The argument is often made about food, as well as about dozens of other “strategic goods”, that we must be self-sufficient in the face of threats to peace around the world.

The argument itself is very old, old enough for the self-sufficiency argument, as well as the feasibility of actually being self-sufficient, to have finally graduated to the status of political myth. Yet this is, unfortunately, a myth that refuses to die. One that continuously puts European nations on the path towards fragile supply chains.

The conflict in Ukraine has disrupted Black Sea agricultural exports, pushing prices higher, and exacerbating high energy and fertilizer costs. As major exporters of grain and vegetable oil, conflict around the Black Sea is significantly disrupting shipping.

In Sudan, the combined effects of conflict, economic crisis, and poor harvests are significantly affecting people’s access to food and have doubled the number of people facing acute hunger in Sudan to around 18 million. The higher grain prices from the war in Ukraine was the final nail.

If fighting in Gaza escalates across the Middle East, (which, fortunately, is looking less likely) it could spark a second energy crisis which could send food and fuel prices spiralling. The World Bank warned that if the conflict were to intensify, it could result in significant price hikes for oil and exacerbate food insecurity, both within the Middle East and globally.

It should be obvious that the most secure food supply, steel supply or fuel supply is one that draws from as many sources as possible, so that if one dries up, or is caught up in a military or diplomatic calamity, then the supply is able to be recovered by increasing trade through the many alternative channels. Its how Qatar, cut off during the blockade in 2017, was able to continue largely unaffected despite being shut off from all its neighbours and producing itself almost no food at all.

The myth’s enduring popularity largely is down to the way it interacts with our basic human psychology. Most of our mental heuristics are learn for much more simplistic problems. The way we’ve learnt to survive is by hoarding and sitting on as large a pile of food as possible. We’re also naturally disinclined to trust our neighbours, let alone rely on them.

Breaking though our prehistoric instincts and embracing what are therefore the counter-intuitive tenets of free trade is thus quite a tall order. Perhaps it explains why free trade remains so unpopular compared to protectionism despite the overwhelmingly positive record that free trade can claim for itself, singlehandedly lifting billions out of poverty.

Convincing the current generation of European politicians to diversify their food supply will always be hard – but the gains are massive if they can see the light.

Regions like Latin America and Southeast Asia stand out as regions where the EU does far too little strategic trade. Being in different hemispheres means that the seasons are opposite (or have massively different climates in the case of Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia), so the benefits to mutual supply chains are naturally complementary. Such countries are primed for mutually beneficial trade to boost strategic security.

Countries like Argentina produce large amounts of meat, something the EU sanitary and phytosanitary rules (SPS) make much more difficult to import than it need be. Malaysia is the world’s largest exporter of palm oil, producing the oils and fats needed across dozens of food categories. Compared to other main oilseeds, such as soybean, rapeseed, and sunflower, which can be grown domestically, oil palm is the highest-yielding oil crop. Making it cheaper and easier to import would mean food security in times of instability, and cheaper staples in times of peace by driving down costs.

More trade also means more influence and more transparency in supply chains. Taking the Malays as an example again, their agrifood industry is embracing the use of blockchain technology and traceability to prove that their products are environmentally friendly and deforestation-free. Trade makes economically viable massive environmental efforts to protect the environment. Conversely, it creates interdependence with regions around the world which reduce the likelihood of conflict or international rulebreaking generally.

The great French economist Frédéric Bastiat wrote that ““When goods don’t cross borders, Soldiers will”. He observed the power of interdependence as a peacekeeper. Diversifying trade is therefore both preparation and prevention. Politicians must overcome their primitive instincts and let the goods flow.

The presidential election in Senegal is already noteworthy before it even happens on 25 February 2024. This is because President Macky Sall told the world last summer that he would be stepping down and would not run in the election, thereby fully respecting the end of his constitutional term. As he put it, he has great faith in the country and its people to continue after his presidency. His stance is in striking contrast to the current trend on the continent for military coups and presidents clinging on to power long after their constitutional terms have ended.

In an interview with Africa Report, President Sall said:

He added,

As for his own resignation, he said,

There is speculation that he will be offered several prestigious roles, especially around giving an international voice to Africa. In particular, his name has been associated with the African Union’s newly acquired seat at the G20.

He is active in debates about global governance, including financial governance, and vocal about what he believes are necessary reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. He is also a powerful voice on climate change, emphasising that Africa’s share of global pollution is less than four percent and that it is unjust to tell the African continent it cannot use fossil fuels or have them financed.

He is expected to be called upon for peace-making roles and is considered a favourite for the prize of $5m that Mo Ibrahim awards to an Africa leader who has demonstrated good governance and respect for term limits. Some of these roles are already being granted.

The OECD and France named him in November 2023 as the 4P’s (Paris Pact for People and Planet) special envoy from January. The statement said President Sall’s personal commitment will play a decisive role in mobilising all the players of goodwill and signatories to the 4P.

President Sall’s legacy on the international stage, including his former role of Chair of the African Union, is well-respected. He has championed the cancellation of African debt and strengthening the fight against terrorism. He has also been influential in his rejection of the military coups that have taken place in Africa since 2020 and the efforts to reverse them.

Of course two of the earlier coups were in Mali, Senegal’s biggest trading partner. These were followed by a coup in another neighbour, Guinea, and a failed attempt in next-door Guinea-Bissau. President Sall was chair of the African Union when a coup struck in Burkina Faso for the second time within 2022. He played a leading role in the response of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to every coup, including one in Niger in July.

