist referred to frequently as “economic growth” – a sustained increase in the output of goods and services of a country, usually measured at one sector of the economy most times through the increase of the Gross National product (as one of the forms of indicators of economic development) is often confused with economic development itself. Historically, Nigeria’s economic development has evolved significantly, shaped by its rich endowment of natural resources, governmental policies, and its interactions within the global economy. Nigeria’s oil and gas sector accounts for about 90% of export earnings and more than 50% of government revenue (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2022). This over-dependence on oil and gas has made the country’s economy highly susceptible to global oil price fluctuations. Efforts have been intensified in recent times, to diversify the economy through the development of the agricultural sector, which accounts for about 70% of the labour force and about 24% of the country’s GDP (National Bureau of Statistics, 2022). The Manufacturing sector, though still nascent, holds great promise, in terms of its contributions to the nation’s GDP. This is the clear focus of the Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP), designed to support the manufacturing sector to become globally competitive by increasing the sector’s manufacturing base (Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, 2022). The services sector has recorded the fastest growth in Nigeria, with telecommunications driving the expansion of mobile telephony and internet penetration. The financial services industry has been revolutionized, enhancing financial inclusion (PwC, 2023). Despite such progress, especially in the services sector, Nigeria’s economic development is still hampered by challenges of corruption, insecurity, political instability, and unacceptable unemployment rate, especially among the country’s youth population. Poverty is also widespread, as a significant portion of the country’s human population continues to live below the poverty line. Nigeria’s political leaders are today, also strained by contemporary socio-economic and geopolitical problems.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The interplay between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria is profound and deeply influential, presenting a mix of opportunities and challenges over the years. Depending on the nature of leadership, sometimes military and sometimes civilian, centralized versus decentralized, this interplay between political leadership and economic development in Nigeria has been marked by significant shifts. Persistent issues such as corruption and political instability remain significant barriers. The path to sustainable economic development in Nigeria depends largely on the emergence of transparent, accountable, and effective political leadership. Economic policies and outcomes are directly impacted by political leadership. For example, Nigeria witnessed significant regional disparities due to political and ethnic tensions, during Nigeria First Republic (1960-1966), which greatly influenced developmental policies and economic development decisions (Falola & Heaton, 2008). From the late 1960s to late 1990s, the Nigeria witnessed long periods of military regimes, with centralized control over decision-making and economic resources. Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999, signaling a significant turning point for the nation’s political and economic landscape. The Federal Government then, led by President Olusegun Obasanjo, from 1999- 2007, initiated significant economic policies, including banking sector reforms, privatization and the war against corruption to promote Nigeria’s growth and economic stability (Utomi, 2013). Despite these encouraging efforts, corruption, insurgency, political instability, and inadequate infrastructure have continued to impede substantial economic progress. Resources that could be applied for economic development have been drained by political corruption, due to large-scale mismanagement and embezzlement of funds by political leaders (Ekanade, 2014), significantly hampering Nigeria’s economic development. The establishment of institutions such as the ICPC and the EFCC demonstrates leadership commitment to combating corruption. However, the effectiveness of these institutions has depended largely, on the leadership’s commitment and political climate (Agbiboa, 2012). Political leadership seeks to recast the economy, the rules of the institution of property and production, and the distributional benefits from economic growth and stability; it seeks to redistribute property and production, enunciates and enforces written and principled rules of commercial behavior so that technology, skills, knowledge, and other means of production are deployed efficiently at the levels of the corporate sector, while acceptable distributional privileges are punctuated; and it seeks to protect and defend property rights, and to regulate the conduct and behavior of economic agents within the terms of written and enforced rules. The governance structure can either facilitate or obstruct the realization of the aim and objectives of political leadership.

CONCLUSION

Political leadership is fundamental in the process of governance, towards the achievement of desirable objectives, including economic development, social integration, public well-being, and such other related goals. However, political leaders could impact the economy in diverse ways, such as their political orientation and ideology. Furthermore, political leadership is expected to engineer the economy towards greater performance through various operative mechanisms like policy formulation, decision-making, implementation, and the evaluation of policies. It is these functions that allow political leaders to use public resources to create value for the improvement of the living standards of a country, while at the same time working to broaden social welfare, for instance, by increasing employment. Although political leadership’s corresponding influence on economic development can have significant consequences, either through its impact on policy change driven by its transfer of power from one set of political actors to another, or by altering expectations and beliefs, political regimes can shape patterns of economic development and distributions. Such leaders can act as a model, man of action, great communicator, or transformational leader, while others have been seen as people of vision pursuit focusing on creativity and risk persuasiveness inspiring trust to make things happen, society builder, nation-builder(s), nation transformer, and many more. Good political leadership creates an environment that promotes economic development. Intriguingly, corruption at all levels of governance, poor accountability and transparency have been identified as the bane of the underdevelopment of many African nations including Nigeria. To find solutions to these problems, this work has investigated the influence of political leadership on economic development in Nigeria. The paper is anchored on the legitimacy theory which emphasizes the importance of public confidence and trust in government-to-government effectiveness. The study adopted the quasi-experimental research design with the secondary source of data as the only source of data collection. Data analyzed were obtained from secondary sources using content analysis. The research found out that political leadership influences economic development in Nigeria ranging from ineffective utilization of resources, embezzlement of public funds, bad governance, poor service, and inadequate level of socialization, and encouragement of corrupt practices among public officials. This paper suggests that more attention should be paid to the challenges at the institutional structure and the political system in Nigeria. These challenges call for significant measures aimed at promoting good political leadership in Nigeria. For Nigeria to attain her worthy goals as a competitive and prospering nation, Nigerians must commit to re-establishing value for the common good, a good society, community, dialogue, tolerance, fraternity, and self-identity, fostering a mutual sense of belonging in full participation and well-being. Furthermore, initiating agile services reflecting due transparency and encouraging responsibility among all its leaders at all levels, in good faith and uprightness, and manifesting self-pride. To this end, the paper advocates for the urgent need for enhancing moral leadership and promoting genuine politics in terms of the inviolability of life, perennial morals, and the preservation of the human environment, and democracy for social and civil rights.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When political leaders are unjust, oppressive and manipulative, it becomes difficult to share the goals of the elite, and consequently stifle efforts toward growth and development. However, and usefully, vision, political will, attributes of democratic inclusiveness and transformational qualities make great leaders capable of leading development and country mobilization into prosperity, democracy and development. A sense of national interest as the cardinal point of leadership informs the communal spirit of visionary political leadership in building and remolding the structure of a nation state. In conclusion, all historical trajectories to high growth in emerging economies were marked by focused attention to structural change by political leadership. In this sense, an inclusive approach and response from the political leadership in Nigeria places some optimism in the quest for long-term growth and economic progress. Leadership at the level of nation-states had a greater impact on growth and development than at any higher level. A developing country’s own leadership had the major responsibility to initiate, guide and pace its growth process. History and successful models of change provide a message of hope, that with the right policies, attributes and dispositions of its leaders, good countries can become better. However, at other times political leaders thwart the development of their nations through corrupt practices and greed that undermines development objectives.

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First publication: International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (ISSN 2454-6186), vol. VIII, issue VII, July 2024, p. 1274-1282, https://dx.doi.org/10.47772/IJRISS.2024.807106 Received: 17 June 2024; Revised: 30 June 2024; Accepted: 04 July 2024; Published: 07 August 2024.

Illustrative Photo by Christina Morillo: https://www.pexels.com/photo/black-and-gray-laptop-computer-turned-on-doing-computer-codes-1181271/

The relationship between the Fulani, corruption and neo-pastoralism, i.e. the purchase of large herds of cattle by wealthy city dwellers to hide ill-gotten money.

