The announcement came a week after Nordic broadcasters revealed the extent of Russian spying activities in the North Sea. This included gathering information on windfarms and subsea cables connecting them to the terrestrial electrical grid. The North Sea has become a critical area for maritime and energy security. It also entails new vulnerabilities.

The North Sea plan boasts energy production capacity equal to several nuclear power stations, and the EU will increasingly depend on this. While nuclear power plants have a high level of security and are not accessible to the public, windfarms, cable installations and other types of energy production are less secure.

The recent Nordic documentary demonstrated how easily cable grids and windfarms can be accessed. My colleague, a kayak enthusiast from Denmark, confirmed that some people visit these windfarms for recreational activities such as diving.

Intentional sabotage or accidents are a major threat to the security of wind farms as they grow. Recent examples include the collision of a cargo vessel Petra L with a rotor at the Gode Wind Farm in the North Sea on 27 April, which caused severe damage to the ship.

The accident, despite the fact that the cause is still under investigation, highlights the dangers of accidents and the need for increased safety measures.

Despite the increased focus after the Nord Stream incident, the full ramifications and implications of the critical maritime infrastructure are still not fully understood.

Can Nato fix it?

All the states bordering the North Sea are Nato members and seven are also EU members. Nato has announced plans to increase efforts in protecting critical maritime infrastructure, including the North Sea. This will likely boost security in the area. But protecting wind farms is not solely a military mission and must include a civilian component.

State-sponsored sabotage can be disguised as an accident or carried out by a vessel other than a military ship, such as a fishing boat or leisure yacht.

Coastguards and maritime police will be the ones to respond when threats are detected.

Nato alone is not able to provide the necessary protection of critical maritime infrastructures located in the North Sea. It is vital that the EU, the United Kingdom and Norway continue to collaborate. Ideal would be for them to form a new maritime community. It should include several elements. Close collaboration between the maritime security and energy agencies of the nine North Sea States is essential, but different organisational structures in each country’s maritime sector make it difficult.

Denmark, for instance, has only a navy while other countries, like the UK, have several agencies involved in maritime security. For example, a coastguard function forum could be created for the North Sea to promote collaboration and develop the best practices for surveillance and protection.

To effectively monitor and prevent threats against critical maritime infrastructure it is necessary that information be shared, surveillance is conducted, and any suspicious activity at sea reported.

This requires the integration data from different sources, such as satellites, radars, patrols and CCTV. To facilitate this, European Union launches a Common Information Sharing Environment that will be operated by European Maritime Safety Agency.

The UK and Norway do not currently participate in this initiative. It is therefore important to identify the political solutions that will allow them to contribute to it.

It is not just the government that can ensure the safety and protection maritime infrastructures, but also the industry. It is crucial to develop common regulatory standards for the measures the industry must implement and how it works with state agencies on areas such as information sharing, investigation and emergency management.

As plans for green energy production in the North Sea become more ambitious, maintenance and repair capacity, including repair vessels and cable depots will increase. These capacities are essential to respond quickly to acts of sabotage, and minimise the impact on Europe’s energy supply.

The nine participating states must review their capabilities to determine if they are adequate to meet the requirements of the planned infrastructure in different attack scenarios. They must also think about how these capabilities can be pooled and shared with the industry.