As head of the African Union last year, he drove efforts to broker the Black Sea grain deal that has allowed crucial shipments of Ukrainian grain to reach African countries despite the Russian invasion. He is also appreciated for his role in forcing out dictator Yahya Jammeh in neighbouring Gambia in 2017.

As for Senegal’s future, President Sall said,

Senegal’s reputation as a democracy has only been further cemented by President Sall’s willingness to step down and his instruction to his government to ensure free and transparent elections on 25 February 2024 and a smooth transition. It is to be hoped that this example will inspire a better year ahead across the continent, in terms of democracy and respect for the rule of law and term limits.

On December 1, Robin Brooks, chief economist and managing director of the Institute of International Finance, asked, “You have to wonder what’s going on in the EU. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is a big threat to everything the EU stands for. But then there are many examples like this: EU exports to Armenia are up 200% since the invasion. This stuff goes to Russia and helps Putin. What is Brussels doing?”

Coincidentally, just one day earlier, on November 30, The Economist stated that “Putin seems to be winning the war in Ukraine—for now.” This article highlighted the West’s failure to implement effective sanctions against Russia and named a few countries that were lending a helping hand to their apparent ally: Turkey, Kazakhstan, Iran, and North Korea.

Not too bothered by Western sanctions, Russia has successfully circumvented them by obtaining drones from Iran, ammunition from North Korea, and various goods through Turkey and Kazakhstan. The list seems too short, and it does not include aforementioned Armenia. This country, according to multiple sources, is one of Russia’s key partners in procuring various goods from the EU and East Asia as of February 2022.

For example, Armenia does not produce cars, but as the Financial Times noted in July 2023, car exports from Armenia to Russia have skyrocketed from $800,000 in January 2022 to just over $180 million in the same month of 2023.

But it is not just cars: microchips, smartphones and dozens of other goods enter Russia via Armenia. A report by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development notes that “new supply chains through Armenia […] were established within days of the sanctions, and it took several months to expand them”. A joint statement by the U.S. Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Treasury categorized Armenia as a “third-party intermediaries or transshipment points to evade Russian- and Belarusian-related sanctions and export controls.”

It is important to note that about 40 percent of Armenia’s exports go to Russia, with much of the trade consisting of re-exports of Western goods that Moscow cannot obtain directly. According to Armenia’s state statistics agency, trade between Armenia and Russia nearly doubled in 2022, reaching $5.3 billion. Armenia’s exports to Russia nearly tripled, surging from $850 million in 2021 to $2.4 billion in 2022 and $2.8 billion in 2023. Imports from Russia increased by 151 percent to $2.87 billion. Total trade for January-August 2023 exceeded $4.16 billion., Armenian exports to Russia totaled $2.3 billion during this period, surpassing imports for the first time, which totaled $1.86 billion.

According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Armenia was assisting the Russian Federation not only in the import of civilian goods, but also in the procurement of military equipment.

It published detailed information about the involvement of an Armenian company in the purchase of foreign equipment for the Russian military industry. The company, identified as Aurora Group, allegedly purchased sensitive electronic components from Western suppliers and then re-exported them to Russia in violation of export control restrictions.

According to Bloomberg, there is evidence of European equipment components being shipped through Armenia for use in Russian military production.

The report cites documents on the shipments and interviews with industry experts as evidence that Armenia plays a key role in helping Russia evade sanctions and maintain its military capabilities.

The Telegraph stated that economic growth in Armenia had reached an impossible 13 percent in 2022, making it a candidate for the third fastest-growing economy in the world.

The newspaper also published a report by the German Centre for the South Caucasus, which “revealed that exports from Germany to Armenia rose from €178 million to €505 million in 2022. That’s from just one EU country. Exports from Armenia to the EU in the same twelve months doubled from €753 million to €1.3 billion.

With a population of barely three million and a GDP per capita of less than a tenth of the average Briton, these are impossible numbers. But they are real. What is clear is that imports to and exports from Russia — which are tariff and duty-free between all EAEU countries, are being near-seamlessly diverted to the outside world via their satellite states”.

According to the Jamestown Foundation, “a significant increase in Armenia’s foreign trade turnover without any serious economic basis domestically, especially the remarkable increase in exports to Russia, as well as the list of products primarily traded, give reason to think that these dynamics are artificial and that Armenia is directly involved in re-exporting sanctioned products to Russia.

Moreover, according to the US Bureau of Industry and Security, Armenia increased the import of microchips and processors from the US by 515% and from the European Union by 212%—then reportedly exported 97% of those products to Russia”.

According to the Polish magazine New Eastern Europe, Yerevan is helping Moscow circumvent EU, US, and UK sanctions by facilitating the transit of Iranian drones and missiles.

The magazine cites operational data on flights from Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport, where Soviet Ilyushin-76MD aircraft allegedly transported Iranian drones to Russia. Iran Air Cargo, the company sanctioned by the US, was observed operating flights through Yerevan airport to and from Moscow, along with other Iranian entities implicated in delivering Iranian drones to Russia through Armenian airports.

According to Ukrainian sources, Armenia is actively using the sea route connecting the ports of Batumi (Georgia) and Novorossiysk (Russia) to re-export sanctioned goods to the Russian Federation. Thus, the Armenian Shipping Company is responsible for the weekly transportation of 600 containers along the Batumi-Novorossiysk sea route.

Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš also commented on Armenia’s growing role in exporting sanctioned Western equipment and technology to Russia.

However, Yerevan’s moves in this game are not limited to technology transfers. Kariņš pointed out that there were two ways to deal with this: talk Armenia out of it or “look for legislation across Europe, to make sure that we criminalise the sanction avoidance. Close the loopholes!”, – he demanded. Sanctions do work, the problem is that they need to be enforced on those who help Russia avoid them.