By Teodor Detchev

The previous two parts of this analysis, titled “The Sahel – Conflicts, Coups and Migration Bombs” and “The Fulani and Jihadism in West Africa”, discussed the rise of terrorist activity in West Africa and the inability to end the guerrilla warfare waged by Islamic radicals against government troops in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Nigeria. The issue of the ongoing civil war in the Central African Republic was also discussed.

One of the important conclusions is that the intensification of the conflict is fraught with the high risk of a “migration bomb” that would lead to unprecedented migration pressure along the entire southern border of the European Union. An important circumstance is also the possibilities of Russian foreign policy to manipulate the intensity of conflicts in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and the Central African Republic. With its hand on the “counter” of a potential migration explosion, Moscow could easily be tempted to use induced migration pressure against EU states that are generally already designated as hostile.

In this risky situation, a special role is played by the Fulani people – an ethnic group of semi-nomads, migratory livestock breeders who inhabit the strip from the Gulf of Guinea to the Red Sea and number 30 to 35 million people according to various data. Being a people who have historically played a very important role in the penetration of Islam into Africa, especially West Africa, the Fulani are a huge temptation for Islamic radicals, despite the fact that they profess the Sufi school of Islam, which is undoubtedly the most tolerant, as and the most mystical.

Unfortunately, as will be seen from the analysis below, the issue is not just about religious opposition. The conflict is not only ethno-religious. It is socio-ethno-religious, and in recent years, the effects of the wealth accumulated through corruption, converted into livestock ownership – the so-called “neopastorism” – have begun to exert an additional strong influence. This phenomenon is particularly characteristic of Nigeria and is the subject of the present third part of the analysis.

The Fulani in Nigeria

Being the most populous country in West Africa with 190 million inhabitants, Nigeria, like many countries in the region, is characterized by a kind of dichotomy between the South, populated mainly by Yoruba Christians, and the North, whose population is mainly Muslim, with a large part of it is the Fulani who, as everywhere, are migratory animal breeders. Overall, the country is 53% Muslim and 47% Christian.

The “central belt” of Nigeria, crossing the country from east to west, including in particular the states of Kaduna (north of Abuja), Bunue-Plateau (east of Abuja) and Taraba (southeast of Abuja), is a meeting point between these two worlds , the scene of frequent incidents in a never-ending cycle of vendettas between farmers, usually Christian (who accuse Fulani herdsmen of allowing their herds to damage their crops) and nomadic Fulani pastoralists (who complain of cattle theft and the increasing establishment of farms in areas traditionally accessible to their animal migration routes).

These conflicts have intensified in recent times, as the Fulani also seek to expand the migration and grazing routes of their herds to the south, and the northern grasslands suffer from increasingly severe drought, while the farmers of the south, in the conditions of particularly high dynamics of population growth, seek to establish farms further north.

After 2019, this antagonism took a dangerous turn in the direction of identity and religious affiliation between the two communities, which became irreconcilable and governed by different legal systems, especially since Islamic law (Sharia) was reintroduced in 2000 in twelve northern states. (Islamic law was in force until 1960, after which it was abolished with Nigeria’s independence). From the Christians’ point of view, the Fulani want to “Islamize” them – if necessary by force.

This view is fueled by the fact that Boko Haram, which targets mostly Christians, seeks to use the armed militias used by the Fulani against their opponents, and that indeed a number of these fighters have joined the ranks of the Islamist group. Christians believe that the Fulani (along with the Hausa, who are related to them) provide the core of Boko Haram’s forces. This is an exaggerated perception given the fact that a number of Fulani militias remain autonomous. But the fact is that by 2019 the antagonism had worsened. [38]

Thus, on June 23, 2018, in a village inhabited mostly by Christians (of the Lugere ethnic group), an attack attributed to the Fulani led to heavy casualties – 200 killed.

The election of Muhammadu Buhari, who is a Fulani and former leader of the largest Fulani cultural association, Tabital Pulaakou International, as President of the Republic did not help to reduce tensions. The president is often accused of surreptitiously supporting his Fulani parents instead of instructing security forces to crack down on their criminal activities.

The situation of the Fulani in Nigeria is also indicative of some new trends in the relationship between migratory pastoralists and settled farmers. Sometime in the year 2020, researchers have already established indisputably a noticeable increase in the number of conflicts and clashes between pastoralists and farmers.[5]

Neaopastoralims and Fulani

Issues and facts such as climate change, expanding deserts, regional conflicts, population growth, human trafficking and terrorism have been invoked in attempts to explain this phenomenon. The problem is that none of these questions fully explain the sharp increase in the use of small arms and light weapons by several groups of pastoralists and sedentary farmers. [5]

Olayinka Ajala dwells on this question in particular, who examines the changes in the ownership of livestock over the years, which he calls “neopastoralism”, as a possible explanation for the increase in the number of armed clashes between these groups.

The term neopastoralism was first used by Matthew Luizza of the American Association for the Advancement of Science to describe the subversion of the traditional form of pastoral (migratory) animal husbandry by wealthy urban elites who venture to invest and engage in such animal husbandry to conceal stolen or ill-gotten assets. (Luizza, Matthew, African herders have been pushed into destitution and crime, November 9th, 2017, The Economist). [8]

For his part, Olayinka Ajala defines neo-pastoralism as a new form of livestock ownership characterized by the ownership of large herds of livestock by people who are not pastoralists themselves. These flocks were accordingly served by hired shepherds. Working around these herds often necessitates the use of sophisticated weapons and ammunition, stemming from the need to hide stolen wealth, proceeds of trafficking, or income obtained through terrorist activity, with the express purpose of making a profit for investors. It is important to note that Ajala Olayinka’s definition of non-pastoralism does not include investments in cattle financed by legal means. Such exist, but they are few in number and therefore they do not fall within the scope of the author’s research interest.[5]

Grazing migratory livestock farming is traditionally small-scale, herds are family-owned and usually associated with particular ethnic groups. This farming activity is associated with various risks, as well as with the considerable effort required to move livestock hundreds of kilometers in search of pasture. All this makes this profession not so popular and it is engaged in by several ethnic groups, among which the Fulani stand out, for whom it has been a main occupation for many decades. Besides being one of the largest ethnic groups in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, some sources put the Fulani in Nigeria at about 17 million people. In addition, cattle are often seen as a source of security and an indicator of wealth, and for this reason traditional pastoralists engage in cattle sales on a very limited scale.

Traditional Pastoralism

Neopastoralism differs from traditional pastoralism in terms of the form of livestock ownership, the average size of herds, and the use of weapons. While the traditional average herd size varies between 16 and 69 head of cattle, the size of non-pastoral herds usually ranges between 50 and 1,000 head of cattle, and the engagements around them often involve the use of firearms by hired herdsmen. [8], [5]

Although it was previously common in the Sahel for such larger herds to be accompanied by armed soldiers, nowadays livestock ownership is increasingly seen as a means of concealing ill-gotten wealth from corrupt politicians. Furthermore, while traditional pastoralists strive for good relations with farmers to maintain their symbiotic interaction with them, mercenary herders have no incentive to invest in their social relationships with farmers because they possess weapons that can be used to intimidate the farmers. [5], [8]

In Nigeria in particular, there are three main reasons for the emergence of neo-pastoralism. The first is that livestock ownership seems a tempting investment because of the ever-increasing prices. A sexually mature cow in Nigeria can costs US$1,000 and this makes cattle breeding an attractive field for potential investors. [5]

Secondly, there is a direct link between neo-pastoralism and corrupt practices in Nigeria. A number of researchers have argued that corruption is at the root of most of the insurgencies and armed insurgencies in the country. In 2014, one of the measures taken by the government to curb corruption, especially money laundering, was introduced. This is the Bank Verification Number (BVN) entry. The purpose of BVN is to monitor bank transactions and reduce or eliminate money laundering. [5]

The Bank Verification Number (BVN) uses biometric technology to register each customer with all Nigerian banks. Each customer is then issued a unique identification code that links all their accounts so that they can easily monitor transactions between multiple banks. The aim is to ensure that suspicious transactions are easily identified as the system captures the images and fingerprints of all bank customers, making it difficult for illegal funds to be deposited into different accounts by the same person. Data from in-depth interviews revealed that the BVN made it harder for political office-holders to hide illicit wealth, and a number of accounts linked to politicians and their cronies, fed with allegedly stolen funds, were frozen after its introduction.

The Central Bank of Nigeria reported that “several billions of naira (Nigeria’s currency) and millions in other foreign currencies were trapped in accounts at a number of banks, with the owners of these accounts suddenly ceasing to do business with them. Eventually, over 30 million “passive” and unused accounts have been identified since the introduction of BVN in Nigeria by 2020. [5]

In-depth interviews conducted by the author revealed that many people who had deposited large sums of money in Nigerian banks immediately before the introduction of the Bank Verification Number (BVN) rushed to withdraw it. A few weeks before the deadline for anyone using banking services to obtain a BVN, bank officials in Nigeria are witnessing a veritable river of cash being cashed en masse from various branches in the country. Of course, it cannot be said that all this money was stolen or the result of abuses of power, but it is an established fact that many politicians in Nigeria are switching to paid cash because they do not want to be subject to bank monitoring. [5]

At this very moment, flows of ill-gotten funds have been diverted into the agricultural sector, with an impressive number of livestock being purchased. Financial security experts agree that since the introduction of BVN, there has been a sharp rise in the number of people using ill-gotten wealth to buy livestock. Considering the fact that in 2019 an adult cow costs 200,000 – 400,000 Naira (600 to 110 USD) and that there is no mechanism to establish the ownership of cattle, it is easy for the corrupt to buy hundreds of cattle for millions of Naira. This leads to an increase in livestock prices, with a number of large herds now being owned by people who have nothing to do with cattle breeding as a job and a daily life, with some of the owners even from regions that are too far from grazing areas. [5]

As discussed above, this creates another major security risk in the rangeland area, as mercenary herdsmen are very often well-armed.

Thirdly, neopastoralists explain the new pattern of neopatrimonial relationships between owners and pastoralists with the increased level of poverty among those engaged in the industry. Despite the increase in livestock prices over the past few decades and despite the expansion of livestock farming in the export market, poverty among migrant livestock farmers has not decreased. On the contrary, according to data from Nigerian researchers, in the last 30-40 years, the number of poor herdsmen has increased sharply. (Catley, Andy and Alula Iyasu, Moving up or moving out? A Rapid Livelihoods and Conflict Analysis in Mieso-Mulu Woreda, Shinile Zone, Somali Region, Ethiopia, April 2010, Feinstein International Center).

For those at the bottom of the social ladder in the pastoral community, working for owners of large herds becomes the only option for survival. In the neo-pastoral setting, increasing poverty among the pastoralist community, which drives traditional migratory herders out of business, makes them easy prey for “absentee owners” as cheap labour. In some places where members of the political cabinet own the cattle, members of the pastoral communities or herders of the specific ethnic groups who have been involved in this activity for centuries, often receive their remuneration in the form of funding presented as “support for local communities”. In this way, illegally obtained wealth is legitimized. This patron-client relationship is particularly prevalent in northern Nigeria (home to the largest number of traditional migratory herders, including the Fulani), who are perceived as being assisted by the authorities in this way. [5]

In this case, Ajala Olayinka uses the case of Nigeria as a case study to explore in depth these new patterns of conflict given that it has the largest concentration of livestock in the West African region and the Sub – Saharan Africa – about 20 million head of cattle. Accordingly, the number of pastoralists is also very high compared to other regions, and the scale of conflicts in the country is very serious. [5]

It must be emphasized here that it is also about a geographical shift of the center of gravity and of pastoral migration agriculture and the conflicts related to it from the countries of the Horn of Africa, where in the past it was most advocated to West Africa and in particular – to Nigeria. Both the amount of livestock raised and the scale of the conflicts are gradually being transferred from the countries of the Horn of Africa to the west, and currently the focus of these problems is now in Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. The correctness of this statement is fully confirmed by the data of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Again according to the same source, Nigeria’s clashes and subsequent deaths are ahead of other countries with similar problems.

Olayinka’s findings are based on field research and the use of qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews conducted in Nigeria between 2013 and 2019. [5]

Broadly speaking, the study explains that traditional pastoralism and migratory pastoralism are gradually giving way to neopastoralism, a form of pastoralism that is characterized by much larger herds and increased use of weapons and ammunition to protect them. [5]

One of the key consequences of non-pastoralism in Nigeria is the serious increase in the number of incidents and consequently the dynamics of livestock theft and kidnapping in rural areas. This in itself is not a new phenomenon and has been observed for a long time. According to researchers such as Aziz Olanian and Yahaya Aliyu, for decades, cattle rustling was “localized, seasonal, and carried out with more traditional weapons with a low level of violence.” (Olaniyan, Azeez and Yahaya Aliyu, Cows, Bandits and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling in Northern Nigeria, In: Africa Spectrum, Vol. 51, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 93 – 105).

According to them, during this long (but seemingly long-gone) period, cattle rustling and the well-being of migratory herders went hand in hand, and cattle rustling was even seen as “a tool for resource redistribution and territorial expansion by pastoralist communities”. .

To prevent anarchy from occurring, the leaders of the pastoral communities had created rules for cattle rustling (!) that did not allow violence against women and children. Killings during cattle theft were also prohibited.

These rules have been in place not only in West Africa, as reported by Olanian and Aliyu, but also in East Africa, south of the Horn of Africa, for example in Kenya, where Ryan Trichet reports a similar approach. (Triche, Ryan, Pastoral conflict in Kenya: transforming mimetic violence to mimetic blessings between Turkana and Pokot communities, African journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 81-101).

At that time, migratory animal husbandry and pastoralism were practiced by specific ethnic groups (the Fulani prominent among them) who lived in highly connected and interwoven communities, sharing a common culture, values and religion, which helped to resolve the disputes and conflicts that arose. resolve without escalating into extreme forms of violence. [5]

One of the main differences between cattle stealing in the distant past, a few decades ago, and today is the logic behind the act of stealing. In the past, the motive for stealing cattle was either to restore some losses in the family herd, or to pay the bride price at a wedding, or to equalize some differences in wealth between individual families, but figuratively speaking “it was not marketable oriented and the main motive for the theft is not the pursuit of any economic goal”. And here this situation has been in effect in both West and East Africa. (Fleisher, Michael L., “War is good for Thieving!”: the Symbiosis of Crime and Warfare among the Kuria of Tanzania, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2002, pp. 131 -149).

Quite the opposite has been the case in the last decade, during which we have witnessed livestock thefts motivated mostly by considerations of economic prosperity, which are figuratively speaking “market oriented”. It is mostly stolen for profit, not out of envy or extreme necessity. To some extent, the spread of these approaches and practices can also be attributed to circumstances such as the rising cost of livestock, the increased demand for meat due to population growth, and the ease with which weapons can be obtained. [5]

Aziz Olanian and Yahaya Aliyu’s research establishes and proves indisputably the existence of a direct link between neo-pastoralism and the increased volume of livestock theft in Nigeria. Events in several African countries have increased arms proliferation (proliferation) in the region, with mercenary neo-herdsmen being supplied with “herd protection” weapons, which are also used in cattle theft.

Arms proliferation

This phenomenon took on a whole new dimension after 2011, when tens of thousands of small arms spread from Libya to a number of countries in the Sahel Sahara, as well as to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. These observations have been fully confirmed by the “expert panel” established by the UN Security Council, which, among other things, also examines the conflict in Libya. Experts note that the uprising in Libya and the subsequent fighting have led to an unprecedented proliferation of weapons not only in Libya’s neighboring countries, but also across the continent.

According to UN Security Council experts who have collected detailed data from 14 African countries, Nigeria is one of the most affected by the rampant proliferation of arms originating in Libya. Arms are smuggled into Nigeria and other countries through the Central African Republic (CAR), with these shipments fueling conflict, insecurity and terrorism in several African countries. (Strazzari, Francesco, Libyan Arms and Regional Instability, The International Spectator. Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 49, Issue 3, 2014, pp. 54-68).

Although the Libyan conflict has long been and continues to be the main source of arms proliferation in Africa, there are other active conflicts that are also fueling the flow of arms to various groups, including the neo-pastoralists in Nigeria and the Sahel. The list of these conflicts includes South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Central African Republic, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is estimated that in the month of March 2017 there were over 100 million small arms and light weapons (SALW) in crisis zones around the world, with a significant number of them being used in Africa.

The illegal arms trade industry thrives in Africa, where “porous” borders are common around most countries, with weapons moving freely across them. While most of the smuggled weapons end up in the hands of insurgent and terrorist groups, migratory herders are also increasingly using small arms and light weapons (SALW). For example, pastoralists in Sudan and South Sudan have been openly displaying their small arms and light weapons (SALW) for more than 10 years. Although many traditional herders can still be seen in Nigeria herding cattle with sticks in hand, a number of migrant herders have been spotted with small arms and light weapons (SALW) and some have been accused of being involved in cattle rustling. Over the past decade, there has been a significant increase in the number of cattle thefts, resulting in the deaths of not only traditional herders, but also farmers, security agents and other citizens. (Adeniyi, Adesoji, The Human Cost of Uncontrolled Arms in Africa, Cross-national research on seven African countries, March 2017, Oxfam Research Reports).

Apart from hired herdsmen who use the weapons at their disposal to engage in cattle rustling, there are also professional bandits who mainly engage in armed cattle rustling in some parts of Nigeria. Neo-herdsmen often claim that they need protection from these bandits when explaining the arming of herdsmen. Some of the livestock breeders interviewed stated that they carry weapons to protect themselves from bandits who attack them with the intention of stealing their cattle. (Kuna, Mohammad J. and Jibrin Ibrahim (eds.), Rural banditry and conflicts in northern Nigeria, Center for Democracy and Development, Abuja, 2015, ISBN: 9789789521685, 9789521685).

The National Secretary of the Miyetti Allah Livestock Breeders Association of Nigeria (one of the largest livestock breeders’ associations in the country) states: “If you see a Fulani man carrying an AK-47, it is because cattle rustling has become so rampant that one he wonders if there is any security in the country at all”. (Fulani national leader: Why our herdsmen carry AK47s., May 2, 2016, 1;58 pm, The News).

The complication comes from the fact that weapons acquired to prevent cattle rustling are also freely used when there is conflict between herdsmen and farmers. This clash of interests around migratory livestock has led to an arms race and created a battlefield-like environment as a growing number of traditional herders have also resorted to carrying weapons to defend themselves along with their livestock. The changing dynamics are leading to new waves of violence and are often collectively referred to as “pastoral conflict”. [5]

An increase in the number and intensity of severe clashes and violence between farmers and herders is also believed to be a consequence of the growth of neo-pastoralism. Excluding deaths resulting from terrorist attacks, clashes between farmers and herdsmen accounted for the largest number of conflict-related deaths in 2017. (Kazeem, Yomi, Nigeria now has a bigger internal security threat than Boko Haram, January 19, 2017, Quarz).

Although clashes and feuds between farmers and migratory herders are centuries old, that is, they date back to before the colonial era, the dynamics of these conflicts have changed dramatically. (Ajala, Olayinka, Why clashes are on the rise between farmers and herdsmen in the Sahel, May 2nd, 2018, 2.56 pm CEST, The Conversation).

In the pre-colonial period, pastoralists and farmers often lived side by side in a symbiosis due to the form of agriculture and the size of the herds. Livestock grazed on the stubble left by farmers after harvest, most often during the dry season when migratory herders moved their livestock further south to graze there. In exchange for the assured grazing and right of access granted by the farmers, the cattle excrement was used by the farmers as a natural fertilizer for their farmlands. These were times of smallholder farms and family ownership of herds, and both farmers and ranchers benefited from their understanding. From time to time, when grazing livestock destroyed farm produce and conflicts arose, local conflict resolution mechanisms were implemented and differences between farmers and pastoralists were ironed out, usually without resorting to violence. [5] In addition, farmers and migratory herders often created grain-for-milk exchange schemes that strengthened their relationships.

However, this model of agriculture has undergone several changes. Issues such as changes in the pattern of agricultural production, the population explosion, the development of market and capitalist relations, climate change, the shrinking of the area of Lake Chad, competition for land and water, the right to use migratory pastoral routes, drought and the expansion of the desert ( desertification), increased ethnic differentiation and political manipulations have been cited as reasons for the changes in the dynamics of the farmer-migratory livestock breeder relationship. Davidheiser and Luna identify the combination of colonization and the introduction of market-capitalist relations in Africa as one of the main causes of conflict between pastoralists and farmers on the continent. (Davidheiser, Mark and Aniuska Luna, From Complementarity to Conflict: A Historical Analysis of Farmet – Fulbe Relations in West Africa, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, pp. 77 – 104).

They argue that changes in land ownership laws that occurred during the colonial era, combined with changes in farming techniques following the adoption of modern farming methods such as irrigated agriculture and the introduction of “schemes to accustom migratory pastoralists to a settled life”, violate the former symbiotic relationship between farmers and pastoralists, increasing the likelihood of conflict between these two social groups.

The analysis that Davidheiser and Luna offer argues that the integration between market relations and modern modes of production has led to a shift from “exchange-based relations” between farmers and migratory herders to “marketization and commodification” and commoditization of production), which increases the demand pressure for natural resources between the two countries and destabilizes the previously symbiotic relationship.

Climate change has also been cited as one of the main causes of conflict between farmers and herders in West Africa. In a quantitative study conducted in Kano State, Nigeria in 2010, Haliru identified the encroachment of desert into agricultural land as a major source of resource struggle leading to conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in northern Nigeria. (Halliru, Salisu Lawal, Security Implication of Climate Change Between Farmers and Cattle Rearers in Northern Nigeria: A Case Study of Three Communities in Kura Local Government of Kano State. In: Leal Filho, W. (eds) Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2015).

Changes in rainfall levels have altered pastoralist migration patterns, with pastoralists moving further south into areas where their herds would not normally have grazed in previous decades. An example of this is the effect of prolonged droughts in the Sudan-Sahel desert region, which have become severe since 1970. (Fasona, Mayowa J. and A.S. Omojola, Climate Change, Human Security and Communal Clashes in Nigeria, 22 – 23 June 2005, Proceedings of International Workshop on Human Security and Climate Change, Holmen Fjord Hotel, Asker near Oslo, Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS), Oslo).

This new pattern of migration increases the pressure on land and soil resources, leading to conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. In other cases, the increase in population of farming and herding communities has also contributed to the pressure on the environment.

Although the issues listed here have contributed to the deepening of the conflict, there has been a noticeable difference in the past few years in terms of intensity, types of weapons used, methods of attack and the number of deaths recorded in the conflict. The number of attacks has also increased significantly over the past decade, most notably in Nigeria.

Data from the ACLED database shows that the conflict has become more severe since 2011, highlighting a possible link to the Libyan civil war and the resulting arms proliferation. Although the number of attacks and the number of casualties have increased in most of the countries affected by the Libyan conflict, the numbers for Nigeria confirm the scale of the increase and the importance of the problem, highlighting the need for a much deeper understanding of the key elements of the conflict.

According to Olayinka Ajala, two main relationships stand out between the manner and intensity of attacks and non-pastoralism. Firstly, the type of weapons and ammunition used by the herdsmen and secondly, the people involved in the attacks. [5] A key finding in his research is that weapons purchased by pastoralists to protect their livestock are also used to attack farmers when there are disagreements over grazing routes or the destruction of farmland by itinerant pastoralists. [5]

According to Olayinka Ajala, in many cases the types of weapons used by the attackers give the impression that the migrant herders have outside support. Taraba State in North-Eastern Nigeria is cited as such an example. After long-running attacks by herdsmen in the state, the federal government has deployed soldiers near the affected communities to prevent further attacks. Despite the deployment of troops in the affected communities, several attacks were still carried out with lethal weapons, including machine guns.

The Chairman of Takum Area Local Government, Taraba State, Mr. Shiban Tikari in an interview with “Daily Post Nigeria” stated, “The herdsmen who are now coming to our community with machine guns are not the traditional herdsmen we know and deal with lived years in a row; I suspect they may have been released members of Boko Haram. [5]

There is very strong evidence that parts of the herding communities are fully armed and are now acting as militias. For example, one of the leaders of the herding community boasted in an interview that his group had successfully carried out attacks on several farming communities in northern Nigeria. He claimed that his group was no longer afraid of the military and stated: “We have over 800 [semi-automatic] rifles, machine guns; the Fulani now have bombs and military uniforms.” (Salkida, Ahmad, Exclusive on Fulani herdsmen: “We have machine guns, bombs and military uniforms”, Jauro Buba; 07/09/2018). This statement was also confirmed by many others interviewed by Olayinka Ajala.

The types of weapons and ammunition used in herdsmen’s attacks on farmers are not available to traditional herdsmen and this rightly casts suspicion on the neo-herdsmen. In an interview with an army officer, he claimed that poor pastoralists with small herds could not afford automatic rifles and the types of weapons used by the attackers. He said: “on reflection, I wonder how a poor herdsman can afford a machine gun or hand grenades used by these attackers?

Every enterprise has its own cost-benefit analysis, and local shepherds could not invest in such weapons to protect their small flocks. For someone to spend huge sums of money to buy these weapons, they must either have invested heavily in these herds or intend to steal as many cattle as possible to recoup their investment. This further points to the fact that organized crime syndicates or cartels are now involved in migratory livestock”. [5]

Another respondent stated that traditional herders cannot afford the price of the AK47, which sells for US$1,200 – US$1,500 on the black market in Nigeria. Also, in 2017, the Member of Parliament representing Delta State (South-South Region) in the House of Assembly, Evans Ivuri, stated that an unidentified helicopter regularly makes deliveries to some herdsmen in the Owre-Abraka Wilderness in the state, where they reside with their cattle. According to the legislator, more than 5,000 cattle and about 2,000 shepherds reside in the forest. These claims further indicate that the ownership of these cattle is highly questionable.

According to Olayinka Ajala, the second link between the mode and intensity of attacks and non-pastoralism is the identity of the people involved in the attacks. There are several arguments about the identity of the herdsmen involved in the attacks on farmers, with many of the attackers being herdsmen.

In many areas where farmers and ranchers have coexisted for decades, farmers know the ranchers whose herds graze around their farms, the periods they bring their livestock, and the average size of the herds. Nowadays, there are complaints that herd sizes are larger, herdsmen are strangers to farmers and are armed with dangerous weapons. These changes make the traditional management of conflicts between farmers and pastoralists more difficult and sometimes impossible. [5]

The Chairman of Ussa Local Government Council – Taraba State, Mr. Rimamsikwe Karma, has stated that the herdsmen who have carried out a series of attacks on farmers are not the ordinary herdsmen that local people know, saying they are “strangers”. The head of the Council stated that “the shepherds who came after the army to the territory governed by our council are not friendly to our people, for us they are unknown persons and they kill people”. [5]

This claim has been confirmed by the Nigerian military, which has said that the migrant herdsmen who have been involved in violence and attacks on farmers were “sponsored” and not traditional herdsmen. (Fabiyi, Olusola, Olaleye Aluko and John Charles, Benue: Killer herdsmen are sponsored, says military, April 27-th, 2018, Punch).

The Kano State Police Commissioner explained in an interview that many of the arrested armed herdsmen are from countries such as Senegal, Mali and Chad. [5] This is further evidence that increasingly mercenary herders are replacing traditional herders.

It is important to note that not all conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in these regions are due to neo-pastoralism. Recent events show that many traditional migratory herders are already carrying weapons. Also, some of the attacks on farmers are reprisals and reprisals for killing livestock by farmers. Although many mainstream media in Nigeria claim that herdsmen are the aggressors in most of the conflicts, in-depth interviews reveal that some of the attacks on settled farmers are in retaliation for killings of herdsmen’s livestock by farmers.

For example, the Berom ethnic group in Plateau State (one of the largest ethnic groups in the region) has never hidden its disdain for pastoralists and has sometimes resorted to slaughtering their livestock to prevent grazing on their lands. This led to retaliation and violence by the herdsmen, resulting in the slaughter of hundreds of people from the Berom ethnic community. (Idowu, Aluko Opeyemi, Urban Violance Dimension in Nigeria: Farmers and Herders Onslaught, AGATHOS, Vol. 8, Issue 1 (14), 2017, p. 187-206); (Akov, Emmanuel Terkimbi, The resource-conflict debate revisited: Untangling the case of farmer-herdsmen clashes in the North Central region of Nigeria, Vol. 26, 2017, Issue 3, African Security Review, pp. 288 – 307).

In response to increasing attacks on farmers, several farming communities have formed patrols to prevent attacks on their communities or launched counter-attacks on herding communities, further increasing animosity between the groups.

Ultimately, although the ruling elite generally understand the dynamics of this conflict, politicians often play a significant role in either reflecting or obscuring this conflict, potential solutions, and the response of the Nigerian state. Although potential solutions such as pasture expansion have been discussed at length; disarming the armed herdsmen; benefits for farmers; securitization of farming communities; addressing climate change issues; and fighting cattle rustling, the conflict was filled with political calculations, which naturally made its resolution very difficult.

Regarding the political accounts, there are several questions. First, linking this conflict to ethnicity and religion often diverts attention from the underlying issues and creates division between previously integrated communities. While almost all herders are of Fulani origin, most of the attacks are directed against other ethnic groups. Instead of addressing the issues identified as underlying the conflict, politicians often emphasize the ethnic motivations for it to increase their own popularity and create “patronage” as in other conflicts in Nigeria. (Berman, Bruce J., Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism, Vol. 97, Issue 388, African Affairs, July 1998, pp. 305 – 341); (Arriola, Leonardo R., Patronage and Political Stability in Africa, Vol. 42, Issue 10, Comparative Political Studies, October 2009).

In addition, powerful religious, ethnic and political leaders often engage in political and ethnic manipulations while vehemently addressing the problem, often fueling rather than defusing tensions. (Princewill, Tabia, The politics of the poor man’s pain: Herdsmen, farmers and elite manipulation, January 17, 2018, Vanguard).

Second, the grazing and ranching debate is often politicized and painted in a way that tends toward either the marginalization of the Fulani or the preferential treatment of the Fulani, depending on who is involved in the debates. In June 2018, after several states affected by the conflict decided individually to introduce anti-grazing laws in their territories, the Federal Government of Nigeria, in an attempt to end the conflict and offer some adequate solution, announced plans to spend 179 billion naira (about 600 million US dollars) for the construction of livestock farms of the “ranch” type in ten states of the country. (Obogo, Chinelo, Uproar over proposed cattle ranches in 10 states. Igbo, Middle Belt, Yoruba groups reject FG’s plan, June 21st, 2018, The Sun).

While several groups outside pastoralist communities argued that pastoralism was a private business and should not incur public expenditure, the migratory pastoralist community also rejected the idea on the grounds that it was designed to oppress the Fulani community, affecting the freedom of movement of the Fulani. Several members of the livestock community claimed that the proposed livestock laws “are being used by some people as a campaign to win votes in the 2019 elections”. [5]

The politicization of the issue, combined with the government’s casual approach, makes any step towards resolving the conflict unattractive to the parties involved.

Thirdly, the Nigerian government’s reluctance to outlaw groups that have claimed responsibility for attacks on farming communities in retaliation for killing livestock is linked to the fear of a breakdown in the patron-client relationship. Although the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) justified the killing of dozens of people in Plateau State in 2018 as revenge for the killing of 300 cows by farming communities, the government refused to take any action against the group claiming that it is a socio-cultural group representing the interests of the Fulani. (Umoru, Henry, Marie-Therese Nanlong, Johnbosco Agbakwuru, Joseph Erunke and Dirisu Yakubu, Plateau massacre, retaliation for lost 300 cows – Miyetti Allah, June 26, 2018, Vanguard).This has led many Nigerians to think that the group was deliberately taken under the protection of the government because the incumbent president at the time (President Buhari) is from the Fulani ethnic group.

In addition, the inability of Nigeria’s ruling elite to deal with the impact of the neo-pastoral dimension of the conflict poses serious problems. Instead of addressing the reasons why pastoralism is becoming increasingly militarized, the government is focusing on the ethnic and religious dimensions of the conflict. In addition, many owners of large herds of cattle belong to influential elites with considerable influence, making it difficult to prosecute criminal activities. If the neo-pastoral dimension of the conflict is not properly assessed and an adequate approach to it is not adopted, there will probably be no change in the situation in the country and we will even witness the deterioration of the situation.

Sources used:

The complete list of the literature used in the first and second parts of the analysis is given at the end of the first part of the analysis, published under the title “Sahel – conflicts, coups and migration bombs”. Only those sources cited in the present third part of the analysis – “The Fulani, Neopastoralism and Jihadism in Nigeria” are given below.

Additional sources are given within the text.

[5] Ajala, Olayinka, New drivers of conflict in Nigeria: an analysis of the clashes between farmers and pastoralists, Third World Quarterly, Volume 41, 2020, Issue 12, (published online 09 September 2020), pp. 2048-2066,

[8] Brottem, Leif and Andrew McDonnell, Pastoralism and Conflict in the Sudano-Sahel: A Review of the Literature, 2020, Search for Common Ground,

[38] Sangare, Boukary, Fulani people and Jihadism in Sahel and West African countries, February 8, 2019, Observatoire of Arab-Muslim World and Sahel, The Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS).

Photo by Tope A. Asokere: https://www.pexels.com/photo/low-angle-view-of-protesters-with-a-banner-5632785/

Note about the author:

Teodor Detchev has been a full-time associate professor at the Higher School of Security and Economics (VUSI) – Plovdiv (Bulgaria) since 2016.

He taught at New Bulgarian University – Sofia and at VTU “St. St. Cyril and Methodius”. He currently teaches at VUSI, as well as at UNSS. His main teaching courses are: Industrial relations and security, European industrial relations, Economic sociology (in English and Bulgarian), Ethnosociology, Ethno-political and national conflicts, Terrorism and political assassinations – political and sociological problems, Effective development of organizations.

He is the author of more than 35 scientific works on fire resistance of building structures and resistance of cylindrical steel shells. He is the author of over 40 works on sociology, political science and industrial relations, including the monographs: Industrial relations and security – part 1. Social concessions in collective bargaining (2015); Institutional Interaction and Industrial Relations (2012); Social Dialogue in the Private Security Sector (2006); “Flexible Forms of Work” and (Post) Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (2006).

He co-authored the books: Innovations in collective bargaining. European and Bulgarian aspects; Bulgarian employers and women at work; Social Dialogue and Employment of Women in the Field of Biomass Utilization in Bulgaria. More recently he has been working on issues of the relationship between industrial relations and security; the development of global terrorist disorganizations; ethnosociological problems, ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts.

Member of the International Labor and Employment Relations Association (ILERA), the American Sociological Association (ASA) and the Bulgarian Association for Political Science (BAPN).

Social democrat by political convictions. In the period 1998 – 2001, he was Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Policy. Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” from 1993 to 1997. Director of the newspaper “Svoboden Narod” in 2012 – 2013. Deputy Chairman and Chairman of SSI in the period 2003 – 2011. Director of “Industrial Policies” at AIKB since 2014 .to this day. Member of NSTS from 2003 to 2012.

By Teodor Dechev

The previous part of this analysis, entitled “Sahel – Conflicts, Coups and Migration Bombs”, addressed the issue of the rise of terrorist activity in West Africa and the inability to end the guerrilla war waged by Islamic radicals against government troops in Mali, Burkina Faso , Niger, Chad and Nigeria. The issue of the ongoing civil war in the Central African Republic was also discussed.

One of the important conclusions is that the intensification of the conflict is fraught with the high risk of a “migration bomb” that would lead to unprecedented migration pressure along the entire southern border of the European Union. An important circumstance is also the possibilities of Russian foreign policy to manipulate the intensity of conflicts in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and the Central African Republic. [39] With its hand on the “counter” of a potential migration explosion, Moscow could easily be tempted to use induced migration pressure against EU states that are generally already designated as hostile.

In this risky situation, a special role is played by the Fulani people – an ethnic group of semi-nomads, migratory livestock breeders who inhabit the strip from the Gulf of Guinea to the Red Sea and number 30 to 35 million people according to various data. Being a people who have historically played a very important role in the penetration of Islam into Africa, especially West Africa, the Fulani are a huge temptation for Islamic radicals, despite the fact that they profess the Sufi school of Islam, which is undoubtedly the most tolerant, as and the most mystical.

Unfortunately, as will be seen from the analysis below, the issue is not just about religious opposition. The conflict is not only ethno-religious. It is socio-ethno-religious, and in recent years, the effects of the wealth accumulated through corruption, converted into livestock ownership – the so-called neo-pastoralism – have begun to exert an additional strong influence. This phenomenon is particularly characteristic of Nigeria and will be the subject of the third part of this analysis.

The Fulani and Jihadism in Central Mali: Between Change, Social Rebellion and Radicalization

While Operation Serval succeeded in 2013 in pushing back the jihadists who had taken over northern Mali, and Operation Barhan prevented them from returning to the front line, forcing them into hiding, the attacks not only did not stop, but spread to the central part of Mali (in the area of the bend of the Niger River, also known as Massina). In general, terrorist attacks increased after 2015.

Jihadists are certainly not in control of the region as they were in northern Mali in 2012 and are forced into hiding. They do not have a “monopoly on violence” as militias have been created to fight them, sometimes with the support of the authorities. However, targeted attacks and killings are increasing, and insecurity has reached such a level that the region is no longer under real government control. Many civil servants have left their posts, a significant number of schools have been closed, and the recent presidential elections could not be held in a number of municipalities.

To some extent, this situation is the result of “contagion” from the North. Pushed out of the northern cities, which they held under control for several months after failing to create an independent state, forced to “behave more discreetly”, the jihadist armed groups, looking for new strategies and new ways of operating, were able to take advantage of the factors of instability in the Central region to gain new influence.

Some of these factors are common to both the central and northern regions. However, it would be wrong to believe that the serious incidents that have regularly occurred in the central part of Mali for years after 2015 are just a continuation of the northern conflict.

In fact, other weaknesses are more specific to the central regions. The targets of local communities exploited by jihadists are very different. While the Tuareg in the north claimed the independence of Azaouad (a region which is actually mythical – it never corresponded to any political entity of the past, but which separates for the Tuareg all the regions in the north of Mali), the communities represented in the central regions , do not make comparable political claims, insofar as they make any claims at all.

The significance of the difference between the role of the Fulani in northern events and in the central regions, which is emphasized by all observers, is telling. Indeed, the founder of the Masina Liberation Front, the most important of the armed groups involved, Hamadoun Kufa, who was killed on November 28, 2018, was ethnically Fulani, as were the vast majority of his fighters. [38]

Few in the north, the Fulani are numerous in the central regions and concerned like most other communities by the increased competition between migratory herders and settled farmers that is occurring in the region, they suffer more from it due to historical and cultural circumstances.

The defining trends in the region and the Sahel as a whole, which make it difficult for nomads and settled people to live together, are essentially two:

• climate change, already underway in the Sahel region (rainfall has decreased by 20% in the last 40 years), forces nomads to seek new grazing areas;

• population growth, which forces farmers to seek new land, has a particular impact in this already densely populated region. [38]

If the Fulani, as migratory herders, are particularly troubled by the inter-communal competition these developments bring about, it is on the one hand because this competition pits them against almost all other communities (the region is home to the Fulani, Tamashek, Songhai, Bozo, Bambara and the Dogon), and on the other hand, because the Fulani are particularly affected by other developments related more to state policies:

• even if the Malian authorities, unlike what has happened in other countries, have never theorized on the issue of the interest or necessity of settlement, the fact is that development projects are more aimed at settled people. Most often this is due to donor pressure, usually in favor of abandoning nomadism, considered less compatible with modern state building and limiting access to education;

• the introduction in 1999 of decentralization and municipal elections, which, although they gave the Fulani people the opportunity to bring the community’s demands to the political stage, mainly contributed to the emergence of new elites and thereby to the questioning of traditional structures, based on customs, history and religion. The people of the Fulani people felt these transformations particularly strongly, inasmuch as the social relations in their community are ancient. These changes were also initiated by the state, which they had always considered “imported” from the outside, a product of a Western culture far removed from their own. [38]

This effect is, of course, limited within the vicissitudes of decentralization policy. However, it is a fact in a number of municipalities. And undoubtedly the “feeling” of such transformations is stronger than their real impact, especially among the Fulani who tend to consider themselves “victims” of this policy.

Finally, historical reminiscences should not be neglected, although they should not be overestimated either. In the imagination of the Fulani, the Masina Empire (of which Mopti is the capital) represents the golden age of the central regions of Mali. The legacy of this empire includes, in addition to social structures specific to the community and a certain attitude to religion: the Fulani live and perceive themselves as supporters of pure Islam, in the air of the Sufi brotherhood of the Quadriyya, sensitive to the strict application of the injunctions of the Koran.

The jihad preached by leading figures in the Masina empire was different from that preached by the terrorists currently operating in Mali (who had directed their message to other Muslims whose practices were not considered to conform to the founding text). Kufa’s attitude towards the leading figures in the Masina empire was ambiguous. He often referred to them, but again he desecrated the mausoleum of Sekou Amadou. However, the Islam practiced by the Fulani appears to be potentially compatible with some aspects of Salafism that jihadist groups regularly claim as their own. [2]

A new trend seems to be emerging in the central regions of Mali in 2019: gradually the initial motivations for joining purely local jihadist groups appear to be more ideological, a trend that is reflected in the questioning of the Malian state and modernity in general. Jihadi propaganda, which proclaims the rejection of state control (imposed by the West, which is complicit in it) and emancipation from the social hierarchies produced by colonization and the modern state, finds a more “natural” echo among the Fulani than among other ethnic groups . [38]

The regionalization of the Fulani question in the Sahel region

Expansion of the conflict towards Burkina Faso

The Fulani are the majority in the Sahelian part of Burkina Faso, which borders Mali (in particular the provinces of Soum (Jibo), Seeno (Dori) and Ouadlan (Gorom-Goom), which border the regions of Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao) of Mali). and also with Niger – with the Tera and Tillaberi regions. A strong Fulani community also lives in Ouagadougou, where it occupies much of the Dapoya and Hamdalaye neighbourhoods.

At the end of 2016, a new armed group appeared in Burkina Faso that claimed to belong to the Islamic State – Ansarul Al Islamia or Ansarul Islam, whose main leader was Malam Ibrahim Dicko, a Fulani preacher who, like Hamadoun Koufa in Central Mali, made himself known through numerous attacks against Burkina Faso’s defense and security forces and against schools in the provinces of Sum, Seeno and Deleted. [38] During the restoration of government forces’ control over northern Mali in 2013, the Malian armed forces captured Ibrahim Mallam Diko. But he was released after the insistence of the leaders of the Fulani people in Bamako, including the former Speaker of the National Assembly – Aly Nouhoum Diallo.

The leaders of Ansarul Al Islamia are former fighters of MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa – Movement for unity and jihad in West Africa, by “unity” should be understood as “monotheism” – Islamic radicals are extreme monotheists) from central Mali. Malam Ibrahim Dicko is now presumed dead and his brother Jafar Dicko succeeded him as the head of Ansarul Islam. [38]

However, the action of this group remains geographically limited for now.

But, as in central Mali, the entire Fulani community is seen as complicit with the jihadists, who are targeting settled communities. In response to terrorist attacks, settled communities formed their own militias to defend themselves.

Thus, in early January 2019, in response to an armed attack by unidentified persons, residents of Yirgou attacked Fulani-populated areas for two days (January 1 and 2), killing 48 people. A police force was dispatched to restore calm. At the same time, a few miles away, in Bankass Cercle (an administrative subdivision of the Mopti region of Mali), 41 Fulani were killed by Dogons. [14], [42]

The situation in Niger

Unlike Burkina Faso, Niger has no terrorist groups operating from its territory, despite Boko Haram’s attempts to establish itself in the border regions, especially on the Diffa side, winning over young Nigeriens who feel that the economic situation in the country deprives them of a future. So far, Niger has been able to counter these attempts.

These relative successes are explained in particular by the importance that the Nigerien authorities attach to security issues. They allocate a very large part of the national budget to them. The Nigerien authorities have allocated significant funds to strengthen the army and police. This assessment is made taking into account the available opportunities in Niger. Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world (in last place according to the human development index in the ranking of the United Nations Development Program – UNDP) and it is very difficult to combine efforts in favor of security with the policy of initiating a development process.

The Nigerian authorities are very active in regional cooperation (in particular with Nigeria and Cameroon against Boko Haram) and very willingly accept on their territory foreign forces provided by Western countries (France, USA, Germany, Italy).

Moreover, the authorities in Niger, just as they were able to take measures that largely quelled the Tuareg problem, more successfully than their Malian counterparts, also showed greater attention to the Fulani issue than they do in Mali.

However, Niger could not completely avoid the contagion of terror coming from neighboring countries. The country is regularly the target of terrorist attacks, carried out both in the southeast, in the border regions with Nigeria, and in the west, in the regions near Mali. These are attacks from the outside – operations led by Boko Haram in the southeast and operations coming from the Ménaka region in the west, which is a “privileged breeding ground” for the Tuareg insurgency in Mali.

Attackers from Mali are often Fulani. They do not have the same power as Boko Haram, but it is even more difficult to prevent their attacks because the porosity of the border is high. Many of the Fulani involved in the attacks are Nigerien or of Nigerien descent – many Fulani migratory herders were forced to leave Niger and settle in neighboring Mali when irrigated land development in the Tillaberi region reduced their grazing land in the 1990s. [38]

Since then, they have been involved in the conflicts between the Malian Fulani and the Tuareg (Imahad and Dausaki). Since the last Tuareg uprising in Mali, the balance of power between the two groups has shifted. By then, the Tuareg, who had already rebelled several times since 1963, already had many weapons at their disposal.

The Fulani of Niger were “militarized” when the Ganda Izo militia was formed in 2009. (The creation of this armed militia was the result of the ongoing split in a historically older militia – “Ganda Koi”, with which “Ganda Izo” is basically in a tactical alliance. Since “Ganda Izo” aimed to fighting the Tuareg, the Fulani people joined it (both Malian Fulani and Niger Fulani), after which many of them were integrated into MOJWA (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa – Movement for Unity (monotheism) and jihad in West Africa) and then in ISGS (Islamic State in the Great Sahara). [38]

The balance of power between the Tuareg and Dausaki, on the one hand, and the Fulani, on the other, is changing accordingly, and by 2019 it is already much more balanced. As a result, new clashes occur, often leading to the death of dozens of people on both sides. In these skirmishes, international counter-terrorist forces (particularly during Operation Barhan) in some cases created ad hoc alliances with the Tuareg and Dausak (particularly with the MSA), who, following the conclusion of the peace agreement with the Malian government, engaged in the fight against terrorism.

The Fulani of Guinea

Guinea with its capital Conakry is the only country where the Fulani are the largest ethnic group, but not the majority – they are about 38% of the population. Although they originate from Central Guinea, the central part of the country that includes cities such as Mamu, Pita, Labe and Gaual, they are present in every other region where they have migrated in search of better living conditions.

The region is not affected by jihadism and the Fulani are not and have not been particularly involved in violent clashes, except for traditional conflicts between migratory herders and settled people.

In Guinea, the Fulani control most of the country’s economic power and largely the intellectual and religious forces. They are the most educated. They become literate very early, first in Arabic and then in French through the French schools. Imams, teachers of the Holy Qur’an, senior officials from the interior of the country and from the diaspora are in their majority Fulani. [38]

However, we can wonder about the future as the Fulani have always been victims of [political] discrimination since independence to be kept away from political power. The other ethnic groups feel encroached upon by these traditional nomads who come to tear up their best lands to build the most prosperous businesses and the glitziest residential neighborhoods. According to the other ethnic groups in Guinea, if the Fulani come to power, they will have all the power and given the mentality attributed to them, they will be able to keep it and keep it forever. This perception was reinforced by the fiercely hostile speech of Guinea’s first president, Sekou Toure, against the Fulani community.

From the earliest days of the independence struggle in 1958, Sekou Toure who is from the Malinke people and his supporters have been facing the Fulani of Bari Diawandu. After coming to power, Sekou Toure assigned all important positions to people from the Malinke people. The exposure of alleged Fulani conspiracies in 1960 and especially in 1976 provided him with a pretext for the elimination of important Fulani figures (notably in 1976, Telly Diallo, who was the first Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, a highly respected and prominent figure, is imprisoned and deprived of food until he dies in his dungeon). This alleged plot was an opportunity for Sekou Toure to deliver three speeches denouncing the Fulani with extreme malice, calling them “traitors” who “only think of money…”. [38]

In the first democratic elections in 2010, Fulani candidate Cellou Dalein Diallo came out on top in the first round, but all ethnic groups joined forces in the second round to prevent him from becoming president, handing power to Alpha Conde , whose origin is from the Malinke people.

This situation is increasingly unfavorable to the Fulani people and generates frustration and disappointment which the recent democratization (2010 elections) has allowed to be publicly expressed.

The next presidential election in 2020, in which Alpha Condé will not be able to run for re-election (the constitution prohibits a president from serving more than two terms), will be an important deadline for the development of relations between the Fulani and other ethnic communities in Guinea.

Some interim conclusions:

It would be extremely tendentious to speak of any pronounced propensity among the Fulani for “jihadism”, much less of such a propensity that was induced by the history of the former theocratic empires of this ethnic group.

When analyzing the risk of the Fulani siding with radical Islamists, the complexity of Fulani society is often overlooked. So far, we have not gone into the depth of the social structure of the Fulani, but in Mali, for example, it is very complex and hierarchical. It is logical to expect that the interests of the constituent parts of Fulani society may differ and become the cause of conflicting behavior or even division within the community.

As for central Mali, the tendency to challenge the established order, which is said to drive many Fulani to join the jihadist ranks, is sometimes the result of young people in the community acting against the will of the more the adults. Likewise, young Fulani people have sometimes tried to take advantage of municipal elections, which, as explained, have often been seen as an opportunity to produce leaders who are not traditional notables) – these young people sometimes consider more the adults as participants in these traditional “notabilities”. This creates opportunities for internal conflicts – including armed conflicts – between people of the Fulani people. [38]

There is no doubt that the Fulani are predisposed to ally themselves with opponents of the established order – something fundamentally inherent to nomads. Furthermore, in consequence of their geographical dispersion, they are doomed to always remain in the minority and subsequently to be unable to influence decisively the fate of the countries in which they live, even when exceptionally they seem to have such an opportunity and believe that it is legitimate, as is the case in Guinea.

The subjective perceptions arising from this state of affairs fuel the opportunism that the Fulani have learned to cultivate when they are in trouble – when they are faced with detractors who see them as threatening foreign bodies while they themselves live as victims, discriminated against and doomed of marginalization.

Part three follows

Sources used:

The complete list of the literature used in the first and the current second part of the analysis is given at the end of the first part of the analysis published under the title “Sahel – conflicts, coups and migration bombs”. Only those sources cited in the second part of the analysis – “The Fulani and “Jihadism” in West Africa” are given here.

[2] Dechev, Teodor Danailov, “Double bottom” or “schizophrenic bifurcation”? The interaction between ethno-nationalist and religious-extremist motives in the activities of some terrorist groups, Sp. Politics and Security; Year I; no. 2; 2017; pp. 34 – 51, ISSN 2535-0358 (in Bulgarian).

[14] Cline, Lawrence E., Jihadist Movements in the Sahel: Rise of the Fulani?, March 2021, Terrorism and Political Violence, 35 (1), pp. 1-17

[38] Sangare, Boukary, Fulani people and Jihadism in Sahel and West African countries, February 8, 2019, Observatoire of Arab-Muslim World and Sahel, The Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)

[39] The Soufan Center Special Report, Wagner Group: The Evolution of a Private Army, Jason Blazakis, Colin P. Clarke, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sean Steinberg, The Soufan Center, June 2023

[42] Waicanjo, Charles, Transnational Herder-Farmer Conflicts and Social Instability in the Sahel, May 21, 2020, African Liberty.

Photo by Kureng Workx: https://www.pexels.com/photo/a-man-in-red-traditional-clothing-taking-photo-of-a-man-13033077/